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Organization and Abstraction:  
The Architecture of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill from 1936 to 1956 
 
Hyun Tae Jung 
 
 
This dissertation examines the history of the architecture firm, Skidmore, Owings & 
Merrill (SOM) between 1936 and 1956. While focusing on the birth and growth of SOM, 
this study attempts to position the firm in a larger historical development of the United 
States in the mid-twentieth century.  
While Louis Skidmore and Nathaniel A. Owings established the firm in 1936, 
the dissertation begins at the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929. During the 
1930s, Skidmore and Owings learned critical lessons from industrial designers about the 
significance of the public as well as how to attract their attention. The founders 
discovered the importance of investigating people’s reactions to certain forms and spaces, 
mainly working on small shops and exhibition halls.  
During WWII, SOM worked on prefabricated houses in the town of Oak Ridge, 
TN, which was part of the Manhattan Project. While working confidentially for the 
military for about three years, SOM mastered diverse kinds of building technology and 
gained experience with the various programs necessary for a conventional town. In 




handle complex architectural and engineering projects. As a result of their previous 
experience, SOM evolved into a leader in designing glass and steel office buildings after 
WWII, refining the architectural language it had discovered during the war. In the 1950s, 
the firm continued designing and constructing large town projects for American military 
and other corporations throughout the world.      
This dissertation records the shifts in the profession of architecture in each 
historical context throughout the mid-twentieth century. The first three chapters cover the 
years from 1929 to 1939, 1939 to 1945, and 1946 to 1956 respectively. The fourth 
chapter addresses the architecture community’s perception of SOM and the firm’s 
organizational characteristics. This dissertation investigates how SOM attempted to 
modernize architecture as a whole, responding to new materials as well as to the spatial 
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Congress.  







fig. 4.9 Partners’ meeting in 1957. Louis Skidmore at the extreme right. (Clockwise 
from Skidmore) William E. Hartmann, Nathaniel A. Owings, John O. Merrill, 
Gordon Bunshaft, James W. Hammond, Robert W. Cutler, John B. Rodgers, 
Walter A. Netsch, Jr., J. Walter Severinghaus, William S. Brown, Elliott 
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Martin has been a great mentor and friend throughout my years at Columbia University 
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Office.  I have greatly benefited from the Chicago Architects Oral History Project at the 
Art Institute of Chicago. In addition, I am also indebted to the library staff at the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln and Lehigh University.   
This dissertation benefitted immeasurably from the support and guidance of 
friends and colleagues. I consider it a privilege to have studied with such brilliant people 
as John Harwood, Eric Anderson, Andrew Manson, Richard Anderson, Esra Akcan, Lucy 
Creagh, Kimberly Elman Zarecor, Ken Tadashi Oshima, David Rifkind, Ioanna 
Theocharopoulou, Sjoukje van der Meulen, Nader Vossoughian, Cesare Birignani, 
Shantel Blakely, Inderbir Riar, Irene Cheng, Ralph Ghoche, Jennifer Gray, Elsa Lam, 
Robert Rubin, Eunice Seng, Min-Ying Wang, Tao Zhu and Helen Gyger. Conversations 
with Louis Skidmore, Jr., Robert Nauman, Nicholas Adams, Doug Jackson, Jeff Day, 
Steve Hardy, Nicholas Sawicki and Bruce Thomas were helpful as well. In preparing 
documents and drafts, some of my former and current students helped me notably: Sara 
Hieb, Ellen Pierce, Aja Jeanty and Alexis Weiner.   
Finally, my wife, Hye Jin Soh, has been the most influential person in my life. 
Without her consistent support and great sacrifice, I would never have been able to come 
this far. Her encouragement and patience have granted me the ability to sustain 
throughout many obstacles. Our three children, Sooyeon, Seyeon, and Geo, have made 
our lives incredibly busy, yet immensely fulfilled and happy. As I finish my dissertation, 







Skidmore, Owings & Merrill and Modern Architecture in the United States  
 
 
The first sentence of Nathaniel A. Owings’s ‘Forward’ to his autobiography, The Spaces 
In Between: An Architect’s Journey, reads: “Someone else will have to write an objective 
history of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill.”1 As one of the two founders of the firm 
Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (hereafter SOM), Owings composed a narrative based on 
personal memories but left it up to historians to fully explain the origins, achievements, 
and complications of the firm whose birth and continuous success in the mid-twentieth 
century could not have been realized without his contribution.2
The extensive literature about SOM follows two general trends. Some books 
 It has been more than 
three decades since the publication of his memoir. While many books about SOM and its 
partners have been published over the last several decades, few have fulfilled Owings’ 
wish.   
                                            
1 Nathaniel A. Owings, “Forward,” The Spaces in Between: An Architect’s Journey (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1973), vii. 
 
2 Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM) is employed to refer to the firm known differently along the history 
as Skidmore & Owings, Skidmore and Owings & John Moss (SOM), Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM), 
Skidmore, Owings, Merrill & Andrews (SOMA), Porter-Urquhart, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (PUSOM). 
About SOMA, Nicholas Adams, “Three’s Company: The Early Years of Skidmore & Owings,” SOM 





concentrate on the firm’s prominent designers such as Gordon Bunshaft, Myron 
Goldsmith, Walter Netsch, and Bruce Graham. They are treated principally as individuals, 
instead of as members of a large, interconnected organization.3
The collective and technological nature of SOM’s production forces us to think 
beyond the traditional territories of the discipline, posing a challenge in writing a 
historical account of the firm. The collaborative aspect of the firm requires an explanation 
of the whole entity rather than the distinctive members. In addition, the production should 
not be discussed as the product of individual artistic efforts, but rather as that of 
 Most other books deal 
with buildings designed by the firm, focusing on formal, historical and technical analysis. 
Both of these trends apply conventional, analytic paradigms of an artist-architect to the 
analysis of a large corporate firm. The large firm is an organization, a network of various 
professionals, rather than a series of individuals. Therefore, the architects of SOM are 
different from conventional artist-architects and thus should be approached in a different 
manner. Furthermore, buildings completed by the firm significantly differ from those of 
individual designers in their architectural expressions and social meanings.    
                                            
3 Criticizing historians and reporters who try to identify a designer of a large building, Gordon Bunshaft 
described the importance of a team: “I’ve been trying to explain that I’m part of a team, and I really believe 
that. I think I’ve told you before I don’t believe any man who sits alone can create architecture. It’s a team 
effort. There just happens to be some man that has to make a decision on things, that’s all.” Gordon 






collective efforts. A large firm’s productivity depends on the division of labor and the 
specialization of individuals within a larger system. Thus, individual designers should not 
be the main focus of the research when studying a firm such as SOM, nor should their 
buildings be treated as if they were created by independent people.  
Fortunately, new trends in architectural research on SOM are emerging, and 
this dissertation greatly benefits from them. Modernism at Mid-Century: The Architecture 
of The United States Air Force Academy (1995), edited by Robert Bruegmann, reveals 
some of the complicated cultural, political, and architectural stories that underlie one 
major commission; Robert Allen Nauman’s On the Wings of Modernism: The United 
States Air Force Academy (2004) deals with the same building complex. Despite their 
clear merits, both books focus more on the building rather than on the firm. Furthermore, 
neither of the books provides insight into how the firm came into being. Therefore, a 
comprehensive and specific account on the history of SOM’s design process is essential.     
Nicholas Adams’s Skidmore, Owings & Merrill: SOM Since 1936 (2007) is an 
open, inclusive and historical record of the firm from its inception. Adams presents short 
and unfamiliar yet fascinating accounts of SOM and its major buildings, including earlier 
works. His book is one of the first to discuss the firm’s history in its entirety. Adams 





therefore provides a critical anchor for the future study of the firm. Lastly, Reinhold 
Martin’s book, The Organizational Complex: Architecture, Media, and Corporate Space 
(2003), provides a new perspective on corporate architecture. His provocative yet 
perspicacious analysis of interrelations between architecture, media and corporate space 
presents refreshing insights into SOM and post-war architecture in general. Yet, despite 
his critical contribution to the study of the firm, Martin’s research is not specifically 
about SOM and thus does not differentiate this firm from other post-Second World War 
designers or offices. In addition, Martin’s goal is not to provide historical details on 
corporate architecture, but rather to construct a new perspective on architectural 
developments in the mid-twentieth century.    
The aim of this dissertation is to present a historical account of SOM as an 
organization. It is less about specific individuals and more about the organization as a 
whole and its historical meaning. It also intends to present a social and cultural history of 
the development of architectural practice in the United States, demonstrating the impact 
of a large organizational practice on architectural communities. In doing so, this 
dissertation will contribute to creating a more accurate, diverse and multifaceted picture 
of American architectural developments in the twentieth century.4
                                            
4 Gwendolyn Wright’s recent book on the history of American architecture is one example of a more 





     
Considerations on Modern American Architecture    
In order to grasp architectural developments in the United States in a comprehensive 
manner, this dissertation will emphasize some of the major shifts that occurred during the 
Great Depression, WWII and the early postwar years. These shifts were psychological, 
organizational, formal and technological. In addition, these changes coincided with the 
transformation of the economic structure of the United States. The chronic crisis of 
laissez-faire capitalism generated an unprecedented program of government intervention 
in the private sector, radically transforming the political and economic structures of the 
United States during the 1930s. This Keynesian approach saw the economy recover 
slowly, improved the financial system and made it relatively immune to minor financial 
crises.  
Previously seen as part of culture and industry, architecture was reorganized 
between 1929 and 1945 in the face of the possible collapse of the economic system. This 
reorganization proceeded through two stages: first, the cultural and industrial sides of 
architecture were intermingled with extreme economic difficulties so that one was 
                                                                                                                                  
comprehensive, multi-layered approach to American architecture and its socio-cultural context. Gwendolyn 






inseparable from the other; second, buildings started to respond to social and economic 
factors much more quickly and abstractly than before. In other words, in order to survive 
the whirlpool of massive economic, cultural and political transformations, architecture 
partook in the consumption and production cycle by tackling the under-consumption 
problem as its primary social mission. A building became instrumental in directly 
symbolizing products or was systematically classified to promote mass production of its 
parts. With these changes, the boundary between industrial and cultural logic started to 
blur. In short, the economic upheavals of the Depression forced architecture to leave the 
relatively secure world of art and culture in order to become part of the production and 
consumption cycles of the economy.  
Such an architecture of mass communication was, on one hand, encouraged by 
corporate leaders who wanted to give their buildings corporate identities and, on the other 
hand, was further promulgated by industrial designers who at this time were increasingly 
encroaching on the disciplinary boundary of architects by designing commercial 
buildings and interiors. Throughout the 1930s, in fact, architects found themselves 
competing with industrial designers for commissions. Many industrial design firms took 
on architectural commissions since they were able to hire young and promising architects 





seen most clearly within the context of the two world’s fairs: A Century of Progress 
Exposition of 1933 and the New York World’s Fair of 1939. This confrontation with 
industrial designers during the 1930s left lasting traces on architecture. Mimicking 
industrial designers, architects attempted to add extra ‘value’ to their buildings through 
streamlined design and by adopting corporate symbols. Buildings were transformed into a 
means of mass communication when the “mystery” of architectural form was replaced by 
the transparency of corporate propaganda and by the “marketing” of popular taste by 
industrial designers. Architecture, which had assumed an elevated ideological position 
during the early development of capitalism, was now transforming buildings into explicit 
symbols in order to boost consumption.    
Building technology was as decisive as modern forms were to the proliferation 
of certain ideas or styles in architecture. The logic of mass production and its technology 
substantially penetrated architecture during the Depression and Second World War years. 
While the mass production of the house was a social democratic ideal for many modern 
architects in Europe, it had little to do with social or ideological aspirations on the other 
side of the Atlantic. The business world first suggested the critical importance of the 
mass-produced houses to recover the economy during the Depression, recognizing a 





prefabrication would be critical in creating cheaper homes and thereby stimulating 
demand and fueling production. Many business leaders and journals understood the 
factory production of houses to be an industrial and economic issue as much as a cultural 
issue. Therefore, some architects began to collaborate with housing research groups and 
concentrated on the mechanization and systemization of construction. These architects 
did not see this scientific, mechanical approach to building as a threat to their profession, 
but rather as a chance to increase their social status. However, while the rationalization of 
a building in a factory helped complete large-scale, emergency projects during the war, 
the increasing speed of the production and consumption cycle incorporated architecture 
into the world of commodities.      
During the 1950s the destiny of architecture became more tightly intertwined 
with that of post-Second World War American capitalism. Once the economic, political, 
and military power of the U.S. became dominant in the world, architecture was, to an 
extent, ‘freed’ from the tight circulation cycle. The mass production of houses no longer 
required the active participation of architects. Notably, architecture as an active medium 
of communication in the 1930s now appeared ineffective in following the accelerating 
speed of the post-war economic flow. Those cartoonish buildings, which were, in many 





architecture offered abstract icons for the corporate world or pure technological 
embodiments to be re-appropriated. Glass and steel buildings had to create new means of 
communication through their combination of grid patterns and spatial organization. In the 
end, a high level of technical and professional efficiency was combined with new abstract 
glass and steel aesthetics of simple prismatic forms to embody the architectural symbols 
of the ‘military-industrial complex.’    
Architectural historians have yet to fully consider how the discipline dealt with 
the most serious economic and political crisis in modern American history. What were the 
transformations during the Depression that had a lasting impact on American architecture 
in the post-war period? How did architecture position itself within the depressed 
production and consumption cycle? How did it position itself within the war economy? 
What were the limits and possibilities of architecture during this time period? This 
dissertation is not intended, in turn, to provide a set of answers. Instead, this work is 
meant to widen the existing perspective on the history of modern American architecture 
and to challenge its canonical historiography.  
Recent efforts to reframe architectural history from the 1930s to the early 
1950s as part of the socio-political, economic, and cultural transformations of the country 





modern American architecture. This identity broadly determined the future trajectory of 
architectural developments. It demonstrates that postwar American architecture benefited 
from its own formal and technological experiments as much as, if not more than, from the 
examples of European modernism. Awareness of this creates more opportunities for 
building a constructive and discerning history of modern and contemporary architecture.   
 
Importance of SOM as a Modern Firm     
SOM has an undeniable significance in the history of both modern American and global 
architecture. The firm stands at the center of various intersections of architectural and 
sociological discourse. The dominance of modern architecture in the post-Second World 
War period cannot be told without a sufficient account of several of SOM’s projects, 
which have been recognized as being formally sophisticated and technically innovative. 
The firm’s methods, range of design, and overall operation are at the origins of 
contemporary corporate architectural practice. The firm is thus an excellent way to 
position modern American architecture in its appropriate social, cultural and historical 
contexts.  
Besides its historical importance, SOM made critical contributions to the 





existing building technology or simplify the language of modern architecture in order to 
mass-produce office buildings and meet the demands of business and government in the 
1950s. Alan Colquhoun suggests that SOM was a “new phenomenon in the history of 
Modernism.”5
SOM’s corporate organization was the result of the modernization of the 
architectural practice. As Karl Marx and Max Weber explain, modernization and 
rationalization were closely tied to the bureaucratization of society. In architecture, 
modernization involved efforts to go beyond the traditional method of practice and to 
establish a collective one. Such efforts can be readily observed in the Deutscher 
Werkbund, the Bauhaus, and later on, after WWII, The Architects’ Collaborative (TAC). 
While none of these groups fully overcame the romantic idea of the creative genius, SOM 
 The firm’s contributions to modern architecture were deep and far-
reaching. A new concept of architectural practice was introduced based on collectivity. 
Furthermore, many technical and design innovations were invented by the firm. SOM’s 
contribution to modern architecture can be classified into three areas: modernization of 
architectural practice, technical research and advancement, and innovative design.   
                                            
5 Alan Colquhoun summarizes the main contribution and historical importance as follows: “The firm of 
SOM was a new phenomenon in the history of Modernism. For the first time the anonymity that had been 
aimed by the rationalist wing of the Modern Movement appeared to have been achieved. Thanks to 
technical and professional efficiency combined with a simple and consistent aesthetic, SOM were able to 
marry the ambitions of Modernist rationalism with those of advanced capitalism and corporate bureaucracy. 
In their work modern architecture – or at least a convincing version of it – became normalized within the 
political structures of the Cold War and the ‘military-industrial complex.’” Alan Colquhoun, Modern 





introduced a modernized model of architectural practice. The firm was the first 
partnership-based practice of modern architecture. This partnership was not like that of 
the older type in which the partners’ names carried significant personal aura to clientele 
and employees. Accepting anonymity like a medieval guild, the partners of SOM aimed 
to present the firm as a collective identity, like the brand of a modern corporation such as 
IBM.6
SOM also introduced numerous technical innovations. Many of them 
originated from the firm’s participation, beginning in 1939, in the study of prefabrication 
technology and its application in the construction of various buildings. This experience 
provided the firm with solid theoretical and technical expertise. Among its many 
innovations were: the precision of detailing of the Heinz Warehouse and Vinegar Plant 
(1950-52) and the Chase Manhattan Bank (1957-61); a new relationship between walls 
and columns seen in the Inland Steel Company building (1956-58) and the Crown 
Zellerbach building (1957-59), as well as in many others; and long-span modern 
structural systems such as in the dining hall at the Air Force Academy (1954-62) or the 
 Similarly, the entire firm was rationally organized and operated. All important 
decisions were made collectively and democratically amongst the partners.    
                                            
6 In this sense, SOM is fundamentally different from previous large firms such as Holabird and Roche, 
Burnham and Root and McKim, Mead and White, which went through name changes. SOM fought hard to 





Gunners’ Mates School for the Great Lakes Naval Training Center (1952-54).     
SOM produced efficient and technically advanced buildings, many of which 
were groundbreaking in architectural and urban design. Office buildings for Lever 
Brothers (1951-52), the Manufacturers’ Trust Company (1953-54), the Connecticut 
General Life Insurance Company (1954-57), and the Pepsi-Cola Company (1958-59) 
were nationally and internationally recognized as among the best buildings of the period. 
Architects and critics praised the buildings’ careful proportions and details. For example, 
while discussing the importance of Lever House, Jürgen Joedicke wrote, “The search for 
lightness and transparency had found an answer for the first time.”7
It is important to note that the origin, rise and triumph of SOM in the mid-
twentieth century was made possible by its efforts to keep up with society’s rapidly 
changing technical and cultural demands. This process was, above all, a conscious 
 SOM’s other offices 
pursued more sculptural forms of structure on the façades such as at the Inland Steel 
Company building. The horizontal suburban office building introduced a unique way of 
organizing office space in a natural landscape. In these buildings, the relationship 
between inside and outside, and natural and artificial landscapes, was reformulated.  
                                            
7 Jürgen Joedicke, Architecture Since 1945: Sources and Directions Trans. J. C. Palmes (New York: 






decision among the leaders of the organization. By tackling some of the most urgent 
societal necessities for architecture, such as rapid construction of housing, factories, 
markets and offices, the firm was able to develop sophisticated yet abstract designs, 
technical expertise in building technology, and an advanced organization. SOM 
represented the modernization of an architectural practice in America in the middle of the 
twentieth century.  
 
Structure of the Dissertation  
Two terms, organization and abstraction, epitomize this dissertation. The term 
organization is employed here to indicate a new architectural practice based on a group 
rather than on individuals. Throughout the dissertation, organization therefore implies a 
network of professionals and their expertise, bureaucratically organized for architectural 
practice. It refers to the complex of networks that materialized out of memos, flow-charts, 
streamlined procedures and rigorous studies of the movements of people and products. 
Beginning with the Oak Ridge project, then with national branches after the war, SOM 
decentralized its offices under a unique and unified control system. In this area the 
partners of the firm also believed a flexible organization would facilitate diversity of 





The second term, abstraction, alludes to SOM’s modern aesthetics. It is related 
most conspicuously to the sociological, technological and artistic property of an 
organization and its products. In addition, the work created by multiple and anonymous 
members of an organization reveals little trace of individuality and thus suggests another 
kind of abstraction. The rational and bureaucratic nature of interactions in a large 
corporate organization illustrates the abstract quality of human relations. Abstraction can 
also originate in the mass-production of standardized parts. The grid pattern of curtain 
walls, for example, came from the prefabricated homes of the 1930s and the 1940s and 
resulted from a technological consideration. The technological nature of the glass and 
steel walls expunges an emotional attachment. SOM’s pursuit of spatial flexibility could 
not be imagined without the abstraction of structure and materiality.  
The two decades between 1936 and 1956 are critical to SOM’s development. 
The two terms, organization and abstraction, as well as the relationship between them, 
allow the firm’s activities to be grouped into three different historical periods: from 1929 
to 1939, from 1939 to 1945 and from 1946 to 1956. The year of 1929 represents the 
official beginning of the firm’s precedent: the firm of Skidmore and Owings in Chicago. 
The year of 1956 marks the official retirement of Louis Skidmore from the firm as well 





years provides the general timeframe for this dissertation. However, it does not define a 
clear-cut beginning and end. Instead, it is a rough boundary for the project. The historical 
situation in 1936 was conditioned by the Wall Street crash in 1929. Skidmore and 
Owings’s future trajectories were formed by the culture of the Depression. While working 
on the Century of Progress Exhibition in 1933, the two founders learned the importance 
of industrial design and efficient buildings. In the late 1930s, Skidmore and Owings took 
advantage of the connections they made with industrialists they had met at the Chicago 
Exposition of 1933. Their projects throughout this period were mainly exhibitions, 
interior designs, and small houses.  
Shortly thereafter, the firm of Skidmore and Owings changed to Skidmore, 
Owings & Merrill in 1939 after inviting the Chicago architect and engineer John O. 
Merrill to join the firm as a limited partner. While Merrill remained only a limited partner 
for the following ten years, his surname became an integral part of the firm’s title. In 
1949, Merrill became a full partner along with four other architects from the New York 
office. It was at this moment that the modern partnership in architecture was achieved. 
Officially, the partners were all equal. However, the status of the first two members was 
not reduced. Owings served as the general manager of the firm while Skidmore served as 





beginning of a new era. The fatherly figure as well as the most revered person among its 
partners was no longer an official member of the firm. With Skidmore’s retirement, SOM 
truly became bureaucratic in the Weberian sense of the term. The firm became a 
“pyramid with a flat top” as Gordon Bunshaft described it.8
SOM thus went through distinctive transformations in the areas of business and 
specialties from the 1930s to the 1950s. The firm was known as a small design firm 
specializing in exhibitions and interiors in the 1930s. During the Second World War, it 
worked heavily on prefabrication technology and its applications in construction. 
Between 1943 and 1945, SOM dramatically expanded its areas of business and became a 
comprehensive architecture-engineering firm. After the war, SOM became known to the 
world as the quintessential modern architecture-engineering firm, actively presenting the 
image of a sophisticated designer of post-war glass and steel office buildings.  
  
These shifts in SOM’s history parallel the chapters of this dissertation. The first 
three chapters are roughly chronological and the last is thematic. The first three chapters 
cover the years from 1929 to 1939, 1939 to 1945, and 1946 to 1956 respectively. The 
fourth chapter deals with the perception of SOM in the architectural community and the 
                                            
8 Gordon Bunshaft, Oral History of Gordon Bunshaft, p.121. Charles Perrow made an interesting comment 
about the top of an organization: “Weber noted long ago, the top of an organization is never bureaucratized. 
It always belongs to somebody.” Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 3rd ed. (New 





organizational characteristics of the firm. In three chronological chapters four general 
aspects of architecture are emphasized: political-economic, social life and everyday 
experience, the role of the individual designer, and finally, the architectonic character of 
buildings. During these periods, SOM dealt with three distinctive political, social and 
economic situations. The architects of SOM played different roles in each period and 
developed distinctive relationships with colleagues and clients, resulting in projects that 
were unique to each time period.   
The first chapter, “The Great Depression, Industrial Design and the Origins of 
SOM,” concentrates on the Depression and its impact on the profession of architecture. 
The main argument of the chapter is that modern American architecture was critically 
transformed and reformulated by the economic and social upheavals of the country. 
Modern American architecture in this period was less influenced by European modernism 
and more influenced by the economic situation of the United States and architecture’s 
interactions with industrial designers, who served as new cultural agents for American 
industry. Architects had to compete with these designers and were highly influenced by 
them. A Century of Progress Exhibition of Chicago (1933-34) and the New York World’s 
Fair (1939-40) were essential to the early development of SOM. Skidmore and Owings 





that would later become the foundation for their practice. The New York World’s Fair 
enabled the firm to open its second office and to design around twenty projects. In this 
chapter, many designs and writings by Skidmore and Owings are discussed. In addition, 
some buildings at the Fair such as the RCA building, Westinghouse building and 
Venezuela Pavilion are examined in order to explain the relationship between industrial 
design and architecture in the early activities of the firm.  
The second chapter, “‘Technologically Modern:’ The Prefabricated House and 
the Wartime Experience of SOM,” deals with the experience of the firm during World 
War II. The development of a prefabricated house, from its initial design and construction 
to its numerous variations, is the main focus of the chapter. SOM grew from a small 
design firm to a large-scale, corporate architecture-engineering firm through its wartime 
projects. It worked with the John B. Pierce Foundation on the advancement and 
realization of a prefabricated house, which resulted in the construction of thousands of 
homes. Initially collaborating with the Foundation on a small experimental house in New 
Jersey, SOM later went on to explore large-scale, highly rationalized construction in two 
major commissions. At Middle River, Maryland (1941-42), SOM built 600 houses based 
on the experimental prototype. The housing project gave the firm the opportunity to test 





prefabrication process. At Oak Ridge, Tennessee (1943-46), built as a part of the 
Manhattan Project, SOM initially designed and supervised the construction of thousands 
of houses based on five types and later expanded its boundaries to include diverse 
buildings such as community centers, schools, hospitals and shopping malls. SOM’s rapid 
mastery of advanced prefabrication technology for numerous building types enabled the 
firm to provide fast-track, economical construction and to efficiently manage its labor 
force. It was during this period that the corporate operation, the capacity and size of 
projects and the complex organization of personnel that characterized the post-war firm 
were first achieved.     
The third chapter, “Flexibility and Abstraction: The Architecture of SOM in the 
1950s,” examines SOM’s post-Second World War buildings. Whereas the very existence 
of Oak Ridge, and of SOM’s considerable achievements, had been kept resolutely secret 
during the war, SOM now became known to architectural communities, and to the world, 
as a representative of modern American architecture. The firm built highly visual and 
diverse types of buildings using modern construction technology. This chapter will focus 
closely on three buildings to explore the spatial and technical characteristics of the firm’s 
office production: the Lever House (1950-52), the Manufacturers’ Trust Bank (1954) and 





characteristics of SOM’s later architecture: flexibility and abstraction. These two ideas 
are well-expressed in SOM’s interiors, which aimed at accommodating various programs 
in a single space. In this case, flexibility is achieved with the help of efficient structural 
and organizational systems. Careful employment of mechanical and environmental 
equipment is a precondition for spatial flexibility. Externally, the curtain wall is a critical 
component to understanding these characteristics. It is also depicted as a mechanism for 
reconfiguring the relationships between interior and exterior, volume and mass, and 
solidity and transparency.      
The fourth chapter, “Constructing Corporate Architecture: Hitchcock, Wright, 
Giedion, and SOM,” deals with how the firm was theoretically positioned in the history 
of modern architecture. SOM played an essential role in advancing corporate 
architectural practices by creating a new type of practice. This chapter describes how the 
concept of corporate architecture was fabricated and how it later became demonized. The 
key figures in the chapter are Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Frank Lloyd Wright and Sigfried 
Giedion. The first half deals with the relationships and interactions of these figures as 
they embraced the issue of bureaucratization in architectural practice. Hitchcock had a 
long relationship with SOM and laid a cornerstone in historically constructing the idea of 





genius. Hitchcock appropriated Max Weber’s theory on bureaucracy and charisma in 
order to justify the architectural practice of large-scale architecture-engineering firms in 
post-WWII America. Wright rebutted Hitchcock’s support for the architecture of 
bureaucracy with an outraged dichotomy between genius and the mob in Genius and the 
Mobocracy (1949). In 1957, Giedion revived this debate by positively evaluating the 
creative energy and historical importance of SOM. The second half of the chapter 
describes SOM’s organizational developments. The initial establishment of the office, the 
partnership agreement, and its gradual changes are discussed. Illuminating characteristics 
of SOM’s partnership structure, profit-sharing and welfare system give a glimpse of the 
partners who built and ran the organization. This chapter also illustrates the historical 
meaning of the organized practice in architecture.     
Despite SOM’s considerable architectural, technical and social contributions in 
its early decades, today it is seen as just one of many other faceless corporate firms. How 
did this happen? Why has SOM been left out of major architectural discourse and cursed 
as simply another corporate firm? The lack of an analytical paradigm for such a large 
architecture-engineering firm is the central reason for SOM’s insufficient recognition. In 
addition, SOM’s social success worked against itself in some respects. Its systematic 





to the conventional discourse of architecture. However, this is the natural evolution of 
another kind of modern architecture – in fact a uniquely modern architecture – rather than 
a deviation from it. It was thoroughly modern in a way that no individual architect could 
be. SOM achieved its status while struggling to serve society during the process of 
unprecedented historical upheavals. Its subsequent evolution reveals the complicated 
historical interactions of the firm and society during the course of an evolving cultural 


























The Great Depression, Industrial Design and the Origins of SOM 
 
 
With industry off balance during those depression years, 
conventional procedures in the classical sense of formal practice of 
architecture were dead.  
― Nathaniel A. Owings, The Spaces In Between: An Architect’s 
Journey, 1973 
 
American capitalism encountered its most serious crisis during the Great Depression and, 
inevitably, so did American architecture. This crisis occurred after almost three decades 
of economic expansion capped by seven years of unparalleled boom.1
                                                 
1 David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-45 (New 
York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 10-42. 
 Unemployment 
spread and construction dropped precipitously. Architects gave up their semi-independent 
cultural role and focused principally on buildings that vividly represented corporate 
images and products in order to survive the economic hardship from 1929 to 1939.  This 
chapter illuminates how this economic cataclysm reoriented the trajectory of modern 
American architecture during a transformative period. In this context, the founding and 






The Great World’s Fairs of 1933 and 1939 are surprisingly significant to the 
appraisal of Great Depression’s impact on architecture, specifically in terms of the 
interaction between industrial design and architecture. As a detailed case study, this 
chapter reviews the early work of Louis Skidmore (1897-1962) and Nathaniel A. Owings 
(1903-1984). Skidmore and Owings had worked as Chief of Design and Development 
Supervisor respectively for Chicago’s 1933 “Century of Progress” Exposition. However, 
the relationship between Skidmore and Owings started several years earlier. Skidmore, a 
graduate of MIT with a degree in architecture, was travelling across Europe as a result of 
earning the prestigious Rotch Scholarship between 1927 and 1929. During his travels, he 
met a fashion design student named Eloise Owings in Paris in 1928 who became his wife 
two years later. Eliose was the sister of Nathaniel Owings, a Cornell graduate.2
                                                 
2 Samuel Chamberlain recalled Skidmore of the period. “As for Skid, he settled down with a drawing board 
in this left bank hotel room and began to finish his measured drawings. I turned the remainder of the 
advance royalties over to him to help out on expenses. This permitted him to spend a few extra months in 
Paris, during which time he met an attractive art student named Eloise Owings. This set off a chain reaction. 
First of all the two young people were married. Skid met his new brother-in-law, Nathaniel Owings an 
architect too. Then came the Chicago World’s Fair where Skid acted as a sort of architectural overload after 
which the firm of SOM made its debut… I have always thought it fortunate that some of that advance 
royalty was left over.” Samuel Chamberlain, Etched in Sunlight: Fifty Years in the Graphic Arts, (Boston, 
MA: Boston Public Library, 1968), 51. 
 The 
brothers-in-law were both born in the state of Indiana, but they looked and acted very 
differently. Skidmore was refined, shy and quiet, while Owings was almost the complete 






in Chicago. The next year they opened their second office in New York City which was 
motivated by the 1939 New York World’s Fair, “The World of Tomorrow.” For the Fair, 
Skidmore and Owings designed the largest number of buildings. Shortly after, they 
restructured their firm and renamed it SOM.  
Skidmore and Owings interacted with and learned from industrial designers 
very actively in the 1930s, particularly at the World’s Fairs. The profession of industrial 
design had gradually gained popularity among industrialists during the 1920s. At the 
beginning of the Great Depression, industrial designers emerged as critical components to 
the revival of the economy by enhancing the appearance of products and creating value 
through design. Their great successes helped the profession earn the trust of industrial 
leaders and the public.3
 
 On the contrary, architects experienced extreme difficulty. In the 
end, the economic maelstrom of the Depression transformed the trajectory of American 
architecture. Its identity was reconstructed out of the struggle to transform a crisis into 
new opportunities.     
The Great Depression and Architecture   
How devastating was the impact of the Great Depression on the profession of 
                                                 






architecture? Architects and historians addressed this question in multiple architectural 
journals throughout the 1930s. One article, “How Many Architects Are Carrying On?,” 
published in Architectural Record, provides an objective perspective. It was based on the 
statistics compiled by the F.W. Dodge Corporation about architectural firms and their 
patterns of practice from 1928 to 1932 (fig. 1.1). Financially speaking, the general 
volume of building activities in 1932 was less than one-seventh of what it had been in 
1928, down from $5,217,942,800 to $779,022,600. The total number of architecture firms 
decreased from 9,087 in 1928 to 5,291 in 1932. Furthermore, in the same period the 
average business volume per office dropped from $400,000 to $95,000. The decline was 
far greater in 1932 than in any prior year.4
This extreme economic hardship left a permanent mark on the development of 
American architecture. Although isolated architectural events such as the Modern 
Architecture – International Exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in 1932 
might have had some impact, the most significant event that influenced the development 
of modern architecture, in the United States and elsewhere, was the Great Depression. 
Architectural historian Talbot F. Hamlin published “The Architect and the Depression” 
   
                                                 







on August 9, 1933 in The Nation. This was the first of a series of articles about the effects 
of the depression on various professions. Referring to the report by the F.W. Dodge 
Corporation, Hamlin detailed the suffering of many architects of the period. Six out of 
seven architects had lost their jobs and even those who kept a position had to accept 
trivial commissions to stay in business. Many others turned to different fields, surviving, 
for example, as salespeople or taxi drivers. Realizing that architectural design and its 
labor had little economic value to society in the middle of the depression, Hamlin noted 
that the spirit of architects was “already broken.”5
Economic hardship even had a visible impact on architectural forms. Hamlin 
called attention to two conspicuous and opposite trends: conservative and innovative 
designs. The use of historical styles was prevalent in many government projects in 
Washington D.C. In an economically unstable situation, the familiar symbols of stability 
and permanence were easily preferred to new styles. The second more daring trend was 
influenced by industrial design. Referring specifically to the Chicago World’s Exhibition 
buildings, Hamlin complained that, “the style becomes often merely eccentric, 
extravagant, so entirely divorced from the great architectural problems of plan, material, 
  
                                                 
5 Talbot Faulkner Hamlin, “The Architect and the Depression,” The Nation 137, No. 3553, August 9, 






use, and proportion as to be almost without architectural meaning.”6 Hamlin’s stance was 
quite traditional, but he was correct that all the buildings at the exhibition had moved far 
away from architectural conventions. By competing for attention, they eschewed 
architectural meaning. Hamlin rightly understood that both the conservatism of 
Washington and the festivity of Chicago were “symptoms of exhaustion and despair.” 
They were “escape phenomena, flights from the realities.”7
This situation was pervasive throughout the profession. Ernest J. Russell, the 
president of the American Institute of Architects (AIA) at the time, delivered a message 
about how to survive the financial crisis. “The Architect can no longer wait for 
opportunity to knock at his door. He must act as an individual, and collectively, in such 
manner as will bring proper recognition in every case in which the training, experience, 
and judgment of the Architect are of value.”
  
8
                                                 
6 Ibid, 153. 
 This was the letter published in the official 
journal of the AIA in January 1933 to celebrate the New Year. Without question, the 
message shows that the profession was vastly and deeply damaged. Edwin Bergstrom, the 
treasurer of the AIA, also reflected on the grim situation of the profession: “Never has the 
 
7 Ibid.  
 
8 Ernest John Russell, “A Letter from the President,” The Octagon: A Journal of the American Institute of 






architectural profession, in its distressed financial condition, needed the Institute more, 
and never has the Institute been more needful of the support of the architects of 
America.”9
 
 The treasurer became clearer and more intensive in his tone, enumerating 
issues he thought to be most urgent to the institute and its members.   
During the coming year, it is imperative that certain things be done. 
We must preserve the Institute’s leadership of the architectural 
profession. We must fight through the economic readjustment 
which faces our country. The Institute must carry on the work it is 
doing through its Offices, Divisions, and Chapters, the purpose of 
which is to maintain the integrity of the architectural profession and 
to secure for the individual architect that the public and private 
recognition which is his due.  
We must continue our program to take the government out of 
competition with the private architect. We must continue to 
maintain the ideals of professional practice. We must continue to 
uphold a proper schedule of charges. We must continue to regulate 
architectural competitions. We must continue, by means of the 
standard documents, to improve our business practices. We must 




Each sentence vividly reveals the troubles that architects and the AIA were facing. First 
of all, the institute was about to lose its leadership among its members because many 
                                                 
9 Edwin Bergstrom, “A Letter from the Treasurer,” The Octagon: A Journal of the American Institute of 
Architects (January 1933): 4.   
 






members could afford their dues. The normal activities of the AIA drastically dropped. 
Many architects could not find commissions, proving it difficult to stay in business. Even 
the institute’s monthly journal was in trouble due to lack of funds. The letters of the 
president and the treasurer portray the efforts of both the institute and the architect to 
survive the crisis together.   
Many historians and critics have thought of the 1932 MoMA exhibition as one 
of the most important architectural events of the period (fig. 1.2). One of the organizers 
of the exhibition, Philip Johnson, confessed later that, “The International Style had a 
longer life, it seems to me now, than ever it deserved.”11  The organizers, Alfred H. Barr, 
Jr., Philip Johnson and Henry-Russell Hitchcock, were trying to give a positive, even 
triumphant view of the moment. Barr asserted that the International Style had “already 
gained signal victories in America,”12
                                                 
11 Philip Johnson described the strong impact of the exhibition and the catalogue: “But even though 
comparatively few people came to the exhibition, its impact was huge in the architecture world. It caused 
endless discussions and fights within the profession, at places like the Architectural League. And it resulted 
in big teaching jobs at American universities for Mies van der Rohe and Walter Gropius.” Philip Johnson, 
“Foreword to the 1995 Edition,” in Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson , The International Style, 
3rd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 15.    
 while Hitchcock and Johnson believed that, “There 
is now a single body of discipline, fixed enough to integrate contemporary style as a 
reality and yet elastic enough to permit individual interpretation and to encourage general 
 






growth.”13 However, it should be remembered that this exhibition and catalogue took 
place in the worst year of a cataclysmic economic disaster. It is symptomatic that the 
catalogue does not have any comment or indication of the profession’s dreadful economic 
situation.14 While historical styles became less relevant, the industrial-design-inspired 
styles coincided with the black and white architecture of the so-called International Style. 
We should not presume industrial designers were copying the architecture shown at 
MoMA. In fact, the success of the International Style depended in part on Hitchcock and 
Johnson’s condemning industrial design as the enemy of true modernism.15
Hitchcock and Johnson’s The International Style is still a popular subject of 
architectural discourse. It contributed to the characterization of modern architecture 
through a narrow-minded formalism defined by three characteristics: volume rather than 
mass, regularity rather than axial symmetry, and no arbitrary decoration.
   
16
                                                 
13 The International Style, 36.    
 This 
 
14 Ironically, the exhibition itself was strongly influenced by the Depression. Terence Riley argued, “The 
financial vicissitudes of the Depression, which plagued the entire curatorial process, exacerbated the 
discrepancies between exhibition and catalogue.” Terence Riley, The International Exhibition 15 and the 
Museum of Modern Art (New York: Rizzoli, 1992), 9.    
 
15 The initial proposal for Modern Architecture – International Exhibition focused on “nine of the most 
prominent architects in the world.” They were Frank Lloyd Wright, Raymond Hood, Howe & Lescaze, 
Norman Bel Geddes, Bowman Brothers, Le Corbusier, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, J.J.P. Oud and Walter 
Gropius. Richard Neutra was later added and Bel Geddes was dropped. Terence Riley, The International 
Exhibition 15 and the Museum of Modern Art, 104. Refer to Philip Johnson, “Rejected Architects,” 
Creative Arts 8, No.6 (June 1931): 435.   
 






oversimplification of modern architecture became so successful that it was employed as a 
checklist for modern architecture for decades to come. Regarding Hood & Fouilhoux’s 
McGraw-Hill building completed in 1931, Hitchcock and Johnson contended that “the 
heavy ornamental crown is an illogical and unhappy break in the general system of 
regularity and weighs down the whole design.” In the case of Howe & Lescaze’s 
Philadelphia Savings Fund Society building (PSFS) in 1931, the authors pointed out the 
lower part, insisting that “the relation of the base with its curved corner to the tower is 
awkward.”17  Interestingly, they are typical examples of the influence of industrial design 
on architecture. However, from a purely formal point of view, it is somewhat difficult to 
differentiate the industrial-design-inspired modernism from International Style 
modernism. For instance, a white, ornament-free house called House of Tomorrow by 
industrial designer Norman Bel Geddes in 1932 could be readily accepted as modern, at 
least in light of its style.18
 
  
Obsolescence and Accelerated Consumption  
                                                 
17 Ibid, 163-64. 
 
18 Norman Bel Geddes designed the House of Tomorrow in 1932 when invited by Ladies’ Home Journal to 
present his ideas on the home of the future. Joseph J. Corn and Brian Horrigan, Yesterday’s Tomorrows: 






Despite such polemics, the key to change was not form but production and consumption. 
In the middle of the Great Depression, Henry Ford contended that, “There is no such 
thing as overproduction.”19 The industrialist implied that under-consumption caused the 
economic chaos. Refusing to acknowledge the ruthless competition of the chaotic 
capitalist system, Ford maintained that the crisis could be solved by accelerating 
consumption. Many industrial leaders also believed that consumption was a key strategy 
for escaping the vicious economic cycle. Struggling industrialists insisted that the 
economy would be normalized by returning to a ‘balanced’ cycle of production-
consumption, the exact view of a laissez-faire capitalist.20
To persuade financially traumatized people to become active consumers again, 
industrialists had to rely on industrial design. They hoped that new designs would help 
overcome the under-consumption problem, and most industrial designers agreed that they 
 Rather than government 
regulation and intervention in economic activities such as in the New Deal, they believed 
that a certain normalcy could be reached through market competition.      
                                                 
19 Henry Ford, quote in Roy Sheldon and Egmont Arens, Consumer Engineering: A New Technique for 
Prosperity (New York, London: Harper and Brothers, 1932), 17. 
 
20 For example, Earnest Elmo Calkins, “Introduction: What Consumer Engineering Really Is,” in Roy 
Sheldon and Egmont Arens, Ibid, 4-6. Calkins, who first employed the term “Consumer Engineering,” 
mentioned the disruption of the market in 1929. In order to stop it, Calkins argued that “curtailing the 






could tackle the critical mission of recuperating the economy.21 While industrial 
designers re-designed consumer products to make them more attractive to potential 
customers, they were not content providing the market with a one-time stimulus. They 
went much further, incorporating the concept of obsolescence into their new products. By 
replacing a crude surface with a new one, designers made the product look fashionable 
only to make it look old after a certain period of time.22
 
 Roy Sheldon and Egmont Arens 
first proposed the concept of obsolescence in Consumer Engineering: A New Technique 
for Prosperity (1932). Obsolescence originally had a negative meaning as something that 
had become “antiquated, outworn, old-fashioned.” Sheldon and Arens explained here that 
manufacturers   
understand that it [obsolescence] has also a positive value; that it 
opens up as many new fields as ever it closed; that for every 
superseded article there must be a new one which is eagerly 
accepted. He sees all of us throwing razors away every day instead 
of using the same one for years. He turns in his own motor-car for a 
new one when there is no mechanical reason for so doing. He 
realizes that many things become decrepit in appearance before the 
works wear out.23
                                                 
21 Jeffrey L. Meikle, “Plastic, Material of a Thousand Users,” Imagining Tomorrow: History, Technology, 
and the American Future, ed. Joseph J. Corn (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1986), 85.  
 
 
22 Nigel Whitely, “Towards a Throw-Away Culture: Consumerism, ‘Style Obsolescence’ and Cultural 
Theory in the 1950s and 1960s,” Oxford Art Journal 10, No.2 (1987): 3.   
 







The authors acknowledged that obsolescence represented a threat and an opportunity at 
the same time. It was not enough for manufacturers to increase the speed of the 
production and consumption cycle. Industrial designers were necessary to perpetuate and 
accelerate the cycle and to create the myth of value through design. The threat was that 
design would become part of the expendable commodity, thus leaving little room for 
independence or any association with permanence. The opportunity presented itself for 
designers to become the key to industrial development and the economic activities of 
corporations.          
The concept of obsolescence was further developed by consumer engineers. 
The noted industrial designer Raymond Loewy argued that even if a product is “the most 
advanced product that research can develop and technology can produce,” it would not 
always sell well. He proposed that each product has a critical point in which the 
consumer’s desire for novelty reaches what Loewy calls the ‘shock-zone’. At this level, 
the desire to purchase the product arrives at a plateau which often results in a resistance 
to buying the product. Here was the struggle “between attraction to the new and fear of 
the unfamiliar.” While the shock-zone demands a new design, the public’s taste advances 






familiar. Otherwise, the design will be rejected by the public. Loewy argued that, at this 
point, a design could reach what he called the MAYA (Most Advanced Yet Acceptable) 
stage.24 A new design should associate itself with previous ones in order to be accepted 
by the public. Despite some variations according to topography, climate, season, income 
level and age group, the MAYA stage would be the boundary of acceptable design 
innovations (fig. 1.3). If the design looked too alien to the consumer, she would not buy 
the product. The quality of the design mattered little at this moment. He concluded that 
“the intrinsic value of the design cannot overcome resistance to its radicality at the 
MAYA stage.”25
Henry Dreyfuss, another industrial designer, proposed a similar concept that he 
called “Survival Form.” Designers intentionally incorporated an ‘ingredient’ into the 
product to help consumers associate it with the previous one. This design element or 
detail of a preexisting product would be seen in “electric toasters, coffee makers, 
typewriters, and fountain pens.” It was a reminder of the past product, the remembrance 
 To be successful in the market, the design of a product should not go 
beyond the MAYA stage (fig. 1.4).  
                                                 
24 Raymond Loewy, Never Leave Well Enough Alone (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2002), 277-283. The first edition was published in 1951 by Simon and Schuster. Loewy published the 
concept in other occasions, one of which was Raymond Loewy, “MAYA,” Idea:  International Design 
Annual (1955): viii.   
 






of what something looked like (fig. 1.5). According to Dreyfuss, it would give the users 
of the product “comfort, security, and silent courage.” “By embodying a familiar pattern 
in an otherwise wholly new and possibly radical form, we can make the unusual 
acceptable to many people who would otherwise reject it.”26 The main function of 
Survival Form was to help consumers familiarize themselves with a new product, making 
them feel more comfortable purchasing it (fig. 1.6). Some decorative designs such as a 
band on the base of a typewriter might be considered for the naïve “purist” to be 
unnecessary, but the industrial designer believed it would be critical because his field was 
“the everchanging battleground of the department store rather than the Elysian fields of 
the museum.”27
Whether it was called MAYA or Survival Form, the essence of their respective 
arguments was how to facilitate consumption, what Henry Ford considered the key to 
ending the Depression. Industrial designers embraced obsolescence and advanced 
specific methods for developing new designs. Now, design could be an effective 
instrument to stimulate consumption. As a new weapon, it could shorten the life cycle of 
products and urge consumers to buy new ones. Helping the economy to escape from the 
  
                                                 
26 Henry Dreyfuss, Designing for People (New York: Allworth Press, 2003), 59-60. First published in 1955 
through the Simon and Schuster.  
 






economic cataclysm, industrial designers fully understood how to maximize consumption 
with their design techniques. In doing so, the concept of permanence in design was 
replaced by the extreme temporality of design.  
Walter Dorwin Teague, Norman Bel Geddes, Raymond Loewy and Henry 
Dreyfuss emerged as acknowledged leaders of industrial design in the 1930s. They often 
won commissions from large corporations that were desperately trying to evade the 
depression. Since these designers had no ties to the traditional decorative crafts, their 
roles were not confined to product design. Their influence reached far beyond.28 As 
architectural historian Sigfried Giedion would point out, every aspect of design in the 
mid-1930s focused on re-designing the objects of mass production. “On the one hand the 
businessman trusts the engineer who knows how a thing should be built,” Giedion said of 
American industrialists. “On the other, he lends a willing ear to the industrial designer.”29 
The rise of large corporations and industrial design went hand in hand – a point that 
historians have repeatedly underscored.30
                                                 
28 “Both Fish and Fowl,” Fortune, February 1934: 40-98. 
 The profession of industrial design could not 
 
29 Sigfried Giedion, Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1948), 607-11. 
 
30 Arthur J. Pulos, American Design Ethic: A History of Industrial Design to 1940 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1983), Jeffrey L. Meikle, Twentieth Century Limited: Industrial Design in 
America, 1925-1939 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979) and Donald J. Bush, The Streamlined 






have risen to the level it occupied in the 1930s without the sponsorship of corporate 
clients (fig. 1.7). Teague’s clients included Kodak, Ford, and Texaco; Loewy’s were 
Sears Roebuck, the Pennsylvania Railroad, and Studebaker; Bel Geddes’s included 
Standard Gas Equipment Company and General Motors; Dreyfuss worked for Bell 
Telephone and New York Central Railroad. Industrial designers designed vacuum 
cleaners, refrigerators, cookware, radios, clocks, shops, packaging, furniture, office 
equipment, automobiles, trucks, passenger coaches, railway locomotives and rolling 
stock, aircraft interiors and ocean liners (fig. 1.8) (fig. 1.9) (fig. 1.10) (fig. 1.11) (fig. 
1.12).31 The range of their designs was nearly limitless as early as 1935.32
Industrial designers were more interested in attracting the masses than teaching 
them. “The industrial designers,” wrote Teague, “are supposed to understand public taste 
and be able to speak in the popular tongue, and because as a profession they are bound to 
disregard traditional forms and solutions and to think in terms of today and tomorrow.”
  
33
                                                 
31 Jonathan M. Woodham, Twentieth Century Design (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 68-69.  
 
This attitude toward the public often came from earlier training. Teague had worked for 
 
32 Industrial designers also systematized their offices. Fortune reported, “Yet of all designers his [Bel 
Geddes’s] is easily the most highly systematized shop, the nearest approach among the independent 
designers to industrialized industrial design. In his drafting room are twenty engineers, architects, and 
draftsmen; his record-keeping devices defy satire.” “Both Fish and Fowl,” Fortune, February 1934: 90. 
 







more than fifteen years as an advertising illustrator, Bel Geddes and Dreyfuss had made 
successful careers as stage designers, and Loewy had become one of New York’s leading 
fashion illustrators. They evolved similar methods of operation and developed the first 
full-blown industrial design offices.34 Although they came from diverse fields, most 
industrial designers worked with a similar aesthetic: streamlining. The American public 
favored streamlining, which fanned industrial designers’ enormous success. They had 
created and popularized the streamlined aesthetic, literally reshaping cars, trains, ships, 
and other forms of transportation into teardrops and sinuous curves. In principle, this 
surface treatment delivered aerodynamic or hydrodynamic efficiency. However, in most 
such cases, it was merely a visual evocation of machine age modernity (fig. 1.13) (fig. 
1.14) (fig. 1.15).35
 
 Streamlining carried associations with technological precision and 
efficiency as well as optimism about a unified and smoothly functioning future despite 
the fact that it made only superficial references to a technological utopia.  
Industrial Design as New Architecture 
                                                 
34 Meikle, Twentieth Century Limited, 38-67. 
 
35 Sheldon Cheney and Martha Cheney wrote, “We subjectively accept the streamline as valid symbol for 
the contemporary life flow, and as a badge of design integrity in even smaller mechanisms, when it 
emerges as form expressiveness.” Sheldon Cheney and Martha Cheney, Art and the Machine (New York: 






All the same, in the early 1930s, a few architectural critics did accept the streamline as a 
unique expression of American life. Sheldon Cheney and Martha Cheney, authors of Art 
and the Machine, argued that architecture had followed the lead of industrial design in 
the 1920s and 1930s. They presented several well-known examples of modern American 
architecture as the ‘New Architecture as Industrial Design.’ Some of the buildings had 
been included in the International Style exhibition at Museum of Modern Art (MoMA).36 
Regarding this crucial connection to architecture, the authors stated, “under the new way 
of living, architecture is industrial design. Already it has begun to appear machine-made, 
most beautifully so where actual industrial designers have stepped over into the once 
sacrosanct realm of ‘the mother art.’”37
Many architects set out to defend the discipline in every way possible realizing 
that industrial designers were their competitors. Rhetoric was the major tool, although 
they usually ended up addressing other architects who agreed with this point-of-view. 
William Lescaze, who designed the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society building (1932) 
with George Howe, insisted that these interlopers did not understand the connection 
between “content and form.” He was outraged that industrial designers like Teague and 
  
                                                 
36 Ibid, 141-79. 
 






Bel Geddes were practicing architecture without studying and mastering the discipline. 
They should not be allowed to accept such commissions because “a building is not a 
gadget.”38 Lescaze believed that architects should be the ones to exercise influence. 
Indeed,  Lescaze himself worked as an industrial designer for the Columbia Broadcasting 
Company. Between 1934 and 1945, CBS gave him a series of contracts to design 
buildings, interiors, equipment and signs.39
We should not be surprised that streamlining was not merely in products for 
mass consumption. It is quite visible in many skyscrapers from the early 1930s. The 
PSFS building (1932) epitomizes the impact of streamlining on architectural design (fig. 
1.16). The bottom three floors of the building form a single horizontal curve wrapped 
around two sides of the building (fig. 1.17). Above shop display windows on the first 
floor is a continuous wall of reflective charcoal granite, broken by a wide band of gall, 
flush with the surface. The architects carefully designed the surface of the first three 
floors with smooth curves as not to disrupt the experience of pedestrians. Another 
example is the McGraw-Hill building (1931) by Raymond Hood (fig. 1.18). This Art 
Deco style building shows a clear acceptance of streamlining in the design of the entrance 
  
                                                 
38 William Lescaze, On Being An Architect (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1942), 172-75.  
 






(fig. 1.19). The top of the entrance emphasizes the horizontality through the repetition of 
green and brass lines. A light metallic blue on top, cut by bands of dark turquoise, 
outlined in light blue tubing and split by strips of brass confirms the impact of 
streamlining.40
Several prominent architects considered partnership with industrial designers. 
After dissolving his partnership with Lescaze in March 1935, architect George Howe 
attempted to organize one with Bel Geddes. Howe’s reason for the partnership with the 
industrial designer remains unclear. However, Robert A. M. Stern seems to believe that 
“[Howe’s] concern with the forces that shaped design led him to feel that industrial 
designers, with their eyes cast in the directions of both the marketplace and aesthetics, 
were going to play an increasingly important role in the future.”
 In addition, much like industrial designers, architects of both buildings 
considered the pedestrian when they designed the ground-level sections. This too was an 
effort to meet public taste through streamlined design.   
41
                                                 
40 Meikle, Twentieth Century Limited, 173-74. 
 Howe must have hoped 
that working with an industrial designer would allow him to gain the upper hand in the 
 
41 Robert A. M. Stern, George Howe: Toward a New Modern American Architecture (New Haven: Yale 






tough market. Ultimately, the partnership with Bel Geddes was deemed illegal since the 
industrial designer was not a licensed architect.42
Stern also argues that industrial designers seriously threatened the architectural 
profession in the 1930s and 1940s.
   
43 Architectural Record hailed the idea as “a new and 
significant type of partnership.”44
The growing influence of industrial designers was echoed in many architects. 
While Lescaze criticized industrial designers for not having proper training for 
 If this partnership had worked, the firm would have 
dealt with almost all types of design commissions (fig. 1.20). The architect wanted to 
cover industrial products in his service and not be limited to traditional architectural 
commissions. Architects and designers alike competed to get the same commissions from 
corporations and to win the public’s attention.   
                                                 
42 Helen Howe West, George Howe, Architect, 1886-1955: Recollections of My Beloved Father 
(Philadelphia: The William Nunn Company, 1973), 54-55.  
 
43 Robert A. M. Stern, “Relevance of the Decade,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 24 
(March 1965): 7.  
 
44 “New Partnership: Norman Bel Geddes & George Howe,” Architectural Record 78 (July 1935): 47. The 
journal writes, “With a fresh outside point of view it sets before the industrialist the needs and demands of 
the public as related to his established technical and business methods in such a way that he can reach 
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architectural practice, a noted architect, Harvey Wiley Corbett, presented himself an 
industrial designer. He proposed an inclusive concept of design:   
 
In these days of specialization we are apt to think of industrial 
design as something very different from other forms of design and 
therefore requiring a different approach, a different training, or a 
different technique. But, I think this is wrong…. I am an industrial 
designer myself…. Design is something generic and all inclusive, 
not something special and limited to a fixed field.45
 
 
While Corbett refused to differentiate architecture from industrial design as many 
architects attempted to do, he ironically presented himself as an industrial designer. By 
embracing a very broad concept of design, Corbett intended to attract industrial design 
commissions as well as architectural ones. While this design approach was the result of 
architecture’s economic situation, industrial designers agreed with Corbett more than 
architects did.   
Teague described industrial design in a similar manner: "a new profession of 
industrial design came into sudden success, taking the organization of all products as its 
broad field without specialization in anything but design."46
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not a mere form-giver but seen as a “new coordinator.” Rather than being limited to 
product design, industrial designers should be allowed to mediate between people and 
products in all kinds of ways. His insistence on this new, much larger role was based on a 
distinctive conception of design.  
 
There is, in reality, no compartmentalism in design. A problem in 
design is a problem in design, whether it has to do with a train, a 
skyscraper, a national capital, a grinding machine, a housing project 
or a fountain pen: if the right form is evoked, the same principles 
and the same approach will obtain in every instance. The only 
difference is in the specialized techniques involved, and it is far 
easier to master these techniques than to acquire creative facility.47
 
 
This inclusiveness did not, in principle, differentiate between a building, a train or a 
vacuum cleaner. If an attractive form could be found, it could be reproduced in many 
different fields. Sheldon Cheney and Martha Cheney characterized Teague as “a typical 
present-day businessman whose business is design, and whose professional pride is in the 
efficiency with which he manages it.” They believed him to be “a progressive 
conservative who sits in confidential conferences with the world’s leading industrialists, 
practices in collaboration at times with the most successful architectural leaders of the 
                                                 






period, and does design work which is seen and admired by millions.”48
Bel Geddes expressed a similar idea about design, arguing that, “The principles 
of designing a building, a painting, music, a poem, or drama are basically the same.”
 Like many other 





believed that shapes, colors, and textures in visual design were combined into a 
“structure.” For Bel Geddes, a few similar principles covered all works of art. Besides 
industrial designers’ typical concept of design, Bel Geddes also insisted that designers 
should understand and combine three distinctive positions in the design process.    
The impetus towards design in industrial life today must be 
considered from three viewpoints: the consumer's, the 
manufacturer's, and the artist's…. The viewpoint of each is rapidly 
changing, developing, fusing. More than that, the economic 
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Industrial designers should consider all three viewpoints together. Their role as consumer 
engineers was to understand consumers and their changing tastes in order to help 
manufacturers develop products and prepare for the changing market. The economic 
situation was the most important factor to industrial design and acted as a synthesis of all 
three viewpoints. Many architects who emulated industrial designers would take a similar 
stance on buildings.   
 
The Key Lessons of “A Century of Progress” Exposition  
The most intense interactions among industrialists, consumers, industrial designers and 
architects happened in the Great World’s Fairs of the 1930s. The 1933 Chicago 
Exposition and the 1939 New York World’s Fair were the two most influential fairs. In 
particular, the former allowed Skidmore and Owings to be part of the historical event and 
to understand industrial designers, consumers and corporate leaders. Through the 
Exposition, they advanced design ideas and exhibition design skills.  
Skidmore, an MIT graduate, was traveling in Europe with the Rotch 
Scholarship when he heard of the Century of Progress. While in Europe between 1927 
and 28, Skidmore met Raymond Hood and Paul Cret. Hood and Cret had different views 






Design. The decision came before the onset of the Depression.51
Planning for the Chicago World’s fair had already been underway for almost 
two years when Wall Street crashed in 1929. The Exposition had been developed to 
celebrate the centennial of Chicago’s founding in 1833 and to highlight the country’s 
scientific and industrial progress. A board of directors was created in late 1927. Rufus 
Dawes was elected chairman, and Lenox Lohr, a retired military officer and engineer, 
became the general manager of the fair. In March 1928, the board of directors appointed 
five architects: Harvey Wiley Corbett, Raymond Hood, Ralph T. Walker of New York; 
Paul Philippe Cret of Philadelphia; and Arthur Brown, Jr. of San Francisco. These five 
architects added three Chicago architects to the commission: John A. Holabird, Edward H. 
Bennett, and Hubert Burnham, son of Daniel H. Burnham (fig. 1.21). Stage designer 




The major building projects were shared by the architects selected by the board. 
Hood designed the Electrical Group (fig. 1.22), Cret the Hall of Science (fig. 1.23), and 
Corbett the General Exhibits Group (fig. 1.24). The Chicago architects designed the 
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Administration Building and the Travel and Transport Building. Bennett and Brown 
shared the Island, and Hood designed the U.S. Government building.53 With concerted 
efforts, the “A Century of Progress” exhibition was extremely successful. There were 
22,565,859 paying attendants in 1933 and 16,486,377 paying attendants in the following 
year; in total, there were more than 30,000,000. Including free admissions, the grand total 
reached to over 48,000,000 people. It was the largest of any American fair up to that 
time.54
Skidmore and Owings used the fair to train themselves about modern 
architecture, industrial design and display design. At the same time, they learned how to 
run a large organization. Owings recalled that acting as Chief of Design, Skidmore “ruled 
the world of signs and sounds and design quality, maintaining the high quality not only of 
these items but of his edicts as well.” Skidmore closely interacted with the largest 
corporations, guiding them as they prepared their exhibitions. Owings remembered 
Skidmore’s activities: “The list of chairmen of boards, presidents and executive vice 
presidents of nationally known companies calling on Skid lengthened, and his power to 
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control their every move inside the world’s fair fence solidified and became law.”55
When the initial design was completed, Skidmore was transferred to the 
Exhibits Department.
 As 
Chief of Design, Skidmore absorbed the lessons of industrial design and used them to 
guide the large corporations that had exhibitions. He thus played a critical role in 
transforming architecture into advertisement. In addition, these contacts allowed him to 
develop great relationships with his future clients such as Howard Heinz, the president of 
the Heinz Company. His close relationships with some of the most important 
industrialists would turn out to be essential to SOM’s later success.   
56 The everyday work of his job did not change much, and the entire 
scheme of operations was similar to that of “a very large architectural firm.”57 Skidmore 
had to work with more than five hundred exhibitors. Like his earlier mission as Chief of 
Design, he had to guide exhibitors on the design of their displays. Exhibitors had to 
submit “all designs for exhibits for criticism, revision and final approval, in much the 
same manners as the plans for the buildings themselves were originally handled.”58
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repeatedly performing the same process, Skidmore developed detailed knowledge about 
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the design and display of products and their settings. He also undertook more 
architectural issues such as exhibition plans, space division, impact of construction and 
color treatment. Furthermore, he had an opportunity to learn about new materials and 
building methods at the Fair.59
In dealing with the exposition displays, Skidmore illustrated how the exhibitor, 
the architect, and the Exhibition Department of the fair could work together effectively. 
His department would “advise and guide the exhibitor in the design and preparation of his 
display.” It would also regulate exhibitors’ activities to a certain degree. Skidmore knew 




 In addition, Skidmore recorded an 
interesting change in the teaching and learning relationship between exhibitors and 
architects; 
Frequently the exhibitor’s architect is more tenacious upon 
traditional treatments than is his employer. He must have pointed 
out to him how incongruous such treatments would be in the 
modern setting of this Exposition. Then he forgets about decoration, 
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and thinks about the display. He places the units so that they will be 
visible to the greatest number of observers.61
 
   
In Skidmore’s mind, few architects understood modern settings, concentrating instead on 
decoration and lacking a sense of reality. Thus, it was architects who needed to learn 
from the new contexts, and the essence of the learning was the new psychological 
relations between the world of products and consumers. Skidmore believed the architect 
had to be a consumer engineer.  
Owings initially was the Development Supervisor in the Department of Works 
and was later assigned to the Concessions Department.62 Working in these departments, 
Owings developed extensive knowledge and experience in new materials and building 
methods. Lohr also remembered that Owings was largely responsible for the 
organizational work of “Wings of a Century” and “Skyride.”63 Still a young man, Owings 
came up with some of the most popular items of the Fair, such as the Skyride and 
Observation Towers: spectacular steel web towers, rising 628 feet (fig. 1.25). Records 
show that 2,616,339 persons went up the towers and crossed in the cable cars.64
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therefore learned thoroughly the basics of how to create spectacles and attract the 
public.65
The Official Guide Book to the Fair describes the prevailing style of 
architecture at the exposition as modern and restrained, “unbroken planes and surfaces of 
asbestos and gypsum board and plywoods and other such materials on light steel frames, 
rather than a parade of sculptured ornamentation.”
  
66 The architectural focus was less on 
decoration and more on volumes created by light steel frames and smooth surfaces. 
However, the use of color compensated for the lack of ornament. Harvey Corbett, 
Chairman of Architectural Commission, argued that, “ornament, which had had its origin 
in masonry, could not be appropriately used. Color, brilliantly handled, was the logical 
substitute.”67
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 This substitution reached an intense level. The Official Guide Book evoked 
bold splashes of color that “almost articulate with the spirit of carnival, a flaming 
expression of fun and frivolity which, after all is said and done, is of the very essence of 
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the Fair.”68 Free use of color was one of the most conspicuous aspects of this exhibition, 
where only one building, the Dairy Building, was painted white (fig. 1.26).69
Insisting upon the importance of the expositions on the development of 
architecture, Skidmore evoked a “sincere effort toward simplicity in the design of this 
exposition,” and elsewhere “toward a healthy expression of naturalness” or “an honest 
function of the buildings.” Finding resonance with the tenets of innovative modern design, 
Skidmore naturally assumed that there might be “important consequences to the future in 




 His conclusion about the 
impact of the exhibition on architecture now appears prophetic:   
No prediction can be made as to the effects of this exposition on 
pure design of the future, that is, whether it will be all glass and 
steel; vertical or horizontal; or a combination of both… With the 
rapid improvement of interior mechanical equipment such as 
ventilating, heating, air conditioning, interior communication and 
transportation, and with the rapid obsolescence of location, 
commercial buildings become outmoded within a comparatively 
few years. The foundation and structure are built for permanence, 
involving a large investment that rapidly depreciates. The structure 
of the 1933 World’s Fair buildings offers a definite hope that a 
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building practice will result that will produce commercial structures 
which will be designed to last no longer than their mechanical 
equipment and which will permit of economical demolition.71
 
  
It is odd to find Skidmore talking about “all glass and steel” in 1932. The architecture 
firm he co-founded in 1936 with his brother-in-law built some of the best-known glass 
and steel buildings in the mid-twentieth century. Skidmore’s lesson from the exposition 
was, quite simply, that buildings could be built to last only in a certain life-span. 
Skidmore expected that with the help of technological developments in building industry, 
it would be possible to build and demolish commercial structures more economically. 
Like production costs in other industries, the construction industry of the 1930s could 
develop expendable architecture, which would last as long as the building’s mechanical 
equipment and then be inexpensively dissembled. The impact of industrial design was 
obvious. As in Loewy’s MAYA and Dreyfuss’s Survival Form, Skidmore imagined a 
building that could function for a certain program for a limited period of time like a 
product designed with obsolescence. This meant that architecture would become part of 
the production-consumption cycle. On another occasion, Skidmore presented his idea of 
what architecture should be:    
                                                 







Certainly this architecture is free from the shackles of the past. It 
has brought the building and the exhibits it is to house into a close 
and sensible relationship with each other. The economy of 
construction, the use of new materials or the new uses of traditional 
materials, the departures in illumination, the use of color in ways 
hardly imagined before may forecast a new era in building, an era 
that lays stress not so much on permanence as on the functioning of 
a building during its actual life, a building era that forgets the 
limitations of the past and designs buildings which are basically 
honest, which express the task they are performing, and which 
actually perform that task.72
 
  
The new architecture created a new relationship between content and form. In a quite 
literal sense, Skidmore’s new architecture was an architecture of performance: not 
permanent, but functioning for a certain period of time. Skidmore conceived of 
architecture with shortened life-spans, but with high performance.  
In January 1936, the firm of Skidmore & Owings opened. One of their first 
projects was to design seventy-five houses for Frederick H. Bartlett & Co. in Highland 
Park. The firm had begun designing 20 different low-cost houses in 1935.73
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become the director of the department of architecture and a professor of senior design.74
 
 
Armour Institute merged with Lewis Institute to become Illinois Institute of Technology 
(IIT) in 1940. Skidmore kept this post before permanently moving to New York City to 
pursue architectural opportunities at the New York World’s Fair. Mies van der Rohe took 
over the position in 1938.   
The New York World’s Fair of 1939 
The United States gradually moved out of the dark years of the Great Depression in 1939. 
The winds of war fueled production and a new more expansive mood was settling in. 
Suspended between the Depression and World War II, the New York World's Fair may, 
in retrospect, look like a daydream or an uncanny festival. Yet it had a logic given that it 
was organized by a group of prominent businessmen who were worried about the 
economic future of the city. From their point of view, visitors needed to learn new 
commercial desires. And so, situated in an expansive open setting at Flushing Meadows, 
Queens, the fair’s architecture merged the streamlined aesthetic with commercial slogans 
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and technological innovations (fig. 1.27). As in the case of Chicago, enticing consumers 
and promoting consumption were key goals for the fair.  
The fair was not simply a trade show, but rather a school for the public (fig. 
1.28). Educational functions were one of the main concerns for those who prepared the 
fair. This meant, first, education for commercialism, second, the development of 
technology, and third, visions of the future fabricated by rapidly growing American 
companies. New technology proved surprisingly useful to achieve that purpose. Henry 
Ford, for example, stated that the fair would help people to educate themselves and to 
pass new knowledge they learned in the fair to others.75
The year 1939 was chosen because it marked the 150th anniversary of George 
Washington’s inauguration as the first president in New York City. The fair was 
incorporated by September 1935 and a large board was formed.
  
76
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to the board.77 Although the group was relatively conservative, the industrial designers 
such as Teague, Bel Geddes, Loewy, and Dreyfuss were able to make the fair’s style 
more modern or, at least, modernistic through the influence of Teague who was a key 
member of the board’s Theme Committee with Robert D. Kohn.78 Teague and Kohn 
further refined the theme and came up with the slogan, “Building the World of 
Tomorrow.” Afterward, the Theme Committee, divided the fair into seven geographic 
and thematic zones (fig. 1.29).79
A Beaux-Arts style plan organized the main exhibit area into a round-point 
system of radiating streets and fanlike segments. The Board of Design arranged the main 
exhibit area along Classical lines, with the main axis directly leading to the fair’s central 
theme buildings: Harrison & Fouilhoux’s Trylon and Perisphere (fig. 1.30). 
Approximately 375 structures, including small information booths, were built. About 
one-third of the one hundred full-scale buildings were built by the Fair Corporation itself. 
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The fair opened on schedule on April 30, 1939 with 198,791 paying customers that day. 
Although the fair attracted forty-five million visitors in its two seasons (1939 and 1940), 
it closed on October 27, 1940 with a considerable amount of deficit.80
World’s Fairs were traditionally considered to be places of architectural 
experimentation because structures, for the most part, were intentionally temporary and 
the inventions of form and structure were not limited to utilitarian logic. However, most 
of the critics did not favor the New York Fair’s architecture, and many of them felt that 
the fair’s design was overwhelmed by a superficiality of architectural expression.
 
81 It was 
believed that designers and architects at the fair were “profoundly ignorant of European 
artistic achievements” and had only “an intense interest and faith in all types of 
mechanical and scientific achievement.”82 Architecture critic Frederick Gutheim called 
the fair’s architecture the “Corporation Style.”83
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The Board of Design banned conservative styles: “No imitations either of 
historic architecture or imitations of permanent materials were permitted, with one 
exception only, namely in the sector devoted to exhibits of the States.”84 The transitory 
nature of the fair buildings let the designers further free themselves from the burden of 
designing buildings for future generations. The impact of industrial design on architecture 
appeared so obvious that some conservative architects simply accepted the aesthetics of 
industrial design. In part, it came from the design board’s contention that a building’s 
exterior shape should symbolize its content and purpose.85
The Aviation building by Lescaze and J. Gordon Carr was composed of a 
semispherical structure that soared above and slightly overlapped a second, low lying 
structure that resembled an airplane hangar (fig. 1.31).
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 Four airplanes were suspended 
from the structural supports in the main display area (fig. 1.32). The building evoked both 
the architecture of aviation and the experience of flight itself. The abstract forms of 
International Style modernism were transformed into a direct symbolism comparable to 
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that of the more traditional fair pavilions.87 Gutheim recognized the building as “probably 
the best fair-built building” successfully summarizing “the forms of aircraft and airports,” 
while also noting that it was “hardly great architecture.”88 Ely Jacques Kahn and 
Muschenheim & Brounn’s Marine Transportation building was another example of an 
architecture of communication (fig. 1.33). The building signified its purpose by a gigantic 
pair of ocean-liner prows and a one hundred foot mast. Eighty foot prows of gigantic 
super-liners towered at each side of the main entrance and seemed to slice through the 
building itself. The National Cash Register Co.’s exhibit by Kahn, Teague and Harry 
Heybeck directly expressed a coherency between content and form (fig. 1.34). This 
strikingly literal representation was sardonically described as “little more than the 
world’s largest cash register.”89 Kahn, who was known as one of the most prominent 
commercial architects in New York in the late 1920s, was not interested in the 
International Style and his previous work shows consistent employment of rich 
decoration and exotic ornament.90
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At the fair, streamlined images were combined with associations of speed in 
automobile company exhibits. Ford and General Motors buildings, for example, were two 
of the most popular places. The Ford building was composed of a changing rhythmic 
sequence of elements that featured a garden court, an open-air theater, and a triple-tiered 
spiral ramp leading to the elevated “Road of Tomorrow” (fig. 1.35). By contrast, the 
curved walls and rounded parapets of the General Motors Building created a series of 
seamless enclosing shells (fig. 1.36). Within a cool, inward-turning container, the General 
Motors building drew people to an exhibition named “Futurama.”91
Both buildings were the result of a collaboration between the same architect, 
Albert Kahn, with different industrial designers, Teague for Ford, and Bel Geddes for 
General Motors. However, in the case of the General Motors pavilion, Kahn’s role in the 
building design was limited to the translation of Bel Geddes’s design idea into an actual 
structure. Bel Geddes provided the architectural design for the building and sent a 
telegram to Kahn on June 1, 1938 indicating the completion of a building model and 
drawings for Kahn to look at. His preliminary design was remarkably similar to the final 
building in program and form.
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transportation was the means for solving two problems: urban structure and the style of 
the century’s objects. According to Gregotti, it was not only a matter of giving modern 
shape to the productive processes inspired by the new technologies, but also establishing 
a continuity of cultural aspirations between the product and the consumer.93
Industrial designers attempted to transform design into a means of publicity 
using streamlined fantasies. Their works were based on an awareness of industrial 
production’s potential, on the connection between quality and use-value, as though 
design was a means of increasing value through information.
  
94 Architects’ buildings in 
the fair appeared nearly indistinguishable from those of industrial designers. In order to 
direct contemporary American taste, architects transformed buildings into industrial 
objects.95
The dominant symbol of the fair was the Theme Center which consisted of two 
adjoining structures: a seven hundred foot obelisk called the Trylon and a two hundred 
foot diameter Perisphere by Harrison & Fouilhoux. The Trylon, a three-sided tower 
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reaching towards the sky, symbolized, according to the Official Guide Book, “the Fair’s 
lofty purpose.”96 The Perisphere, a smooth white globe, sat statically next to the Trylon. 
The Theme Center was reproduced as a symbol of the fair in almost every possible 
format.97 Inside the Perisphere was the fair’s theme exhibit Democracity designed by 
Dreyfuss (fig. 1.37). After riding an escalator from the base of the Trylon into the 
Perisphere, visitors stepped onto one of two platforms, one above the other, revolving in 
opposite directions around the interior circumference of the globe. It took six minutes to 
make a complete revolution. Floating in space, visitors saw images of clouds and sky cast 
on the dome above them by concealed projectors and Democracity below them. 
Democracity was a centralized urban scheme of the future about two miles in diameter. It 
contained business, cultural and leisure activities in low buildings separated by green 
spaces and connected by pedestrian walkways over streets and highways. It was the city 
of tomorrow, the pollution free and slum free society of the year 2039. This city 
incorporated the concept of rigid control, reflecting paternalistic faith in total 
environmental planning to provide a good, healthy life for all (fig. 1.38).98
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The most extensive and comprehensive vision of utopian future was embodied 
by Bel Geddes. Bel Geddes’s Futurama was a synthesis of the low-density land use 
patterns seen in Frank Lloyd Wright’s Broadacre City and the gridded skyscraper design 
seen in Le Corbusier’s Plan Voisin (1925) and Radiant City (1930). Just as Le Corbusier 
organized his city into a grid of superblocks to enhance movement of traffic, Bel 
Geddes’s future city was composed of smooth superblocks, fully developed highways, 
and wide-open green spaces (fig. 1.39) (fig. 1.40) (fig. 1.41). Futurama was in direct 
response both to a technological America and to Thomas Jefferson’s and Wright’s dream 
of agricultural utopia (fig. 1.42). The exhibition could accommodate 27,000 visitors per 
day on its conveyor-belt system of easy chairs wired for sound, carrying visitors along on 
a 1,600-foot, 15-minute trip. After bearing the visitors aloft to look down upon futuristic 
farms, bridges, and superhighways, the armchair tour entered the City of 1960. The 
skyride ended with a view of a metropolis with streamlined skyscrapers interspersed 
between low-rise buildings, parks and more highways (fig. 1.43). The recorded voice told 
the visitor about “the city of 1960, with its abundant sunshine, fresh air, fine green 
parkways – all the result of thoughtful planning and design.”99
                                                 
99 Cited from Folke T. Kihlstedt, “Utopia Realized: The World’s Fairs of the 1930s,” 106. And, The World 
of Tomorrow: The 1939 New York World’s Fair (New York: The Main Street Press, 1988) contains some 
specific images and part of the narratives of the Futurama. 






Communication and interconnectivity were strongly emphasized in many 
exhibits at the fair. The fair attempted to symbolize a new stage of relationship between a 
city, its buildings and mass-produced goods. Architect Robert D. Kohn, Chairman of the 
fair’s Theme Committee and a member of the Board of Design, remarked that the fair 
should be something more than a vainglorious exhibition of mechanical achievements. 
Interactions of many different areas of life were understood as critical to human life.100 
There were efforts to connect all important areas to the modern world as well as to 
educate the public. He insisted that “the apparent isolation of science, art, commerce, and 
agriculture would disappear in our plan.”101
                                                 
100 Robert D. Kohn, “Social Ideals in a World’s Fair,” in Culture and Commitment, ed. Warren Susman 
(New York: George Braziller, 1973), 298. First appeared in The North American Review 247 (March 
1939): 115-120. Kohn recalled, “We chose to make our major divisions more or less functional, the things 
with which the average man comes in contact in his everyday life – food, shelter, clothing, communications, 
education, transportation, etc. What is more, instead of isolating science and art, the planners would attempt 
to show them permeating all of these other things, as illustrations of their interpenetration into the functions 
of modern life.” 
 Some exhibits of communication technology 
exemplified this interconnectivity. The telephone, the radio, and the television were 
repesented. At the American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) building, designed by 
Voorhees, Walker, Foley and Smith and industrial designer Dreyfuss, visitors were 
randomly chosen to get a chance to make a long-distance call from the Demonstration 
Call Room (fig. 1.44). A large map of the United States on the wall displayed lights 
 






indicating the places where lucky visitors might make their calls. This visualized 
interconnection was a symbol of the present utopia, the reachable world with the help of 
corporate technology. The fair was a daring, captivating, and even unruly beacon of hope 
in the face of a dawning world catastrophe and the lingering Depression.  
 
Skidmore & Owings and John Moss Associations   
While Skidmore and Owings’s interactions with industrial designers began with the 
Century of Progress Exposition in 1930, the New York fair provided a new incentive to 
bring an industrial designer into the firm. Skidmore and Owings hired John Moss in 1937 
in part to get fair commissions. Moss was considered one of the best designers at the 
Teague office.  Skidmore gave him the responsibility of designing all the firm’s buildings 
commissioned for the fair. Moss was so essential to the firm that he was immediately 
made a partner.102
                                                 
102 Bunshaft remembered the period as follows: “During the World’s Fair the firm was Skidmore, Owings, 
John Moss Associates. John Moss was a man who had worked for Walter Dorwin Teach, and he was very 
gifted at renderings, especially with an airbrush. He was an attractive man. In fact, he hired me – he and 
Skid did. Skidmore made him an associate. I guess that’s the only way he could get him out of Teague’s 
office. The firm was nothing. You had Skidmore, Owings, but Skid was kind of a designer of sorts, but not 
much, and Owings was none. Owings couldn’t draw water. So that’s how the firm started in New York. 
After the fair, John Moss disappeared. I mean, the thing broke up.” Gordon Bunshaft, Oral History of 
Gordon Bunshaft, Interviewed by Betty J. Blum (The Art Institute of Chicago, 2000), 51. 
 The firm of Skidmore & Owings became Skidmore & Owings and 






internalizing industrial design into his architectural practice. Bunshaft recalled Moss’s 
design process and the situation of the office: 
 
It comes later in the story of the World’s Fair business. There were 
nineteen projects going on. John Moss was making renderings of 
buildings just from dreams. He had no plan, no building. He’d just 
make a sketch and then he’d start with his air brush and make pretty 
pictures. It was just like advertising rather than architecture because 
there was a great rush and we had a lot of work. This went on from 
1937 into 1938, and the office was getting crowed.103
  
 
The impact of Moss on the firm was strongly felt through attractive renderings and 
exhibition buildings. Skidmore and Owings heavily relied on him in designing the 
exhibitions and the buildings. He was one of the main reasons why the firm was able to 
acquire many projects for the Fair and his outstanding rendering skills and design 
approach influenced people at the firm. Several of the firm’s future partners were hired as 
well. They were later called “Skid’s Boys:” Robert W. Cutler (1905-1933), Gordon 
Bunshaft (1909-1990), William S. Brown (1909-1999), and J. Walter Severinghaus 
(1905-1987). These young architects would contribute significantly to the development 
                                                 






of the gigantic firm, running it for several decades. Moss, as a main designer, made 
important decisions in their hiring and had a strong impact on them.  
 Skidmore was no exception in this case. Skidmore recognized a fundamental 
shift in the design process that could prove advantageous and perhaps visually appealing. 
When asked about the firm’s fair buildings, Skidmore described the design process as 
packaging:  
 
We reverse the usual procedure and wrap the building around the 
exhibits. That’s usually the last step instead of the first. We turn the 
usual psychological approach to a building plan inside out, working 
from the angle of the public understanding of the products to be 




In this design process, a building was treated as a wrapper for a program. It is clear that 
Skidmore fully accepted the lessons of industrial design. By doing so, Skidmore and 
Owings consciously eliminated the very possibility of architecture as critical art.  
Architecture was instead to be a mass medium for education, instructing the public about 
the beneficial impact of technology, consumerism and corporations. SOM’s buildings 
                                                 







were not only functional but were also “supposed to be representative of the product’s 
relation to living and the life of the community.” Skidmore and Owings’s work 
comprised “the largest group of buildings designed by any one firm.”105
Skidmore also pointed out the importance of “psychological analysis” in 
designing exhibitions and pavilions. According to him, Americans were freer than 
Europeans who could be “shunted around at the will of the authorities.” So, each of the 
exhibitions had to be designed to keep up with American desire to exercise free will. 
Designers indicated many exits in the buildings so that “the greatest number of people 





idea is similar to Teague’s. In explaining his works for the 1933 Chicago Exposition and 
1939 New York World’s Fair, he explained his exhibition designs and ideas. He 
summarized the importance of flow in an exhibition.   
We had found that curving walls of this kind of great value in 
holding the visitor’s interest and leading him on. Usually, if he can 
see half of an object around a curve, his curiosity will be piqued to 
see it all, whereas if he is asked to make a right-angle turn he may 
not continue. People must flow in an exhibit. Audiences follow the 
line of least resistance just as water does, and it is much easier to 
                                                 
105 “Buildings ‘Package’ Exhibits,” Ibid. Bunshaft remembered there were nineteen projects going on at the 
firm. Bunshaft, Oral History of Gordon Bunshaft, 111. 
 






take them around a slow curve than to make them turn an abrupt 
corner.107
   
 
Teague insisted that curving walls were better than walls with right angles because the 
former would allow people move naturally and without conflicts. It was about flow and at 
the same time about streamlined forms. Considering Moss worked for Teague for more 
than several years, it was almost natural to find SOM’s building designs were following 
what Teague described in 1937.   
Moss’s designs, like other buildings, could be considered reductionist 
advertising. For instance, the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) Building by 
Skidmore & Owings and John Moss Associates was shaped like a giant radio tube (fig. 
1.45). Television, available for the first time to the general public in the New York 
metropolitan area, was the most popular feature of the exhibit (fig. 1.46).108
                                                 
107 Ibid.  
 The front 
façade of the RCA building implemented a massive glass wall screening an arrangement 
of television sets. Other exhibits covered facsimile broadcasting, radio point-to-point 
international communications, marine radio communications, sound broadcasting, 
recording, and record reproduction.  
 






The Westinghouse Company building resembled a huge magnet (fig. 1.47). At 
the axis of the two exhibition halls, there was the “Immortal Well” for a time capsule, a 
record of the world of the 1930s’ intended for recovery five thousand years later. “The 
Battle of the Centuries” was a dishwashing contest between Mrs. Drudge, who used her 
hands, and Mrs. Modern, who used a Westinghouse electric dishwasher (fig. 1.48). 
Elektro, the Westinghouse Moto-Man, was the most popular entertainer at the fair. He 
stood seven feet tall, weighed two hundred sixty pounds, and occasionally appeared with 
his Moto-Dog, Sparko (fig. 1.49).    
The Wonder Bakery was created for the Continental Baking Company, makers 
of “slo-baked” Wonder Bread (fig. 1.50). The wall was dotted with red, blue, and yellow 
balloons, suggestive of the bread’s colorful wrapper. Inside, people could watch the bread 
and Hostess Cakes being baked. In the rear was the only wheat-field that had been grown 
in New York City for over fifty years. The building for Swift and Company looked very 
much like a frankfurter or a streamlined ark with a crew of hams and sausages aboard (fig. 
1.51). This direct symbolism or architecture of mass communication did not achieve any 
formal, spatial meaning. They easily devolved into signs without meaning.  
The Venezuela pavilion looked slightly different from other buildings by the 






private company, but for a country. The theme of the exhibits was the modern, 
progressive life, industry, and art of Venezuela. The architects lifted the roof off the 
building in order to transform the ceiling into one gigantic mural depicting “scenic 
beauties and products.”109 Skidmore explained this process: “We want to draw the people 
into the buildings by a display that appeals to them even from the outside… The 
psychological reaction of any passer-by would be to go in and see what it’s all about.”110
When the fair was over and the firm needed a new project, Owings sent a letter 
to his friend, James A. Gloin, assistant general manager of L.S. Ayers Department store 
in Indianapolis, Indiana, with hopes of finding a new commission. He specifically 
 
It is clear that buildings became nothing but gadgets or large signboards for attracting 
spectators. Like the industrial designers, to direct contemporary American taste, 
Skidmore and Owings & John Moss Associates transformed their buildings into a means 
of mass communication. Most of their works envisioned design as a means to enhance 
value through extra information. Designers of the firm concentrated on direct symbolism. 
A building became what it served.  
                                                 
109 Official Guide Book: New York World’s Fair 1939, 149.   
 
110 Skidmore, “Buildings ‘Package’ Exhibits,” 12. Joan Ockman provides a different reading of the project. 
She argues this anticipated “the elegant integration of architecture and art in his [Bunshaft’s] postwar 
work.”  Joan Ockman, “Art, Soul of the Corporation: Patronage, Public Relations, and Interrelations of 






expressed an interest in becoming either consultants or the “architects and interior 
designers.” Owings wrote:  
 
I think that you know we have been concentrating our attention on 
the study of the best methods of merchandising ideas and products 
from the three dimensional presentation point of view. We have had 
ample opportunity in connection with our Fair work and Exhibit 
work and permanent jobs to study public reaction and how to 
properly present the product to create a favorable reaction….This 
involves a lot of angles, only a part of which concerns 
architecture.111
 
   
In the single-page letter, Owings clearly summarized how the firm had evolved in its 
early years (fig. 1.53). Under the enormous pressure of the Great Depression, Skidmore 
and Owings developed an entirely different psychology as architects. They became 
specialists in presenting ideas and products to the public. They studied how to create a 
favorable public reaction with presentations and exhibitions. Like industrial designers, 
they became efficient consumer engineers. In this sense, the firm of Skidmore and 
Owings was a direct product of the Depression, fundamentally different from other 
architectural design firms in that it fully internalized the lessons of industrial design and 
                                                 
111 Nathaniel A. Owings, Letter to James A. Gloin, 4 March 1939, Nathaniel A. Owings Archive, Oversize 







product exhibitions. Replying to Owings letter, Gloin admitted that the traditional 
practice of buying products and retaining them for a long period of time was over. 
Architects and interior designers had to be “more sensitive to merchandise trends as well 
as consumer habit.” He praised SOM’s achievement, declaring “your organization is 
certainly on the right track in casting aside some of the more traditional ideas in favor of 
emphasis on better display of the merchandise itself.”112 Soon after this letter, the 
department awarded SOM an “extensive remodeling” job including a small restaurant in 
the basement, new elevators, and other interior works. Through this work, the firm 
developed expertise that led to commissions for “the Charles Stevens store and Marshall 
Field and Company in Chicago and the latter’s subsidiary, Frederick Nelson in Seattle” 
before World War II and Marshall Field’s, Goldwater’s in Phoenix and H.S. Manchester 
in Madison, Wisconsin after the war.113
The February 1947 issue of Architectural Record published Owings’s article, 
“Economics of Department Store Planning.”
    
114
                                                 
112 James A. Gloin, Letter to Nathaniel A. Owings, 13 April 1939, Nathaniel A. Owings Archive, Oversize 
Box No.9, Library of Congress.  
 In the article, he attempted to present a 
 
113 Ambrose Richardson, “Skidmore and Owings: The Early Days,” 70. 
 
114 Architectural Record recognized SOM as a leader in the scientific planning of department stores after 
World War II. Nathaniel A. Owings, “Economics of Department Store Planning,” Architectural Record 101 







“science of department store planning” with an example by SOM: Goldwater’s new 
fashion department store in Phoenix, Arizona. He contended, “The exterior, as well as 
expressing a personality very much in harmony with local determinants, evolves naturally 
from a precisely studied functional interior, where departmental groupings and inter-
relationships are organized on the preferred horizontal basis.”115 Owings concluded the 
article insisting that emphasis on the design of department stores would shift from 
“‘interior decoration,’ and unproductive doodling, to an architectural treatment 
progressively subordinate to the main issue – merchandizing and customer service.” 116 It 
is not hard to see the connection between SOM’s activities in the 1930s and this article. It 
is not a coincidence that John Moss was at Marshall Field’s. After the New York Fair, 
John Moss left the firm whose title included his own name. He joined the Marshall 
Field’s department store as chief designer where he became recognized for lighting 
implementation and supervised the design of all of the department’s stores.117
In October 1939, a Chicago newspaper reported that John O. Merrill (1896-
1975), an architect of the Federal Housing Administration for Illinois, resigned to form a 
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117 Richard Marsh Bennett, Oral History of Gordon Bunshaft, Interviewed by Betty J. Blum (The Art 







new partnership with Louis Skidmore and Nathaniel A. Owings, which was to be 
renamed, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill. 118
 
 Merrill, an MIT graduate, had previously 
worked for a Chicago firm, Granger & Bollenbacher, and had served as president of the 
Chicago chapter of the AIA during 1936 and 1937. The addition of this engineer-architect 
to the small design firm was beneficial to the great fortune of SOM’s future. When John 
Moss left and John Merrill joined, the change opened up new avenues for the firm. The 










                                                 













‘Technologically Modern:’  
The Prefabricated House and the Wartime Experience of SOM 
 
 
The essence of this large-scale organization of the late twentieth 
century is that within it people of very diverse skills and knowledges 
work together. This, traditionally, could never be done except in 
very small groups, teams of four or five at most. Today we do it – or 
at least try – with very large numbers – thousands of people with 
different knowledges, coming together in a business, a government 
agency, or an armed service – under a management with specific 
knowledge of building and directing the large-scale organization.  
This newly gained ability has given man great new capacities, for 
better or worse. The atom bomb was much less a triumph of science 
than a triumph of organization.  
― Peter F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation, 1972 
  
Many critics have condemned mid-twentieth-century American architecture as a 
degeneration or debasement of European modern architecture, especially during its high 
point in the 1910s and 1920s. They have asserted that the dominance of corporate and 
consumer culture prevented authentic modern architecture from transplanting onto 
American soil. One such critic, Colin Rowe, contended that “purged of its ideological and 






“décor de la vie for Greenwich, Connecticut,” or the “suitable veneer for the corporate 
activities of enlightened capitalism.”1
There are two fundamental flaws in Rowe’s narrative of good architecture 
turned bad as a result of corporate culture and consumerism. First, European modern 
architecture was never unified and monolithic. The perceived similarity downplays major 
differences, particularly fundamental political and economic differences in Europe. 
Second, post-Second World War American architecture was influenced as much, if not 
more, by wartime technological experimentation as by European modern architecture of 
the interwar period. While the first has been discussed by many historians, the second has 
never been appropriately recognized. Therefore, this chapter attempts to explain the 
mechanization and systemization of building and its impact on building technology and 
expression. Through this analysis, I will later argue that post-war curtain-wall technology 
and its expressions came from wartime technological experimentation.   
 In sum, utopian visions of social transformation 
through modern architecture became mere fashions in the United States; empty 
ornaments for corporate America devoid of all content.  
Rowe’s comment about American corporate architecture has often been 
associated with the firm that became Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM) in 1939. 
                                            






Indeed, SOM has long been considered the epitome of a so-called ‘corporate modernism.’ 
Historians and theorists readily criticized the firm for a commercialized modern 
architectural language that simply seemed to please its post-WWII clientele, namely large 
corporations and government agencies. This kind of critique claims to expose a 
purposeful distortion of modernism’s original goals, including its engagement with 
modern technology. By refraining from such formal analysis we will find that SOM 
embraced modern technology both before and during the war. Indeed the firm 
experimented with materials and production processes in innovative ways, especially 
during World War II.         
William Hartmann, an early partner, argued that, while the New York World’s 
Fair of 1939 was a watershed in SOM’s early history, it was the war that enabled the firm 
to become a large-scale modern organization. The critical moment would come in 1942 
when SOM was selected to design the city of Oak Ridge, Tennessee.2
                                            
2 William Hartmann, Oral History of William Hartman, Interview by Betty Blum (The Art Institute of 
Chicago, 2003), 71-72. Recalling the importance of Oak Ridge, Hartmann argued that “SOM had the 
capability of dealing with almost any kind of project, whether it be a school or a hospital or a house or 
prefabrication or anything. The organization had capability. SOM became a large organization. I don’t 
recall the numbers, but I’m sure it was in the thousands. That includes city planning. They made the town 
plan of Oak Ridge… It accumulated some people of great talents. Walter Netsch was hired to work on Oak 
Ridge. John Merrill really came in about that time and became the head of the Oak Ridge effort in Oak 
ridge. Many other people–engineers, architects, and all kinds were grouped together in that effort. That 
established the spirit of SOM as a professional organization.” 
 However, the 






the lessons of modern building materials and technology from the World’s Fairs, SOM 
joined forces with the John B. Pierce Foundation to explore research and new 
construction systems for prefabricated housing. This collaboration began with a small 
‘Experimental House.’ The first prototype and subsequent collaborative projects gave 
SOM the technical knowledge and on-site experience that would prove essential to carry 
out large-scale military, government and corporate commissions. This period prior to the 
war prompted significant changes in SOM’s business practices and organizational 
systems as well as formal topologies. Thus, SOM’s architecture in the 1940s and 1950s 
began with the vision of a house: the house of mass production.   
 
The Vision of the House: Flexibility and Abstraction 
When the United States officially entered the Second World War in December 1941, the 
battle was already being waged in distant battle fields and at home. The domestic front 
transformed the country into a highly effective supply base for materiel and basic 
resources. The tempo of everyday life accelerated as war production injected a sudden 
surge of energy into the industrial economy still stagnant from the depression years, and 
Americans began to feel a sense of common purpose. The new speed generated by the 






building production became more systemized and formal prototypes more standardized. 
These processes crystallized sufficiently to compete with conventional production and 
ultimately guaranteed the postwar predominance of American architecture in the world. 
For example, standardized wartime housing production laid the foundation for postwar 
suburbia and urban apartment buildings. The prefabrication techniques used for wartime 
housing also provided the basis for post-war curtain-wall structures. The Pierce 
Foundation and SOM were crucial to both the prefabrication of a building and the 
development of the curtain wall.  
This was by no means a surprise. Recognizing that there would be a major 
shortage in civilian housing, architectural journals anticipated a vast and sudden increase 
in postwar production. Prefabrication technology would allow this to happen. The 
September 1942 issue of Architectural Forum, “The New House of 194X,” exemplified 
this way of thinking. The journal took on the question, “How can the House of 194X be 
made the most-wanted commodity in the competitive postwar market place?” As did 
many other journals, Forum engaged the imminent market situation in which mass 
production through systemization and mechanization was supposed to take over 
traditional architectural production. The journal invited thirty-three architecture firms to 






of these firms was SOM, whose article was ironically entitled “Flexible Space.”3
“Flexible Space” began with a formula based on the principal elements of a 
building. (fig. 2.1) (fig. 2.2) (fig. 2.3). Geared towards industrial mass-production, the 
formula also allowed for a variety of combinations for adapting the prototype to the 
particular requirements of the occupants. The SOM text stressed that “every family is 
different” and “every family changes.” Calculating both the most efficient system of 




While most of the other proposals were practical, SOM concentrated on a fairly 
abstract idea of space. In essence, architects of SOM theorized the flexibility of a spatial 
system. The goal was to construct a formula for spatial organization in which a building 
would be a collection of disassembled parts and dividable functions. Using a crude 
linguistic model, SOM subdivided architectural production into three stages. The first 
stage, “Vocabulary,” referred to the shell or enclosure of a space, its practical units, wall 
units and mobile units. Second, “Grammar,” or the “functional relation of vocabulary,” 
was a process of combining shell and utilities in order to create spaces that successfully 
  
                                            
3 “The New House of 194X,” Architectural Forum (September 1942): 100-03.  
 






met visual, acoustical and atmospheric requirements. “Grammar” would satisfy the 
diverse demands of each occupant. The final stage was “Composition” which clarified the 
possible variations of the spatial system based on certain prototypes.5
“Flexible Space” had little to do with materiality, technology, context, or even 
space. Flexibility was a conceptual system that could combine with anything else. It was 
a state of neutrality. The key to its notion of flexibility was the abstraction with which 
mass production and reproduction would achieve their projected economic and technical 
goals. This abstraction could originate from the technical nature of spatial flexibility or 
from the visual characteristic of individual units of repetition. The difference was only 
from how you approach the building, either from outside or from inside. The abstraction 
could then generate countless minor variations. Thus, “Flexible Space” prefigured today’s 
mass customization.  
  
 
The John B. Pierce Foundation and the Experimental House No.2  
The idea of “Flexible Space” came from SOM’s previous experience with prefabricated 
housing research. From 1939 on, the firm was entirely devoted to researching the 
prefabrication of houses and related technological issues. They worked in collaboration 
                                            






with the John B. Pierce Foundation, one of the most well-known prefabrication research 
institutions. However, the first opportunity for collaboration came unexpectedly. SOM 
worked with many corporations designing buildings and exhibitions for the New York 
World’s Fair of 1939. SOM developed close relationships with Joseph F. O’Brien of 
Westinghouse since he took charge of preparing the 1939 exhibition pavilion of the 
company. At the end of 1938, O’Brien decided to leave Westinghouse and join the Pierce 
Foundation as Director of Electrical Research where he soon became General Manager.6
The Pierce Foundation’s research on prefabrication was previously spurred by 
the Great Depression. Prefabrication would attract much attention from businessmen and 
architects in the 1930s as a means for reviving the building industry.
 
O’Brien was instrumental in hiring SOM as consulting architects for the foundation’s 
prefabricated house project. This prompted a short, yet intensive period during which 
SOM accumulated expertise related to prefabricated housing technology and 
subsequently systematized its architectural language.      
7
                                            
6 New York Times, November 12, 1938, 26.  
 Fortune magazine, 
reporting on the nation’s housing problems in 1932, concluded that prefabrication was 
“the greatest single commercial opportunity of the age.” Recognizing the importance of 
 
7 Alfred Bruce and Harold Sandbank, A History of Prefabrication, 2nd ed. (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 7. 






prefabrication in economic reasoning, the article presented a distinct and fresh concept of 
design. Design was not an aesthetic issue, but an industrial one. Accordingly, “design will 
dictate the form of thousands of units instead of the form of one,” as was the case with 
the automobile industry.8
The Pierce Foundation also took up the challenge of mass production of houses. 
Established almost a decade earlier, in 1924, by John B. Pierce, then Vice President of the 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, the original goal was “educational, 
technical and scientific work in the general fields of heating, ventilating, and sanitation.”
 Therefore, the traditional concept of a house as a unique 
cultural entity must recede to economic priorities.  
9
                                            
8 “Five Questions….. And a Striking Answer,” Fortune, July 1932: 61. 
 
From its inception, the foundation declared that it would focus on the physical and 
physiological human environment. The Housing Research Division was then set up in 
New York in 1931, with the Harvard-educated architect Robert L. Davison as the first 
director. Davison was a well known specialist in prefabrication, with experience in many 
parts of the country. The Foundation was interested in multiple other areas as well. In 
1933, it established another division: a separate Laboratory of Hygiene in New Haven, 
Connecticut that specialized in physiological problems in the domestic environment. The 
 






supervisor C. E. A. Winslow, who was then head of the Department of Public Health at 
Yale University, has often been regarded as the father of the public health program in the 
United States. The Pierce Foundation researched prefabricated housing, the scientific 
analysis of spatial use, and physiological and psychological reactions of people in the 
domestic environment. These were intended to complement each other even though 
prefabrication was to some extent the lynchpin, seen as the outcome of a scientific 
understanding of the individual, family life, and the industrialized building. However, 
prefabrication did not necessarily mean standardization for the Pierce Foundation. On the 
contrary, it was seen as a precondition of flexibility.  
The foundation erected its first prefabricated house in 1932 (later named 
‘Experimental House No.1’) on top of the Starrett-Lehigh Building in New York City. 
Numerous types of material for structural and enclosure purposes were tested.10
                                            
10 Ibid. 
 The 
Foundation did not publicize the experiment nor did they develop detailed research 
projects. Seven years later, with the construction of its second prefabricated house, the 
Foundation took an active role as a leader in prefabrication research and production. 
SOM began to work as consulting architects with the foundation. The second house, 






Walter Severinghaus was appointed supervisor for construction and design improvement 
of Experimental House No. 2. The house was built in Lebanon, New Jersey, the site of 
Joseph O’Brien’s farm. It was a single story house with a pitched roof and a porch with 
windows. The plan was a box divided into two bedrooms, a living room, a bathroom and 
a kitchen-dining room. The main building material was prefabricated plywood without 
insulation. Immediately after the completion of the Experimental House No.2, SOM 
developed variations of the prototype with changes in orientation and two types of 
garages. The foundation then decided to build ten more houses with SOM’s exterior 
variations (fig. 2.6).   
In October 1940, Architectural Forum commissioned SOM to study the 
materials it had collected from builders on prefabricated housing in order to present “a 
basic house design” which was to include the merits of individual house plans (fig. 2.7). 
The following month, Architectural Forum published an article, “The Architectural 
Forum Defense House by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Architects.,” which included 
SOM’s drawings with annotations. The basic intentions of the project were to present an 
economical house, to examine the various prefabricated houses available in the market, 
and to provide manufacturers with a standard model of the low cost dwelling unit.11
                                            







article insisted that SOM’s house would meet all the general conditions for a low-cost 
house including the fact that it was flexible and repeatable as a prototype in any context.  
SOM’s “Plan Selection and Orientation” diagram reveals characteristics of the 
firm’s approach that would later define their large-scale projects (fig. 2.8). The detailed 
yet abstract diagram was easy to use and applicable anywhere. Analyzing various four-
room prefabricated houses, the architects of SOM found only two types of floor plans: 
one with the bathroom between the kitchen and a bedroom and the other with the 
bathroom between two bedrooms. The SOM team chose the first plan as the basis for 
their housing research because, firstly, it economized the plumbing by putting the kitchen 
and bathroom back to back, and secondly, it permitted greater flexibility in the shape of 
the house and its orientation. As shown in the figure, eight variations were created from 
the first plan. Each plan could then be used for certain orientations that could be readily 
installed in various possible locations according to the diagram. The firm developed the 
diagram based on such as factors “winter sun and summer breeze on the living room, and 
kitchen exposures.” The diagram was devised to find “the best possible plan for a given 
site, determine the direction in which the site faces, plot this direction on the chart, judge 
which of the plans is nearest the line.” This simplified, scientific diagram could 
                                                                                                                                  






supposedly be employed in “most parts of the U.S.” although “it should be adjusted to 
local prevailing wind conditions” and “to sun conditions” of the extreme south.12
John H. Callender, a key member of the Pierce Foundation, later wrote a 
technical resource book on architecture, Time-Saver Standards: A Handbook of 
Architectural Design (1966). This was, to some extent, a continuation of his previous 
work proposed in a booklet titled Introduction to Studies of Family Living (1943). 
Callender argued that “housing design should be based on family needs. The problem 
was how to obtain the data on which to base a design for housing not one, but several 
thousand, families.”
 Thus, 
with the eight variations and the diagram, SOM made low-cost housing development 
easily calculable. The detailed drawings for individual houses aiming at diversity and 
flexibility confirm SOM’s systematic approach to architecture.  
13
                                            
12 Ibid.  
 Callender’s argument confirms that an interest in creating variety 
through mass production was the underlying theme in the Foundation’s research, which 
in turn suggests that SOM’s “Flexible Space” was a continuation of the Foundation’s 
research. The research program on family life was highly influenced by a sociologist, 
Svend Riemer, who had worked with the Swedish Cooperative Building Society. 
 






Riemer’s research, called the ‘Stockholm Study,’ was a continuous record of the activities 
of each member of a Swedish family. More than 200 families were studied through 
interviews and on-site sketches of the interiors of their home in order to closely analyze 
how people interact with others and their domestic built environment. After thorough 
research, Riemer proposed a new concept of design. Presenting a paper at the Milbank 
Memorial Fund Annual Conference in New York City in 1939, he contended:  
 
All too often the designer views the home in its static aspect only. 
He considers it as comprising so much space with so much furniture, 
neglecting the fact that it is the setting for many diversified 
activities of the family and its individuals, occurring in continuous 
flow and often conflicting… in space and time… Design is a 
problem of conflicts in space and time.14
 
  
Like Riemer, Callender and SOM understood the issue of design as “a problem of 
conflicts in space and time.” For them, design was far more than an issue of style or 
aesthetics. (fig. 2.9) (fig. 2.10) (fig. 2. 11) (fig. 2.12) (fig. 2.13).   
Hoping to resolve conflicts in family living, Callender suggested analyzing 
                                            
14 Svend Riemer, quote in John H. Callender, Ibid, 8. Riemer’s paper was later published. Svend H. Riemer, 
“Family Life as the Basis for Home Planning” in Housing for Health: Papers Presented under the Auspices 
of the Committee on the Hygiene of Housing of the American Public Health Association (Lancaster, 







housing design in terms of three categories: space, equipment, and environment.15 Space 
was measured by the physical occupation of a person and equipment around specific 
items such as a chair, a table or even a mirror in the domestic space. The environment 
was subdivided into physiological and psychological measurements. The physiological 
environment included control of moisture, heat, ventilation, light, sound, and sanitation. 
The psychological environment incorporated control of privacy, consideration of the 
general appearance, and impression of the space and equipment as well as aesthetic 
preferences and social standards. In this process, design did not begin with physical walls 
and their shapes, but with “a human and wrapping around him with the required space, 
equipment, and environment.”16 The objective spatial measurements of human activities 
and the development of various furnishings were crucial aspects of the design process 
(fig. 2.14) (fig. 2.15). In contrast, the style of a house could be “fairly conventional – 
possibly even Cape Cod Colonial,” thereby taking into account aesthetic preferences and 
social standards.17
 
 SOM would explore this concept of design in its work with the Pierce 
Foundation.  
                                            
15 Callender, Introduction to Studies of Family Living, 12-13  
 
16 Ibid.   
 






The Housing Project for the Glenn L. Martin Bomber Plant 
On October 7, 1941, a group of businessmen, government officials and reporters gathered 
in Baltimore to celebrate the completion of a housing project for the employees of the 
Glenn L. Martin Aircraft Company. The event was followed by a visit to Middle River, 
Maryland where Stansbury Estates, a 300-unit housing project, had just been completed 
and a second 300-unit housing project, Aero Acres, was under construction (fig. 2.16). 
Bror Dahlberg, president of the Celotex Corporation, and Joseph F. O’Brien, then serving 
as the general manager of the Pierce Foundation, made speeches focusing mainly on their 
respective roles in the construction of the projects. While the Pierce Foundation and the 
Celotex Corporation were indeed central figures in these housing projects, SOM played a 
significant role in their realization (fig. 2.17).18
The Glenn L. Martin Aircraft Company housing project was initially conceived 
as part of the expansion of the 1929 Martin aircraft plant in Middle River, Maryland 
originally designed by Albert Kahn and Associates. Wartime production entailed a 
 The firm acted as the primary architect 
for the project, creating general plans and specific technical drawings for the construction. 
The prototype for these housing projects was the Experimental House No.2 that the firm 
had developed in collaboration with the Pierce Foundation in 1939.   
                                            
18 Speeches on “The Cemesto House” by Bror Dahlberg and J.F. O’Brien, A Vital Contribution (Chicago: 






dramatic increase in aircraft bombers which, in turn, boosted personnel from a peacetime 
number of 17,000 employees to 45,000 at the end of 1941.19 Expecting that the influx of 
war workers would worsen the already dire housing situation of the city of Baltimore, the 
company decided to finance and construct its own housing development. For this task, 
Martin organized the Stansbury Manor Corporation, a subsidiary to be managed by the 
designer-builder Jan Porel who had completed a 185-unit garden apartment project at 
Middle River three years earlier.20 In an effort to find the best in low-cost construction 
techniques, Porel compared thirty-two types of construction methods out of which the 
Pierce Foundation’s method used in the Celotex’s Cemesto House was ultimately 
selected.21
                                            
19 “Building for Defense,” Architectural Forum (November 1941): 335-37.  
 The shape of the Cemesto House was identical to that of the Experimental 
House No.2. The only difference was the materials. Rather than plywood, it was made of 
a new building material called Cemesto, a product of the Celotex Corporation (fig. 2.18). 
In order to first prove the efficiency of the construction method and the durability of the 
Cemesto House, the Pierce Foundation and Celotex built a one-family and a six-family 
house based on their previous experiments, specifically the project at Lebanon, New 
 
20 “Houses for Defense,” Architectural Forum (November 1941): 321-22. 
 







Jersey. The latter proved to have some technical problems, while the former appeared so 
durable and attractive that the Martin company decided to build 600 identical houses on 
both sites within walking distance of the bomber plant in Middle River, MD.22
The Martin Aircraft Company house was a compact, rectangular, four-and-one-
half room shape, A3 plan in the “Plan Selection and Orientation” diagram (fig. 2.19). The 
plan followed what the firm specified in their previous research, in which two bedrooms 
were directly connected to each other and the bathroom and kitchen were adjoined to 
facilitate plumbing installation. The house was composed of a living room with a dining 
alcove, two bedrooms, a kitchen, and a bathroom. It had three curtained closets and two 
storage spaces and demonstrated careful consideration in minimizing both traffic 
congestion and sound transmission. Other significant design elements included two large 
windows covered with metal Venetian blinds in the living-dining area, a covered porch, a 
linen closet, a coat closet, a shower fixture over a tile-trimmed bathtub, built-in shelves 
and cabinets in the kitchen (fig. 2.20) (fig. 2.21).
  
23
                                            
22 “Houses for Defense,” 322. 
 The house was equipped with electric 
appliances such as a refrigerator, a water heater, a stove, and an oven. These detailed 
considerations were contrived to attract working families, encouraging them to remain at 
 







the plant in the middle of the war when supply of labor force was limited and most 
needed. The structural system of the Martin House was identical to that of the early 
Experimental House No.2 in that it employed a wood skeleton frame and curtain walls.   
Cemesto was the main building material, encompassing exterior and interior 
wall finish. It consisted of a cane fiber insulation board core, sealed with a special 
compound, between two layers of weather, fire and wear-resistant combinations of 
asbestos and cement.24 Exterior walls employed one and one-half inch thick Cemesto 
board, and interior partitions were one inch in thickness. All of the boards and structural 
members were delivered cut to specified sizes by the manufacturer. Assembly work was 
executed mainly in a field shop on the construction site; a second field shop was set up 
for the assembly of plumbing, which was under a separate contract (fig. 2.22) (fig. 2.23) 
(fig. 2.24). Most importantly, the Martin House was “pre-engineered for mass production 
with the wall and roof materials factory-made and delivered to the building site.”25
When this new prefabricated construction procedure replaced traditional 
craftsmanship, it also changed the traditional concept of housing design. The house 
became a product. The Pierce Foundation and SOM had aspired to erect 600 identical 
   
                                            
24 A Vital Contribution, 10. 
 






houses with identical drawings when they began their research. Every house in the two 
housing complexes was identical except for the colors of roofs, window frames, and 
curtains. While the houses were the same at the time of construction, they could be easily 
modified to produce many variations. The differences were purely cosmetic. The 
fundamental idea was maximum speed, construction and standardization from start to 
finish. In order to save time, construction was reorganized into specialized groups, each 
one concentrating solely on their designated task without any idea of how the whole 
house was completed. The construction workers of each team were like assembly-line 
factory workers, entirely alienated and isolated from the final product.26
 
    
The Manhattan Project and Oak Ridge 
The development of the atomic bomb in the United States began around 1939, when 
Professor Albert Einstein of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey 
(along with others) urged President Roosevelt to initiate a nuclear research program. This 
effort enabled the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to create the Manhattan Engineer 
District (MED) under the directorship of Brigadier General (later Major General) Leslie 
                                            
26 “Six Houses a Day,” Business Week, September 13, 1941: 65. The magazine reports, “This Lebanon 
house is the spiritual father of homes for airplane workers which are going up at the rate of six a day at the 






R. Groves (fig. 2.25). There were three major locations for the project: Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee; Hanford, Washington; and Los Alamos, New Mexico. The community in Los 
Alamos was directly operated by the military and was the smallest and least complex of 
the three. The Oak Ridge and Hanford communities were created as unprecedented 
military-civilian communes, more complex in their organization and operation than Los 
Alamos. Oak Ridge, designed and built by SOM, was constructed first and became a 
model for Hanford.      
The site of the future Oak Ridge community showed few traces of human 
settlement until the end of 1942. That fall MED bought a rectangular area of 59,000 acres 
a few miles away from Norris Dam and eighteen miles west of Knoxville, Tennessee (fig. 
2.26). The location had been carefully selected and was then fenced in its entirety to keep 
out intruders and spies. The remoteness made it safe from air attack. Natural barriers 
separated the principal buildings from a small but sufficient town. The Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA) provided dependable electric power in large quantities. The nearby 
Clinch River provided an adequate water supply. In addition, the land was cheap. The 
vast site which cost $2,600,000 (about $40/acre) was purchased through eminent domain.  
MED ominously called the site ‘Kingston Demolition Range’ and later 






used to refer to the whole site during the project.27 The town site was located at the 
eastern end of the reservation on the slopes of Black Oak Ridge. In order to avoid 
unnecessary confusion and to lessen outsiders’ curiosity, the name of Oak Ridge was 
employed for the post office address of CEW starting from the summer of 1943.28
By the spring of 1942, several methods of extracting the rare isotope U-235 
from the more common U-238 were tested and nearly ready for pilot plant construction. 
These methods were the centrifuge, gaseous diffusion, thermal diffusion, and 
electromagnetic methods of separating U-235.
  
29
                                            
27 Charles O. Jackson and Charles W. Johnson, “The Urbane Frontier: The Army and the Community of 
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 1942-1947,” Military Affairs (February 1977): 9. 
 The Tennessee Eastman plant at CEW, 
known as Y-12 and consisting of 270 buildings, employed the electromagnetic process. 
The Carbide and Carbon Corporation plant, K-25 which occupied 71 buildings, used 
gaseous diffusion. S-50, operated by the Fercleve Corporation, employed the thermal 
diffusion method (fig. 2.27) (fig. 2.28). These nuclear facilities were located in valleys 
eight to ten miles away toward the fenced western perimeter of the reservation. Also 
located in a parallel valley was the X-10 plant operated by DuPont, which produced a 
 
28 Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: the Story of the Manhattan Project (New York; Harper, 1962), 
25-26. 
 








small amount of plutonium. However, this was only a plutonium research facility, with 
the main production plant located at the Hanford Engineering Works in Washington.30
Later called the “Home of the Atomic Bomb,” Oak Ridge arose suddenly from 
the sparsely populated, rugged and hilly landscape. Ernest A. Wende who worked as an 
engineer at Oak Ridge called the construction of the town “incidental by-product of the 
largest and one of the most effective projects for war.”
    
31 The town and housing 
development were secondary in comparison with the construction of the nuclear facilities. 
Nevertheless, providing scientists, engineers, and operators of the nuclear facilities with 
the proper living environment was essential.32
No one initially anticipated the final size of the town. The city grew larger and 
larger until it became “the biggest job of quick town building ever attempted in the 
U.S.A.”
 In addition, there was an agreement within 
the army that civilians (scientists, engineers, and other operators) should be provided with 
given better living conditions than military personnel.  
33
                                            
30 Louis Falstein, “Oak Ridge: Secret City,” The New Republic, November 12, 1945: 636. 
 In 1942, the land was empty and undeveloped. Just three years later, at the end 
of the war, there was a population of 75,000 people, 10,000 family dwelling units, 13,000 
 
31 Ernest A. Wende, “Building a City from Scratch,” Engineering News-Record (December 1945):149. 
 
32 Daniel Lang, “The Atomic City,” The New Yorker, September 29, 1945: 52.  
 







dormitory spaces, 5,000 trailers, more than 16,000 hutment and barrack accommodations, 
and all of the supplementary facilities for everyday town living (fig. 2.29).  
SOM was in charge of the majority of the building projects at Oak Ridge. The 
main considerations in planning and building the town were “speed, saving of critical 
materials and minimum interference with the local labor supply.”34
                                            
34 Ernest A. Wende, “Building a City from Scratch,” 149 
 It is not surprising 
that speed was the foremost consideration in many of MED’s missions. To MED leaders, 
the key to winning the war was quickly operating nuclear facilities and producing the 
atomic bomb. Prior to joining this operation, SOM was only a small design firm with 
little experience apart from exhibition halls, stores and prefabricated houses. The firm 
only had about twelve employees in each of their Chicago and New York offices in 1942. 
How could such a small firm possibly take on one of the most confidential and largest 
projects of the war and complete its task so successfully? What were the effects of this 
success to the development of the firm? The answers to both of these questions involve 
SOM’s reorganization from a small design firm into a competent and efficient large-scale 
architecture-engineering firm. Activities at Oak Ridge reveal how and why SOM 
succeeded in its mission and prepared the firm for its international triumph during the 






As a small, virtually unknown firm, SOM was not the military’s first choice for 
the job. In late June of 1942, the Stone & Webster Corporation (S&W) of Boston, one of 
the primary contractors for the Manhattan Project, agreed to take the responsibility for 
developing the reservation site including utility facilities and housing construction. For 
the next several months, however, District Engineer Colonel James C. Marshall and his 
staff gradually became aware of the corporation’s inability to prepare town and housing 
development plans. There were also occasional delays in plan delivery which made MED 
apprehensive.   
When S&W submitted its overall plan to the MED New York headquarters on 
October 26, 1942, General Groves, Colonel Marshall, Lt. Col. Nichols and others 
convened to review the proposals. The plans revealed many elementary mistakes 
including miscalculations in the number of urinals and showers.35
                                            
35 General Groves mentioned that “Too many urinals and showers; not enough toilets. Ratio of 1:12 about 
right; change. Cut one row showers, add 4 toilets, eliminate 4 urinals. 24 wash bowls too many, to be 
reduced.” “Notes on conference in District Office, 9:45 a.m., 26 October 1942,” File MD-337, “Meetings 
and Conferences, District Office,” Box 28, RG 4nn-326-85005, National Archives and Records 
Administration, Southeast Region Depository, East Point, Georgia (hereafter, NARA).  
 In addition, during a 
telephone communication on December 17, 1942 with August C. Klein, then vice 
president of the corporation, the colonel expressed dissatisfaction with the design of the 







believed that S&W’s designs for houses should not be accepted.36
In the meantime, MED began to evaluate S&W’s plans internally. This task 
was carried out by the Principal Engineer of MED, Wilbur Kelly, and resulted in a brief 
report on January 3, 1943. The report stated that the drawings by S&W did not show any 
“originality or modern innovations.” In addition, there was a much more serious problem. 
According to Kelly, S&W’s work also contained major errors in estimating the cost. Out 
of the six types of the original houses, only one type was matched with the original cost 
estimate. The rest showed wide gaps between the original estimate and the new estimates. 
Some of the new estimates were beyond the limit established by law.
    
37 Kelly argued that 
the housing development “was not a sideline and should not be treated as such” and 
contemptuously reported that “plans equal to, or better than, the ones produced up to now 
could have been obtained from any lumber yard at the cost of printing.”38
                                            
36 Transcript of Conversation between Klein and Marshall, 5:40 p.m., December 17, 1942, File MD-600.1, 
“Construction and Installations,” Box 41, RG 4nn-326-85005, NARA. 
 He suggested 
two options to resolve the situation. The first was to force a reorganization of the S&W 
housing team with competent personnel and to re-assign the job to them; the second was 
 
37 Wilbur E. Kelly, “Report on Housing Plans – Summary of Status and Recommendations,” January 3, 
1943, File MD-624 “Housing,” Box 52, RG 4nn-326-85005, NARA. “It is not desirable to build houses of 
the types design by Stone and Webster at the costs indicated, and of course, the law prohibits construction 
of any single dwellings costing over $7500.00.” 
 







to establish a new contract “for house design to an architectural firm experienced in low 
cost work.” Kelly clearly preferred the second, as he and his colleagues had encountered 
more than enough troubles. He finally insisted that a new architecture firm be hired and 
S&W be released from the town and housing design mission.39
MED began searching for a reliable architecture firm on which they could 
trust. They immediately turned to the Pierce Foundation, which was well-known for its 
low-cost prefabricated housing research from the late 1930s. William Brown, a partner at 
SOM, later recalled that Joseph O’Brien of the Pierce Foundation knew of the project and 
phoned to set up a meeting with MED.
 
40 However, it is more reasonable to believe that 
O’Brien was contacted by MED first.41
                                            
39 Ibid. 
 Considering that MED was searching for an 
architectural firm that had experience in the development of low-cost housing, the team 
of the Pierce Foundation and SOM made sense: a competent housing research foundation 
and its consulting architecture firm. Due to the success of the houses they had constructed 
for Glenn L. Martin, mass producible, easily transportable, and inexpensive Cemesto-clad 
 
40 William S. Brown, Manuscript sent to Owings, October 1970, Box 49, The Papers of Nathaniel A. 
Owings, Library of Congress.  
 
41 Nathaniel Owings recalled the first meeting with MED: “One fine December afternoon in 1942 two men 
in civilian clothes walked into our New York office unannounced and requested an interview with Louis 
Skidmore.” Nathaniel A. Owings, The Spaces in Between: An Architect’s Journey (Boston: Houghton 






units, the team seemed almost ideal to the military.    
On January 28, 1943 about three weeks after the submission of the negative 
evaluation of S&W, a small meeting was held in New York City. Four people attended: 
Captain Block and Lieutenant Moore of MED, Joseph F. O’Brien of Pierce Foundation, 
and Louis Skidmore of SOM. The MED officers had organized the meeting in order to 
learn more about the team and, in particular, its experience in town planning and housing 
development. O’Brien and Skidmore promised they needed only two weeks to present 
“complete plans and specifications, a site layout including stores, dormitories, 
recreational facilities, hospital, etc., and cost estimates based on any size town.”42 
O’Brien persuaded the officers to consider their plans as a viable – indeed preferable – 
alternative to those submitted by S&W. However, the MED officers thought that it would 
be worth doing some more research on the foundation, including visiting completed 
projects by the foundation and the firm. They accepted O’Brien’s and Skidmore’s offer, 
noting that for the preliminary work the foundation and SOM would not claim any 
expense.43
                                            
42 “Conference with J. B. Pierce Foundation with Reference to Town Planning and Housing Development,” 
January 29, 1943, File MD-337, J.B. Pierce Foundation, Box 29, RG 4nn-326-85005, NARA. 
 Skidmore and Merrill departed for Baltimore along with several army 
officials to tour the Glenn L. Martin housing project.  
 






MED soon discovered that the foundation was one of the leading research 
institutions in the field of low-cost prefabricated houses and that the architecture firm had 
sufficient if only small-scale working experience. It was clear to those involved, however, 
that the military considered the team primarily because of the foundation’s reputation.44 
For the first year or so, SOM was not recognized separately from the Pierce Foundation. 
Partially for this reason, the firm desperately tried to get more exposure to MED to secure 
the commission, establishing strong relationships with the officers and competently 
handling all their assignments. However, the design of an entirely new city with a 
network of houses, schools, hospitals, shopping centers and streets was all the more 
daunting because of the extreme secrecy surrounding the project. When the architects 
asked the officers about the location of the town, they were told it was confidential. The 
only information that the designers could obtain amounted to a few aerial photographs 
and topographical maps without titles or names.45
A meeting took place on February 16, 1943, in the MED office in New York 
 After spending several days collecting 
this basic yet vague information, the SOM planners spent four to five days finishing the 
town planning. The design was then ready to be submitted to MED.  
                                            
44 Nathaniel A. Owings, The Spaces in Between: An Architect’s Journey, 86. 
 
45 Stéphane Groueff, Manhattan Project: The Untold Story of the Making of the Atomic Bomb (Boston: 







City. S&W’s housing and site plans were placed on the table alongside another set of 
drawings by SOM. Leon H. Zach, a Harvard-trained landscape architect, former associate 
with Olmsted Brothers and chief of the Engineering Branch, Construction Division of the 
US Army Corps of Engineers, was called in and asked to compare the two plans. Zach 
criticized S&W harshly for the poor quality of their general scheme, specifically the lack 
of traffic circulation, narrowness of city blocks, minimal consideration of topography and 
parking, and poor drainage. On the other hand, he applauded SOM. According to Zach, 
SOM’s plans showed “far more thought and ability.” He chose to proceed according to 
the new SOM plans. The meeting resulted in five instructions given to the Pierce 
Foundation (and SOM) which would redirect all of the housing and town developments 
in Oak Ridge.46
                                            
46 “Conference – Housing,” February 17, 1943, File MD-337, “Meetings and Conferences, District 
Office,” Box 28, RG 4nn-326-85005, NARA. “A. Pierce Foundation to go ahead as quickly as possible on 
1000 house layout, including shopping and recreation facilities for same, using survey parties and 
draftsmen in field with a view to starting road construction Monday, February 22. B. Pierce Foundation to 
proceed with plans and specifications of houses in order to have them ready for bidding in approximately 
two weeks’ time. C. Pierce Foundation to furnish detailed street layout as soon as possible in order to 
arrange conference with Stone and Webster relative to utilities, as Stone and Webster will do this work. D. 
Pierce Foundation to work up and submit a schedule for construction of 1000 houses by July 1 with 
recommendations on number of contractors necessary, etc. E. Pierce Foundation to furnish plans for a 
women’s apartment dormitory.” 
 After this meeting, the Pierce Foundation and SOM immediately and 
officially became part of the Manhattan Project. Their first assignment consisted of the 
design of one thousand houses, subsequently increasing to three thousand, five thousand 







was the beginning of an ideal commission: designing an entire town from scratch.  
MED called a meeting a week later to streamline the transfer of work on 
February 24, 1943. The military officials asked SOM to “provide detailed layout of 
sections of the town site as rapidly as final locations have been checked and established 
on the ground,” even though the design of the drainage system was officially S&W’s. In 
addition, SOM was required to submit recommended road sections for approval “within 
the next day or two” and to make recommendations for locations of a temporary trailer 
camp to house 1,000 trailers.47 This transfer of work happened immediately. A letter 
from Lt. Colonel K. D. Nichols sent to S&W made it clear that they were relieved from 
the responsibility of overall town planning, preparation of plans and specifications for 
dwellings, shopping center, schools, theater, church, recreational facilities, and the town 
hall. All of those responsibilities were now in the hands of SOM, which had little 
experience with those programs. Nevertheless, Nichols made it clear that certain work 
being done by S&W would remain with the corporation, writing that “the elimination of 
the work by this letter does not alter your responsibilities for design and construction of 
the now-authorized dormitories, cafeteria, laundry and guest house.”48
                                            
47 “Memorandum to the Files,” February 25, 1943, File MD-337, “Meetings and Conferences, District 
Office,” Box 28, RG 4nn-326-85005, NARA.  
 The letter also 
 






revealed that plans for the hospital were being reviewed. Prior to this point, S&W still 
thought that they held the hospital design commission as well as the dormitories, cafeteria, 
laundry and guest house facilities.   
From March 15 on, an entirely different story developed. Lt. Colonel Robert C. 
Blair sent a letter to S&W. Blair pointed out that Nichols’s letter “did not contain any 
definite statement as to whether you [S&W] would retain responsibility for design of the 
hospital.” The design of the hospital (with all other jobs mentioned above) would also “be 
assigned to the Pierce Foundation.”49 This transfer was just one of many such instances. 
SOM and O’Brien tried, officially and unofficially, to supplant S&W. O’Brien, for 
example, sent an informal letter to Captain Block on March 3, 1943 about the apartment 
and guesthouse at the town site after studying the S&W plans with the SOM architects. 
O’Brien found technical mistakes in the S&W drawings and returned those plans with 
corrections arguing that they were “not intended to be a criticism of the plans drawn up,” 
but intended to call Captain Block’s attention to “certain things that seem to be somewhat 
out of proportion.”50
                                                                                                                                  
“Construction and Installations,” Box 41, RG 4nn-326-85005, NARA. 
 Shortly thereafter, the design and construction of the dormitories 
 
49 A letter by Colonel Robert C. Blair to R. T. Branch of S&W, March 15, 1943, File MD-600.1, 
“Construction and Installations,” Box 41, RG 4nn-326-85005, NARA. 
 
50 A letter by J. F. O’Brien of the J.B. Pierce Foundation to Captain Block, March 3, 1943, File MD-624 






and the guest house were also turned over to SOM.  
Skidmore later took advantage of personal relations with MED officers. The 
design and construction of some facilities in the Chicago area is a good example. Captain 
Joseph T. Ware had close personal and professional relations with the SOM partners, 
having worked as one of the liaison officers between the firm and MED in 1943. He 
stayed at the SOM New York office many times and travelled to the MED office located 
several blocks away. On the 5th of September, 1944, Captain Ware sent a letter to the 
MED headquarters about the modification of a commercial building in the Chicago area. 
Here too he insisted that the job not be given to S&W, arguing that “investigation by the 
contractor revealed that the firm of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, with offices in 
Chicago and New York, was in a position to begin design work immediately.”51
 
 
Apparently, Captain Ware knew SOM’s situation well and favored the firm. After 
working only about a year and half, the small design firm had become quite competitive 
and seemed entirely trustworthy to the military. The MED personnel who worked closely 
with the firm now recommended SOM over larger organizations.  
                                            
51 “Chicago Area – Construction Contracts,” September 5, 1944, File MD-600.1, “Construction and 
Installations,” Box 41, RG 4nn-326-85005, NARA. Joseph T. Ware, who was stationed in the SOM New 






‘Technologically Modern’    
MED officials approved the general town and housing plan in the hectic February of 
1943. SOM inquired about when they should send a team out to the site to begin work. 
The answer was “immediately.” Merrill along with five other SOM architects and 
planners including Albert Goers, Louis Scesa, and Walter Metschke took off for the site. 
This was about a week after the final meeting on the planning of the town among S&W, 
SOM, MED and Leon H. Zach. The travel arrangements were rather unusual. They were 
informed by a MED officer to be at Pennsylvania Station of New York City at a precise 
time, without any indication as to their destination. The architects and planners received 
their tickets in sealed envelopes. After boarding the specified train, the crew opened the 
envelopes and discovered that their destination was Knoxville, Tennessee. The day after 
arriving in the city, they met Colonel Nichols for the necessary instructions and moved to 
the CEW. On the site, Merrill set up a temporary field office in the rear of a garage and 
started surveying the area.52
The site plan initially selected and approved by MED was based on a contour 
 The SOM crew inspected all of the road locations on foot in 
order to avoid topographical obstacles. They also surveyed all potential locations for 
houses.  
                                            






map and some aerial photographs. The architects believed that the site plan would only be 
used for preliminary planning purposes and not for construction. MED, however, thought 
otherwise. There was no time to develop a new site plan derived from the context. SOM 
thus had to adopt a strategy for supplementing the submitted plan with thorough 
exploration of the whole site, rather than preparing another site plan based on the actual 
context. This procedure was enacted because re-planning would require too much time. 
Walter Metschke, who took on a critical role in developing the original plan as a site 
planner and later civil engineer, remembers the process as follows:   
  
The first move was to randomly stake an alignment which the 
survey party would accurately locate in the field as a basis for 
preparing a computed vertical and horizontal alignment. This 
stationed alignment was then staked in the field. It was again 
walked for required adjustments. The roads were located on top of 
the ridges and in many situations had to be precisely on the center 
line of the ridge to accommodate housing on both sides… Each 
time the road was restaked in the field it was again walked for 
possible revisions, a new alignment prepared, computed and 
restaked. This procedure was repeated as many times as necessary 
to achieve as nearly perfect an alignment as possible to avoid 
construction errors and delays.53
 
 
This repetitive operation in the field was required to avoid any delay since there was no 
                                            







time to correct errors or make changes. Once the position of the roads was indicated, the 
rest of the procedures were almost automatic. As the SOM team scrambled along the hilly 
landscape, staking out roads, sewers and water lines, the construction crew followed right 
behind them (fig. 2.30) (fig. 2. 31) (fig. 2.32).54
The road and housing construction set the pace for the whole project at Oak 
Ridge.
  
55 The military’s minimum requirement was site plans for fifty houses each day.56
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Every lot was staked in the field and plans for the four corners of the house were applied. 
Furthermore, the center line of the road was established so that the finished floor plans 
could be applied by field inspection. Trees were cut down only when they were located 
within the boundary of a house. To save time, new construction methods were 
systematically and enthusiastically devised. As in the Glenn L. Martin project, the 
construction process was divided into separate operations, each of which was processed 
one by one. However, the operation at Oak Ridge was better organized and much faster 
(fig. 2.33) (fig. 2.34). Each process, such as pouring a foundation or erecting walls, was 
performed on a number of houses at the same time and when the first crew was ready to 
 
55 Groueff, Manhattan Project, 165. 
 







move on, another crew took over according to the construction sequence clarified by the 
firm. By doing so, 30 to 40 houses were completed and ready for occupancy each day.57
Oak Ridge was a narrow strip approximately one mile wide and over six miles 
in length, stretching along a major ridge (east-west axis) and crisscrossed by minor ones. 
This linear layout proved to be “adaptable to rapid expansion on the difficult, hilly site. 
Houses were placed to take advantage of the lovely view and existing trees, but to 
necessitate a minimum of roadway construction.”
 
This expedited construction of prefabricated houses would later be continued and 
popularized by private industry mass-developers such as Levitt & Sons. 
58 The general network of streets was 
determined by the topography of the landscape. This method was the best way to save 
time and construction costs and allowed for easy expansion. The gentle slope was the 
result of the army’s requirement that the percentage of grade on the roads should not 
exceed eight percent (later, at SOM’s request, the requirement was raised to twelve 
percent because of the topography of the site).59
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 The street layout looked natural and the 











planning (fig. 2.35). 
In order to avoid the confusion of disorderly names in a street system, a 
systemized nomenclature was contrived by SOM. Several thoroughfares connected the 
ridge with the valley. There were three principal east-west main roads called “Avenues;” 
the connecting roadways were called “Roads;” loops that led to the original place were 
called “Circles;” dead end streets were identified as “Lanes” or “Places.” The avenues 
were named after states and all streets leading to one avenue employed the same first 
letter. For example, all streets leading from Kentucky Avenue had names beginning with 
the letter “K,” like Kelvin Lane, Kenwyn Road, Kimball Lane, and Kingsley Road. The 
alphabetical system was employed everywhere except for the three east-west arterials.60
The original experimental house of 1939 and its numerous variations became 
an important part in deciding the general image of Oak Ridge (fig. 2.36) (fig. 2.37) (fig. 
2.38). All the houses were standardized, yet diverse in size. The A and B types were small 
two-bedroom houses, the C house had an extra bedroom, and the D house had a dining 
room. The A, B, and C types were ranch style while the D was L-shaped. All of the 
houses had picture windows in the living rooms, hardwood floors, and a blower air 
 
Consistent with SOM’s work, even the street naming was simple and efficient.  
                                            







circulation system. Like the Glenn L. Martin house, all houses were equipped with stoves, 
refrigerators, garbage cans, and Venetian blinds or shades in all windows. They were 
heated by coal furnaces.61




                                            
61 Martha Cardwell Sparrow, “The Oak Ridgers,” (Master’s Thesis, Mississippi State University, May 
1980), 41-43.  
 However, there was an architectural principle of homogeneity in the design of 
the houses. They looked conventional at first glance, but to the more trained eye, they 
appeared as something in-between; a hybrid. There were three reasons for this; first, 
SOM employed the Experimental House developed by the firm and the Pierce 
Foundation as a generic template. Second, there was no time to develop new designs. 
Additionally, MED officials were comfortable with the original designs, in part because 
they preferred a pseudo-conventional aesthetic. This third point deserves further 
explanation. The initial 3,000 Cemesto houses were intended to accommodate well 
educated engineers, scientists, and their families. SOM was asked “to provide an 
environment which would offer no unavoidable conflict with their temperament, their 
routines and their habitual standards.” It was assumed that residents would be from many 
different parts of the country, not just from big cities. Therefore, modern architecture 
 
62 Joseph T. Ware, a letter sent to Owings, October 7, 1970, Box 49, The Papers of Nathaniel A. Owings, 






would not be widely popular. However, MED believed that the residents would want 
certain modern amenities inside their homes: electric kitchens and built-in heating 
systems as well as visible fireplaces and porches.63
It should be noted that the Experimental House No.2 and its variations were not 
developed for any specific context or climate. In principle, they could be built anywhere 
with minor modifications. As Colonel Nichols recalled, “Oak Ridge was a city without 
past, and it was not designed to have much of a future. We tried to design only for the 
duration of the war, in order to conserve money, materials, and labor.”
 This effort to lessen the readjustment 
difficulties of the personnel undoubtedly contributed to the conventional image of the 
town.  
64
                                            
63 Owings, The Spaces in Between, 90. 
 The short 
temporality of the town was a perfect condition for the Pierce houses, technologically 
modern but formally indefinable. The earliest houses could be called prefabricated 
designs with vague allusions to the country dwelling (fig. 2.39) (fig. 2.40). However, 
more advanced technical products soon replaced the envelopes whenever needed. All 
parts of the houses and other buildings were manufactured in factories, delivered by train, 
and assembled on site. Building parts were elaborately standardized with careful 
 
64 K. D. Nichols, “My Work in Oak Ridge,” These Are Our Voices: The Story of Oak Ridge, 1942-1970, ed. 







consideration paid to systematized construction so that assembly was quick and easy.    
The architectural historian Peter B. Hales praises SOM’s entire Oak Ridge 
development for “its combination of conservation and innovation, its melding of the 
mythic qualities of past American utopias with the modern vision of centralization and 
government management.”65
The crucial fact here is that SOM designs used anonymous nostalgic images to 
produce conventional yet mystical sentiments that contributed to the centralization and 
governmental management of CEW. There was no tension between the centralized, 
government’s ownership and management of the town and a small-town, natural design 
aesthetic. The two were part of the well controlled whole. If there was a nostalgia for the 
American past at Oak Ridge, it was an outcome of the speedy construction of technology, 
 The houses united conventional images and advanced mass 
production technology. The town and houses irresistibly recalled traditional villages; the 
organic shapes of the streets and traditional shapes of the houses are a testimony to the 
imagery of past America. The technology employed in their construction symbolized the 
other side; a mechanical and futuristic America. In this sense, Hales’s comment captures 
the essence of Oak Ridge. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the organic 
imagery was the result of army’s time and cost requirements.  
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on one hand and the tight military control of the town on the other. This imagery actually 
belonged to the flexibility of modular technology. In other words, the design was neither 
modern nor traditional, but a hybrid, technological and transformative. The overall image 
of the town was derived from systematic mass reproduction. In some sense, asking 
whether the style of the houses was modern or conventional is irrelevant. They were all 
modern, technologically, while style was simply a matter of taste.  
 
Becoming a Large Firm at Oak Ridge 
With an increase in size and complexity of its participation at Oak Ridge, SOM was 
forced to reinvent its own architectural practice. The town itself went far beyond the 
boundary of a traditional architectural practice, requiring a new architecture-engineering 
firm that could cover road and housing construction, hospital and school design, town 
planning, equipment design and interior design. SOM’s mission required the firm to 
extensively expand their business areas, diversify personnel, manage a large number of 
people with various backgrounds, and rationalize the firm’s organization for efficiency 
and effectiveness. The town of Oak Ridge was a laboratory where SOM built a new kind 
of architectural practice that anticipated the fast approaching corporate architectural and 






SOM’s first contract officially spanned from February 1943 to July 1943. The 
main focus was “the design of all structures required for a community to house 
approximately 12,000 inhabitants,” which included “the design of dwelling units, store 
groups, theatres, churches, grade schools, high school, hospital, recreation buildings and 
other buildings as required for the community.” In the first phase, SOM designed site 
plans for roads and house locations: 3,000 dwelling units comprised of six types, two 
shopping centers, a town administration building, a hospital, a nursing home, an 
elementary school, two apartment buildings, a gas station, a recreation hall, and several 
neighborhood stores. SOM was hired with the lump sum of $130,000 under the condition 
of compensation for overtime and additional services.66
None of the designers at SOM had any idea how many schools, supermarkets, 
hardware stores, and barbershops would be needed, not even for the population of the 
initial 12,000 inhabitants. With little experience in urban planning or large-scale projects, 
the designers made reasonable estimates, relying upon data in almanacs and the wisdom 
 The total amount would later 
prove to be millions of dollars, attracting more jobs in other MED-related areas both 
during and right after the Second World War.    
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of experts.67 They studied Lawrenceburg, Indiana, a similar size city that was Louis 
Skidmore’s birthplace, and then developed a technique based on coefficients per person. 
For example, there were a certain number of barber chairs in Lawrenceburg. That number 
was divided by the number of men; so each man in the city theoretically needed 0.0012% 
of a barber chair. In the same way, each woman required 0.00658% of a beauty shop. By 
multiplying the expected community population by these numbers, SOM designers 
produced scientific estimates applicable to MED’s changing population estimates.68
The second major contract spanned from September 6, 1943 to August 1, 1944. 
Now the scale of SOM’s task grew much larger and more complex. The estimated 
population of this phase rose to 44,000 residents and soon increased to 66,000. Design 
specifications included overall site plans, 9,250 new family dwelling units excluding the 
30,000 units already under construction, new men’s dormitories necessary to 
accommodate 1,600 mean, women’s dormitories to house 6,000 occupants, cafeterias, 
laundries, schools, and other structures to complete the development of the city (fig. 2.41) 
(fig. 2.42) (fig. 2.43) (fig. 2.44) (fig. 2.45) (fig. 2.46). It also incorporated distribution 
facilities in the town which had previously belonged to S&W. Now serving as an 
  
                                            
67 Groueff, Manhattan Project, 164. 
 







architecture-engineering firm, SOM was asked to handle facilities such as the various 
sewer, water, and power facilities.69
At the end of 1944, about twenty months after the first team of six SOM 
employees arrived, the firm had some 650 employees at the Oak Ridge site. The New 
York and Chicago offices had also grown significantly, supporting the operations at Oak 
Ridge and working on several military projects. SOM had been transformed into an 
entirely different firm in its organization, operation, and capability. In March 1943, while 
Merrill and others were working at the site from dawn to dusk seven days a week, the 
small New York office on East Fifty-Seventh Street was full of architects, engineers, and 
draftsmen producing plans for houses. William Brown, who was then only thirty-four 
years old, was put in charge of the housing project at Oak Ridge. He later took charge of 
the special buildings as well as the housing. Robert Cutler designed the hospital and Arne 
Engberg the Town Center. By this time, Merrill had set up an office in the Administration 
Building at Oak Ridge and worked primarily on site planning and building location.
 In sum, they played an increasingly important role 
as the expansion of the plants created a need for more housing and the full range of 
services necessary for normal town living.  
70
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The SOM New York office was the locus for the Oak Ridge project until late 
1943. Drawings were produced there and sent to the nearby MED headquarters. Due to 
security reasons, the communication between the firm’s New York office and the Oak 
Ridge office was modulated by the military security team. Several MED officers, Colonel 
Blair, Captain Ed Block, and Lieutenant Ware were assigned to the mission and almost 
continuously stayed in the office. Their jobs entailed guiding and checking all drawings 
and acting as a liaison between SOM, MED, and CEW.  
In August 1943, Colonel Marshall, Engineer of the District, was promoted to 
Brigadier General and assigned another job not related to the Manhattan Project. The 
deputy Engineer Kenneth Nichols became the leader of MED under General Groves. 
Realizing the strategic importance of CEW, he decided to transfer the district’s 
headquarters from Manhattan to the administration building at Oak Ridge called “the 
Castle.” Accordingly, the major part of the SOM design team moved to the city of Oak 
Ridge in the same month (fig. 2.47). The team found a number of difficulties at the new 
location including the acquisition of office space, telephones, and furniture.71
Nevertheless, the whole situation was significantly better for SOM. First of all, 
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the complicated communication problem between MED and the SOM New York and Oak 
Ridge teams had dissolved, so the firm could instantly respond to certain unexpected 
situations or difficulties occurring at the site. Secondly, SOM as architect-engineers 
became fully exposed to MED. The latter gradually relied on the firm for any issue 
related to town planning, housing design and construction. At the early stage, until the 
end of 1943, SOM was regarded as part of the Pierce Foundation. When the main design 
team of the firm along with other related crews in the New York office finally moved to 
the Oak Ridge site, its presence was instantly felt by MED. This meant, for the military, 
that SOM was immediately and continuously available for the diverse demands of the 
city. The firm was constantly pressed by MED to take on many different roles. This not 
only meant intense pressure, but a great opportunity as well. Working at the site of one of 
the most confidential projects in the Second World War, SOM now had to restructure all 
loosely related areas of architecture-engineering under the aegis of its firm. This was the 
true beginning of the modern, bureaucratic architectural firm.72
SOM took on an exclusive yet inclusive role within the fenced town of Oak 
Ridge. As the only architecture-engineering firm in the town, the scope of their 
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responsibility was indeed “challenging” as Owings later acknowledged, and MED gave 
them “many interesting roles to play.” It was “alarmingly all-inclusive.”73 The firm was 
responsible for anything remotely connected with the planning, building, furnishing, or 
equipping of the town. This was quite beyond the conventional boundary of architectural 
services. The situation forced Skidmore and Owings to supplement more traditional 
architectural work from other professions, restructuring its organization by bringing in 
competent professionals from entirely different fields. For instance, the L. S. Ayers 
department store in Indianapolis dispatched their key merchandizing manager at 
Owings’s personal request. In addition, Skidmore asked Robert Moses of New York to 
send the chief engineer of the Tri-borough New York-New Jersey Bridge Authority to 
head the traffic and highway department. SOM hired a complete construction company 
from Grand Rapids, Michigan to become the construction division of the firm. 
Construction manager Jan Porel, with whom SOM had worked on the Glenn L. Martin 
project near Baltimore, also joined the team.74
Importing personnel from other fields was to some degree compelled by SOM’s 
second contract with MED. “The Architect-Engineer was required to maintain his 
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complete staff, and conduct all his operations at Oak Ridge,” wrote Captain Samuel 
Baxter, then the Contracting Officer’s representative at MED. After working with SOM 
during all stages of the contract, he reported that “an adequate and competent 
organization was maintained throughout the period of the contract.”75 All those in charge 
of the various departments were “experienced and capable men in their respective fields.” 
Baxter similarly indicated that the business administration of SOM was “well organized 
and functioned efficiently and that accounts, files and property records kept up to date 
and in good order with the result that final accounting and auditing of the contract should 
be completed in a minimum time after the completion of technical services.”76
Even the MED officials sometimes thought that SOM’s schedule for 
completing housing, special buildings, roads and utilities was almost impossible or, at 
least, extremely difficult. To some extent, they were surprised by the fact that SOM 
produced all the requisite drawings and specifications within the allotted time-frame. 
 Thus 
SOM’s positive evaluation was, in part, the result of its having imported personnel from 
other fields and of managing them efficiently. Ironically, the strength of the architecture-
engineering firm had less to do with quality of its design than its organizing ability.  
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MED perceived SOM as quite an efficient and competent organization. Captain Baxter 
concluded the report about SOM:  
 
It is the opinion of the undersigned officer [Captain Samuel S. 
Baxter] that Skidmore, Owings and Merrill discharged work under 
this contract in a highly satisfactory and efficient manner, that 
competent men were placed in charge of the various parts of the 
work, that schedules were met in most instances, and that the work 
produced fulfilled the requirements of the District Engineer in an 
economical manner. The partners, the project manager, and the 
department heads of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill cooperated with 
the undersigned officer in every way possible, and left nothing 




The firm successfully completed the contract, while simultaneously restructuring its 
organization. A small architecture firm had transformed itself into a well-modulated 
architecture-engineering firm capable of undertaking a complicated engineering project. 
Working under a difficult schedule, SOM overcame all obstacles and became a large, 
complex, yet flexible organization. The various roles that SOM’s architects were forced 
to take on at Oak Ridge helped them carry out far-reaching projects, which most 
architecture firms of that period could not have undertaken. 
William Brown, one of the early partners of the firm, recalled that the Oak 
                                            






Ridge project significantly increased the scale of the firm’s operations and the number of 
staff. Brown also noted that the personnel of the firm “successfully handled the problems 
involved in coordinating many different types of technicians toward a single result.”78
SOM’s presence at Oak Ridge continued well into the post-war period. From 
the late 1940s, the firm undertook a new mission of transforming the temporary military-
 
As he described it, the experience of the Oak Ridge project would later enable the firm to 
qualify for large-scale military and government projects. SOM designed and built the 
physical infrastructure that would support American military forces and corporate entities 
in the 1950s in foreign countries such as the Philippines, Venezuela, Okinawa, and 
Morocco. The firm built numerous corporate headquarters, hospitals, and laboratories in 
many parts of the country. In fact, one could argue that the small firm only became SOM 
after its experience in Oak Ridge. The size, boundary of business, and organizational 
structure of the firm changed fundamentally during the war. Simplified architectural 
design, advanced technology and efficient organization of a large-scale labor force were 
harmoniously unified. The firm would be known for a modern aesthetic that was 
inseparable from its systemization and mechanization of architectural design and its 
internal restructuring as a bureaucratic business organization.    
                                            






civilian complex into a permanent city (fig. 2.48). Thereafter, SOM designed new 
buildings to replace the temporary, poor quality buildings previously erected or brought 
from other areas during the war. What was intriguing in these buildings was their design. 
Their forms were undoubtedly modern from almost any perspective (fig. 2.49). The June 
1951 issue of Progressive Architecture included an advertisement of the Sloan Flush 
Values. It included four photos of SOM between 1946 and 1950. Two were school 
buildings, the other two were housings. Interestingly, all of the buildings did not show 
any traces of pervious conventional designs which were prevalent in Oak Ride. Instead, 
the schools boasted modern appearances such as flat roofs and sleek glass-steel surfaces. 
The descriptions emphasized modern design of the two schools, arguing that 
“Ultramodern educational facilities are available to Oak Ridge youth in this fine high 
school” and “Elementary schools are designed in contemporary manner.” Oak Ridge was 
now a representation of modernism. The same ad described a housing building: 
“Attractive, multistoried apartments provide modern homes overlooking wooded hills.”79
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This rhetoric of stylistic modernism appeared in a more official setting. A year before the 
ad, the MoMA exhibition catalogue praised modern forms of the same housing project: 







‘cottagey’ approach of most low story housing developments. Its attractiveness depends 
upon the felicity of fenestration and the purity of proportion.”80
With the detonation of the atomic bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima, SOM 
abruptly concluded this brief yet transformative journey, one that had begun with the 
small Experimental House in New Jersey. That first house turned out to be a seed for 
several thousand houses within about five years, and it generated many different types of 
buildings such as dormitories, hospitals, schools, shopping centers, and offices. The 
journey culminated in the formation of a formidable architectural organization that 
combined the technical standardization and systemization of buildings with the concept 
of flexible space.  
 However, it should be 
noted that the same firm and architects who had designed the “cottagey” or the 
conventional looking, pitched roof buildings during the war created these “ultramodern,” 
“contemporary” buildings. There was no gradual transition in style from conventional to 
modern designs; they were identical in essence as though the modern form was already 
embedded in the production system as a ready-made.   
To some extent, the massive architecture-engineering firm was also the 
structural incarnation of that small prefabricated house. With the introduction of the 
                                            






‘bureaucratically’ organized firm to the field of architecture, architects began to take on 
different roles from those of the traditional artist-architect. Building design now became a 
minor part of a firm’s operation and was reorganized to be a combination of all building-
related considerations. Architects were encouraged to incorporate technological, political, 
economic, and cultural issues into their design process. As a group, the architects of SOM 
developed an efficient, flexible organizational machine which could produce systematic 
results under any circumstances. All of these developments were initiated at Oak Ridge 
where the immense pressure of speed allowed for little emphasis on design.  
SOM’s initial prefabricated house was scientifically designed. It was built to be 
a prototype, exemplifying the standardization of building parts and the systemization of 
design and construction. Repeated over and over again, it evolved into different houses 
and facilities. This evolution would later culminate in the glass-steel modern corporate 
headquarters of post-war American architecture. The anonymous corporate buildings that 
proliferated throughout American urban and suburban areas after World War II were a 
natural evolution of war-time building technology. The modern European forms in 
SOM’s postwar buildings were to some extent coincidental. Thus, rather than trying to 
find formal similarities with European modernism, it is more appropriate to ask how post-






































Flexibility and Abstraction: The Architecture of SOM in the 1950s   
 
 
The war years had a profound impact on the growth of SOM 
because of the responsibilities that had been suddenly thrust upon 
those of us who served in the armed forces. Accepting these 
responsibilities, I am sure, greatly affected that cadre of veterans 
who returned to the firm after the war had been won. Each of us 
had had that magic moment when his judgment and action had 
affected the outcome of an important, or perhaps even vital, piece of 
the mosaic of war operations. We were no longer the starry-eyed 
young designers who wanted to rebuild the world in the Corb/Mies 
mold. We did still seek that brave new world, but our enthusiasm 
was now tempered by the pragmatism born of an extraordinary, 
immediate need. The Depression was finally over: We no longer had 
time to philosophize. We only had time to get the job done…The new 
era had indeed begun.   
― Ambrose Richardson, “Skidmore and Owings: The Early Days,” 
1983 
 
While rapidly advancing as an architecture-engineering firm during the Second World 
War, SOM laid the foundation for its rise as one of the leaders of modern architecture 
soon after the war. To meet the challenges at Oak Ridge from 1942 to 1945, the firm had 
developed a team-oriented design process and advanced its expertise in prefabricated 






Through the transformation of crude technological items of fast-track military operations 
into aesthetic objects, the firm established itself as one of the legitimate heirs of modern 
architecture.   
In the 1950s, SOM pioneered a new trend for office buildings with glass and 
metal curtain walls, many of which soon became icons of post-war American architecture. 
The prismatic boxes with highly detailed designs were mainly the result of collective 
efforts. The firm became known to architectural communities around the world for their 
technical excellence combined with efficient organization of interior and exterior spaces.  
This chapter deals with SOM’s buildings designed during the 1950s, 
concentrating on their technical excellence and design ingenuity. Three representative 
buildings are closely examined: Lever House (1950-52), Manufacturers’ Trust Bank 
(1954), and the Air Force Academy (1956-62). The three buildings each have distinctive 
programs: a corporate headquarters, a bank and a military institution. Each program 
evokes different socio-political issues such as the rise of corporations, the financial 
industry and the military-industrial complex. While all three buildings formally employed 
glass and metal curtain walls, they each represent three different types: vertical, urban 
infill and horizontal. While the buildings have distinct similarities, they also differ greatly 






stage of the firm’s production, one characterized by a combination of flexibility and 
abstraction.   
 
The Institutional, the Dramatic, and the Utility  
In 1944, Nathaniel A. Owings presented a paper at the Illuminating Engineering Society 
Technical Conference in Chicago. “Comments on Lighting Layout and Design” recalls 
the firm’s earlier fascination with interior design for product display, indicating a new 
design direction in the following decades. In essence, the paper asks how one designs 
effective lighting for a commercial space. The first sentence could have been written by 
an industrial designer. “The purpose of lighting in all stores [emphasis in original] is to 
help sell merchandise.”1
                                            
1 Nathaniel A. Owings, “Comments on Lighting Layout and Design,” Illuminating Engineering XXXIX, 
No.10 (December 1944): 865. 
 Owings then classified three general ways of lighting: 
institutional, dramatic and utility. The first was used to establish an identity of chain 
stores; the second was used to structure a theatrical or to create a certain mood, and the 
third was employed to meet practical requirements. According to Owings, all three could 
be experienced in sequence. “First lighting can be a major aid in bringing the customer to 
the store; then second, within the store can excite the customer and help create an appetite 






inspect the product intimately.”2
Owings also emphasized the importance of flexibility in equipment. He wrote, 
“the store is a theatre [emphasis in original] – the aisles being roughly analogous to the 
seats, and the selling areas representing the area where the drama takes place – the stage 
[emphasis in original].”
 “The institutional” was related to the identity of the 
store as a whole, “the dramatic” to various expressive effects intended to create certain 
emotions, and “utility” to the practical use of lighting in the store. 
3 Theater productions constantly change. The theatre building 
should therefore be as flexible as possible to accommodate the various demands of drama 
performances. It is thus no surprise that the author greatly emphasized the store’s 
flexibility. He contended that “maximum flexibility is fundamental and one of the prime 
answers to the problem [lighting].”4 A good store should be able to accommodate many 
different exhibition layouts for various products. Owings also emphasized the 
significance of “ample and varied equipment – permitting infinite variety of effects – 
effects producible with the minimum amount of maintenance labor.”5
                                            
2 Ibid.  
 The combination 
of sufficient equipment with careful considerations of flexibility would result in 
 
3 Ibid.  
 
4 Ibid.  
 






achieving great architectural effects.    
 
In a store provided with such equipment, installed with an eye to 
maximum flexibility, there is no reason why the techniques of the 
theatre could not be brought into use as a major aid in selling 
merchandise. Large scale effects can be obtained, vistas created, 




Dramatic visual effects were effectively produced through the aid of equipment and 
flexible spatial organization.7
While these concepts were originally introduced to theorize lighting in a store, 
it is possible to consider their effect in buildings, especially office buildings by SOM in 
the post-Second World War period. “The institutional” can be understood as a way of 
creating a corporate image or an identity with the use of certain materials or forms. The 
building thus serves as a corporate icon or symbol. “The dramatic” encompasses various 
aesthetic considerations in design that are contrived to create certain emotions. A certain 
space or part of a building is designed with a specific design intention that aims at 
creating a particular feeling or emotion within people. “Utility” encompasses efficient 
  
                                            
6 Ibid, 865-66. 
 
7 This part should be interpreted in conjunction with the article “Flexible Space” by Skidmore, Owings & 
Merrill included in “The New House of 194X,” Architectural Forum (September 1942): 100-03. See 






and systematic application of problem-solving processes for circulation, program 
clarification, and spatial organization.  
In the 1950s, SOM was recognized for producing buildings that granted their 
clients architectural spectacles, formal and spatial embodiments of their businesses. 
While highly practical, SOM elicited great excitement for the general public, new 
corporate leaders and architectural communities alike. Several buildings became 
institutional icons for their clients. Most notably, Lever House (1952), Connecticut 
General Insurance Company (1957), Inland Steel Building (1958), Union Carbide 
Corporation (1960), and Chase Manhattan Headquarters (1961) (fig. 3.1) (fig. 3.2) (fig. 
3.3) (fig. 3.4.) SOM represented the client with visual signs, intertwining the institutional 
with dramatic and utility.  
SOM’s buildings of the 1950s were based on modules that would be employed 
throughout the entire building.8
                                            
8 Konrad Wachsmann defined a module as follows: “The module is the abstract fundamental unit of 
measurement.” In this dissertation, a module means the minimum unit of measurement intended to 
facilitate mass production of it. Konrad Wachsmann, The Turning Point of Building. trans. Thomas E. 
Burton (New York: Reinhold, 1961), 54.  
 Sufficient equipment was a precondition of maximum 
flexibility. Thus, the unique spatial quality of a typical large, open office space was made 
possible through the help of the versatile structural and organizational systems. 






equipment was meticulously prepared and installed. In order to accommodate the various 
programs and activities in a single building, a versatile system of glass and steel curtain 
walls, based on the module, was employed.   
 
The Curtain Wall as a Mechanism of Flexibility  
The previous chapter argued that war-time collaboration with the John B. Pierce 
Foundation helped SOM specialize in prefabrication technology and, later, the glass and 
metal curtain wall. Owings’s theories about sufficient equipment and maximum 
flexibility would not have been imaginable without the Pierce Foundation, in particular 
without his interactions with Robert L. Davison who served as the director of the 
Housing Research division of the foundation from 1931 to 1944.9
Davison also played a critical role in the development of the curtain wall.
 Davison conducted 
important research on prefabrication technology as well as behavioral and other medical 
research related to domestic environments.   
10
                                            
9 For more details about Davison and the John B. Pierce Foundation, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation. For 
historical importance of Davison and his research, refer to Hyungmin Pai, The Portfolio and the Diagram: 
Architecture, Discourse, and Modernity in America (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2002), 151-
58.  
 He 
first introduced the idea of curtain wall for mass production in the late 1920s while 
 
10 For example, William Dudley Hunt, Jr., The Contemporary Curtain Wall: Its Design, Fabrication, and 






serving as one of the editors for Architectural Record. At the time, the journal promoted 
both European modernism and native technological developments. The editorial staff had 
two ideological camps. Davison was among the scientific-technocratic group, and Henry-
Russell Hitchcock represented the formalist group.11 Soon after, in 1929, Davison made 
a research trip to Europe after which he published an important article, “New 
Construction Methods,” stating why modern architects were looking for new machine-
made materials that would provide an alternative to traditional masonry. “It is the opinion 
of some of the leading architects of Europe and America that it is entirely practical to 
eliminate masonry by using metal mullions as in the building by Cass Gilbert or in the 
Bauhaus,” Davison wrote.12
    
 As an ardent supporter of new technology and its potentials 
in architecture, Davison summed up his ideas on modern architecture, materials and 
technology: 
The modern architect is aware of changed conditions which demand 
economy and truthful expression in present-day buildings. The 
spirit of the age, which is clearly dominated by the machine and 
mass production, makes necessary the adoption of machine-made 
                                            
11 Mardges Bacon, Le Corbusier in America: Travels in the Land of the Timid (Cambridge, MA and 
London: MIT Press, 2001), 18-19. Davison was Director of Research at the Architectural Record from 
1929 to 1930 according to the biographical information included in Robert L. Davison, “Technological 
Potentials in Home Construction,” Law and Contemporary Problems 12, No.1 Housing (Winter 1947): 16-
24.  
 






products, considered in the light of their aesthetic effects, steel, 
copper, aluminum and alloys, terra cotta, tile concrete as light as 
wood and having the virtues of fireproofness, sound and heat 
insulation, glass with health-giving qualities – all are added to the 
architect’s palette. These products of the machine are to be used 
more and more frankly, first for their inherent structural and 
economic qualities and secondly for their aesthetic attributes.13
 
  
Like Skidmore and Owings, Davison was more interested in technological innovations 
than stylistic ones. Since mass-produced building materials were “the spirit of the age,” 
he recommended them for their structural and economical qualities as well as for their 
aesthetics. He was mainly concerned with modern technological advancement, and spent 
little time on stylistic representations of these advances. Skidmore and Owings did not 
divert from Davison’s way of thought. SOM’s office buildings in the 1950s were the 
foremost result of technological application with artistic concerns considered secondarily. 
Before discussing the firm’s post-war work specifically, it is helpful to discuss how 
Davison’s philosophy advanced from the prewar to the postwar periods.   
Working with Davison at the John B. Pierce Foundation, John H. Callender had 
the opportunity to take up Davison’s idea and advance a rational architectural approach, 
focusing on prefabrication and human behavior in the domestic environment. In “The 
                                            






Scientific Approach to Design,” Callender expressed his hope for “the application of 
scientific principle to dwelling design.” This research proceeded from a study of 131 
families in the New York area. The research mainly limited its focus to “sleeping, 
dressing, washing, and bodily elimination.” Volumetric measurements of human motions, 
such as the size of the volume created when a person changes his or her clothes or washes 
hair, continued the study. Afterwards, the Foundation conducted physiological and 
psychological research, such as the thermal changes in a domestic environment.14
In 1955, Princeton University School of Architecture published a research 
report, Curtain Walls of Stainless Steel: A Study Prepared for the Committee of Stainless 
Steel Producers, American Iron and Steel Institute. This report was one of the first studies 
on curtain walls and Callender led the research. There were four people involved in the 
project, two of whom were faculty members: associate professor Henry A. Jandl and 
 
Callender extended and updated Davison’s scientific research. He continued it to the 
postwar period, actively participating in the theorization of the glass and metal curtain 
wall structure.  
                                            
14 John Hancock Callender, “The Scientific Approach to Design,” Prefabricated Homes 1, No.1 (May 
1943): 6+. Also, John H. Callender, Introduction to Studies of Family Living, (John B. Pierce Foundation, 







director of the school and project supervisor, Robert W. McLaughlin.15 Considering that 
the third person was a research assistant, it is clear that Callender provided the team with 
his theoretical and technical expertise on curtain wall systems.16
Describing the changing concept of the wall in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the report argued that the wall would evolve to be more active. It was expected 
to “perform a number of rather intricate operations” such as excluding moisture and dirt, 
insects and unwanted animals and people, as well as allowing easy control of indoor 
environment. The wall played “so important a part in the control of environment that it 
 While Callender had 
accumulated much knowledge on curtain walls while working with SOM before WWII, 
the firm also provided some of the best examples of glass and metal curtain walls such as 
at Heinz Vinegar Plant in Pittsburgh (1950-52), Greyhound Bus Terminal in Chicago 
(1949-53), and Lever House in New York City (1951-52).    
                                            
15 Curtain Walls of Stainless Steel, A Study Prepared for the Committee of Stainless Steel Producers, 
American Iron and Steel Institute, (Princeton, NJ: School of Architecture, Princeton University, 1955). 
Robert W. McLaughlin, director of the School of Architecture and project supervisor for the report, 
emphasized the contribution made by Callender and James C. Ritchie (Research Assistant) in the 
“Foreword” of the report. “Messrs. John Hancock Callender and James C. Ritchie were actively engaged on 
this study of the School of Architecture on a full time basis, and the substantial body of the work is theirs.”   
 
16 It is worth noting that Callender, McLaughlin, and Skidmore worked on prefabrication before the 
Second World War. McLaughlin worked on prefabrication in the 1930s. He was also introduced as one of 
the pioneers in prefabrication research by one of the Pierce Foundation’s publications: Alfred Bruce and 
Harold Sandbank, A History of Prefabrication (New York: Arno, 1944). In 1955, McLaughlin was director 
of the school. Callender was leading the research and Skidmore was serving as a member of the Advisory 






can almost be considered as mechanical equipment.”17 The wall and mechanical 
equipment merged into one. The report contended that “the wall of a building is 
analogous to the skin of the body which is not just a covering but is an active and 
important organ of the body.”18
The Princeton report classified curtain wall systems into six categories (fig. 3. 
5). It argued that “the classification of the curtain wall was based on the construction of 
the wall and not on its finished appearance,” because it was “often impossible to tell by 
looking at a finished building which type of curtain wall unit was used.”
 As the layer of thin skin incorporated equipment and 
merged together, the conventional separation of wall versus structure began to dissolve. 
Owings’s own idea of sufficient equipment for maximum flexibility is in principle very 
similar to this concept of a wall as mechanical equipment. Owings believed equipment, a 
wall or a lighting system, would help achieve maximum flexibility and desirable spatial 
and formal effects. The concept of a curtain wall as “the skin of the body” aimed at 
creating maximum flexibility within a thin layer of a wall.  
19
                                            
17 Curtain Walls of Stainless Steel, 11-12. 
 However, this 
ambiguity was reduced when the classification was simplified categorically. In October 
1956, the American Building Research Institute (ABRI) organized a conference and 
 
18 Ibid, 12. 
 






further developed the definition of the curtain wall proposed by the Princeton report. At 
the conference, it was argued that “the first classification of curtain walls should be based 
on appearance.” They believed that “almost any system of construction can be used to 
achieve any one of the common curtain wall appearances.”20 ABRI proposed four basic 
visual characteristics: sheath, grid, mullion, and spandrel (fig. 3.6). The sheath type has 
no indication of structural elements. The grid type expresses horizontal and vertical 
structural elements equally. The mullion type emphasizes vertical structural elements. 
Finally, the spandrel type emphasizes horizontal structural elements.21
The curtain wall could emphasize either the building structure or the skin-like 
covering. The building structure could be horizontal, vertical or both. The façade believed 
to have more possibilities if the curtain wall did not express the structure. “In the case of 
facades with depth, he has a wide choice of patterns formed by wall, sunshades, balconies 
and recesses.”
 These four types 
were derived from the eight different classifications proposed by the Princeton report. 
22
                                            
20 Quotation in the 1956 ABRI conference in “Syntax: The Contribution of the Curtain Wall to the New 
Vernacular,” Ian McCallum, ed., Machine Made America, special issue of Architecture Review 121, No. 
724 (May 1957): 299.  
 This level of flexibility was limited because it was only applicable on 
the surface. Nevertheless, the curtain wall was believed to produce enough variety. That 
 
21 Ibid, 300.  
 






was why the Princeton report argued that, “If curtain wall buildings do begin to look alike, 
it will be from the architect’s choice, not from technical necessity.”23
SOM’s contribution to modern architecture is precisely situated in this context. 
Initially proposed as a modernization of building technology, the curtain wall resurfaced 
as an essential design consideration. It then became the focus of a design. The curtain 
wall became, in the post-war period, a mechanism for internal flexibility; reconfiguring 
the relationships among interior and exterior spaces, volume and mass, and solidity and 
transparency. In sum, SOM attempted to advance a new language of glass and steel 
curtain walls by producing exemplary projects throughout the 1950s.      
 They believed the 
orthogonal wall frame could create various distinctive expressions. Formal explorations 
of the grid pattern had yet to be explored.      
 
Owings’s Ideal Office Building   
Although Gordon Bunshaft was the chief designer of the Lever House, SOM’s 
first curtain-wall building, Nathaniel Owings had an undeniable influence on the design. 
This is quite evident in a paper he presented to the Building Managers Association in 
1947, published a few months later as “A Radically New Conception of Tomorrow’s 
                                            






Office Building” in the National Real Estate and Building Journal (fig. 3.7).24
Owings did not justify his idea of the new office building based on aesthetic or 
ideological grounds. Instead, his justification was mainly technical and monetary. 
Convinced that urban centers had reached their maximum capacities, “traffic-wise, 
parking-wise and merchandise volume-wise,” he envisioned new office buildings that 
would give urban workers a more pleasant environment. This new environment would 
not require many changes. On the contrary, “it will require nothing particularly new to 
this, merely an assembly and combination of known facts and techniques with an eye to 




Instead of a modern aesthetic, economy and comfort were his primary concerns. 
Owings recommended an entirely controlled indoor environment through air conditioning 
behind “fixed, flush continuous windows,” and the “sealed sash and the acoustical 
treatment of the ceilings” for sound control.
  
26
                                            
24 Nathaniel A. Owings, “A Radically New Conception of Tomorrow’s Office Building,” National Real 
Estate and Building Journal (January 1948). 
 Sealing all glass walls with inoperable 
windows was more economical than traditional windows. First of all, operable windows 
 
25 Owings, “A Radically New Conception of Tomorrow’s Office Building,” 28.  
 






were more expensive to install. Second, fixed glazing would reduce the frequency of 
interior cleaning by keeping out dirt and grime. He also believed that fixed glazing would 
reduce the costs of heating and air-conditioning. Owings imagined the surface of the 
building as non-corrosive metal and glass that would not need any painting. The building 
would require a flush skin surface, with metal connections for the glass on the interior. 
By doing so, an automatic window washing system could be installed. Windows would 
be washed with a vertical automatic squeegee that would run on exterior tracks. Owings 
thought the cost of washing windows would be significantly reduced with the 
introduction of this system.27
Wall units made of modern materials such as aluminum, stainless steel, other 
alloys and some plastic should be prefabricated in a factory in order to build quicker and 
more economically. The ideal office floor would be “one great slab – no bases or 
permanent partitions to be incorporated.” The lightest type of concrete slab construction 
on a steel frame would reduce dead loads to the minimum. With all these efforts, the 
office building would embody a lightness “from its environment to its construction.”
 To fabricate such an economically advanced wall system 
required SOM’s previous knowledge and application of prefabrication.  
28
                                            
27 Ibid, 29.  
  
 






Owings presented his ideas on the ideal office building again in Architectural 
Forum in August 1949. While this slightly edited version showed little difference in the 
general argument, it was thematically organized. Items such as “set in a private park,” 
“prefabricated walls,” and “low maintenance cost” were separated from each other in 
order to add clarity. In addition to this new organization, Owings added a new summary 
that encompassed all the main issues concerning the new office building. His first 
consideration was a relatively large site for sun light, air circulation, view and sufficient 
parking. Owings suggested that having grass, trees, and fountains were a “merchantable 
asset” to win competition in the market. Owings also discussed specifics of the office 
space.   
 
We believe that the office space should be a simple, flexible, 
rectangular plan with the thinnest possible skin and the maximum 
amount of glass, that all the known scientific devices for control of 
sound, temperature, humidity, and natural and artificial light are 
mandatory, not just desirable.  
We believe that the modern office building must be designed to 
provide for the human beings, who spend a quarter or more of their 
lives therein, all of the comforts, conveniences, and amenities that 
modern science tells us we need and tells us how to provide.  
This solution is arrived at through studying the behavior patterns, 
the actual physical, mental and emotional cycle for each of the basic 
types of occupant. By this research we establish the criteria for the 






that will be required to serve it.29
 
 
Owings insisted if office spaces were more desirable, people would not mind paying 
more. There was little consideration for aesthetics in conceiving of a new type of office 
building. Technical and economic reasoning came to be the main focus. Nonetheless, 
Owings envisioned the future of the glass and metal office buildings and the idea of 
flexible space. He visualized an office with a “simple, flexible, regular plan” wrapped 
around by a thin layer of glass. This glass curtain would be an advanced wall, allowing 
tenants to efficiently control the indoor environment, as later conceptualized in the 
Princeton report. Owings emphasized the importance of understanding various human 
responses to the environment, revealing the influence of the firm’s relations with the 
Pierce Foundation in previous years. This practical approach to office buildings was the 
foundation of SOM’s architectural practice before it began to refine surfaces and interior 
spaces in the early 1950s.  
 
Lever House as an Urban and Corporate Icon   
Owings’s ideal office building became a blueprint for the 1949 Greyhound Bus Terminal 
                                            
29 Nathaniel A. Owings, “The Ideal Office Building” was included in “Bus Terminal and Office Building,” 






Project in Chicago, but its principal influence was in New York (fig. 3.8) (fig. 3.9). The 
technical and economic aspects of Owings’s article and the terminal project would guide 
the early design development of Lever House.30 There are clear similarities to the tower 
design he published in the article, notably, the treatment of the two volumes. The vertical 
volume sits on top of the lower horizontal volume as in Lever House. In the lower 
volume, the first floor is intended to be commercial space such as shops, then two to three 
floors of parking and a roof garden that would be landscaped and available for tower 
residents. Owings stated that the vertical volume sitting on top of the horizontal should 
have no setbacks, giving a similar straight surface. He later noted that he contributed two 
basic ideas to the design of Lever House: first not putting stores at the street level and, 
second, putting the tower perpendicular to Park Avenue instead of parallel, giving all the 
rest of the credit to Bunshaft.31 However, it is obvious Owings made other significant 
contributions to the early development of the design. It is not surprising that Bunshaft 
was not able to “explain how he decided upon the parti.”32
                                            
30 “Bus Terminal and Office Building,” Architectural Forum (August 1949): 70-75, 164, 168. 
“Greyhound’s New Chicago Terminal,” Architectural Record (April 1954): 167-73. This article lists the 
similarities and differences between the terminal project and Lever House.   
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Lever House was begun in 1949 when Lever Brothers Company, manufacturer 
of soap, detergents, cosmetics, toothpaste and oleomargarine, decided to move its center 
of operations from Boston to New York City. Charles Luckman, president of the company 
and trained architect, commissioned SOM to design a modern headquarters for its 
exclusive use.33 The project was completed in December 1951 and officially opened four 
months later (fig. 3.10). This new glass-walled office building received immediate 
accolade, from architects and critics. New York Times architecture critic Aline B. 
Louchheim called it “the most inventive, handsome and remarkable of the firm’s 
buildings.”34 The mayor of the city, Vincent R. Impellitteri, welcomed Lever House, 
calling it “the new showplace of Manhattan.”35
Lever House is a twenty-one story building consisting of a tall tower and a low, 
two-story horizontal volume which serves as office space and provides a colonnade and 
enclosure for the open court (fig. 3.11) (fig. 3.12) (fig. 3.13). The layout of Lever House 
is simple. There is a roughly square, two-story horizontal volume that covers the whole 
 Boasting meticulously designed volumes 
as well as a glass and steel frame, this new building revolutionized the design of 
skyscrapers.  
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plot. It is located along Park Avenue between Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth. The tall, narrow, 
and oblong tower sits on top of the pedestal, turning the narrow side to Park Avenue. This 
twenty-one story high tower housed the company’s offices. The pedestal included a 
courtyard open to the streets with no stores along the streets. In a sealed building, heat 
was an important consideration. As a result, air conditioning and fluorescent lighting 
covered by glass diffusing lenses were employed to reduce heat emission. Air 
conditioning was incorporated by means of a split system: individual window units for 
the glazed periphery of the structure fed with high-pressure water and air and, in the 
center of the office space, a duct system of high velocity. Heat absorbing glass would 
block much of the heat created by direct sunlight as well as effectively reduce glare.36
There were other technical achievements as well. SOM invented a window 
washer, which would allow for easy cleaning of the smooth wall. The invention of the 
window washer became of great interest to the popular press.
  
37
                                            
36 “Lever House Complete,” Architectural Forum (June 1952): 109.  
 The glass was held in 
place by thin aluminum mullions and arranged in a pattern based on the varied sizes of 
the panes. The elegant, green-tinted glass skin covers the walls of the building. Curtain 
walls help achieve a consistent exterior surface, leaving zero manually operated windows 
 
37 “Window Washers in Gondola Car Speed Cleaning of Glass Building,” New York Times, April 1, 1951, 
31. The newspaper reported that “Only two men will be needed to keep the windows of Lever House 






(fig. 3.14). Thus, in the daytime, glass conceals the internal structure.  
Compared to the United Nations Secretariat building, which was built a couple 
of years earlier, Lever House had a smoother skin. While the former had a four inch deep 
frame around the exterior glass to create shadows and accentuate the pattern, the latter 
has a one inch projected frame with two and a half inch wide mullions.38 This flatness 
was part of the architects’ effort to communicate with the public. In contrast to Mies’s 
Lakeshore Drive apartments (1948) with “subtleties of modeling and historical 
associations” that could immediately appeal to architects but not to the public, the Lever 
building seemed to offer “a direct line of communication.” The editors of Architectural 
Review speculated that “most of the marketed curtain walls strive for an effect of flatness 
rather than relief in the façade,” and “in so many of them the scale and proportions of the 
frames and panels seem to relate to the Lever prototype.”39
However, the flatness also received a level of criticism. Robert W. McLaughlin 
believed that there would be a divergence from the “fetish for flatness.” He argued that it 
would happen “not only on aesthetic grounds, because there is certainly a dreariness in 
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flatness when repeated without relief, but also on human grounds, since the flat walls do 
not accomplish as filters the best results in filtering in and out desirable and undesirable 
environmental factors.”40 Regardless, Owings made it clear that his ideal office would 
have “a simple, flexible, rectangular plan with the thinnest possible skin and the 
maximum amount of glass.”41
Creating an institutional identity for the company was an important goal at 
Lever House from the beginning. A refined glass box would advertize the “giant soap 
maker.”
   
42
 
 Luckman and the other executives at Lever Brothers understood the project as 
an advertisement. Other commentators did as well.   
In the three short months since its opening, blazoned Sunday 
supplements, full-page newspaper advertisements, and enthusiastic 
popular magazines have made it better known to the public than 
Mies’ Tugendhad house, Eames’ steel-framed oceanside bungalow, 
Le Corbusier’s Marseilles apartment house, and Wright’s Johnson 
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41 Owings, “The Ideal Office Building,” 168. 
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The enormous popularity of Lever House was not merely a result of corporate 
advertisement; the building provided the city with a new architectural expression. Four 
years after its opening, Architectural Forum ranked the building as the third most 
important office building for the past one hundred years.44
 
 The architectural ingenuity 
and novelty of the glass-walled building was well recognized. One of the most thorough 
analyses of the structure came from Lewis Mumford.  
This whole structure is chastely free of advertisement; the 
minuscule glass cases showing life-size packages of Lever products 
in the glass-enclosed reception chamber on the ground floor would 
hardly be noticed in the lobby of a good hotel. But, the building 
itself is a showcase and advertisement; in its very avoidance of 
vulgar forms of publicity, it has become one of the most valuable 
pieces of advertising a big commercial enterprise could conceive.45
 
 
As Mumford correctly pointed out, the building itself became both a showcase and an 
advertisement. By getting rid of any recognizable signs on the outside, the unique glass-
walled building transformed itself into a sign. The institutional characteristic of the 
                                            
44 “Office Buildings,” Architectural Forum (June 1956): 151. Maurice Lavanoux commented on the 
building, “After several decades of clouded and misty architecture, I find it refreshing to see the clear glass 
shaft of Lever House rising in the otherwise drab atmosphere. And I hope the free area at the base of the 
building is a forerunner of more open spaces which help to reduce the tension of our daily life. In a way, the 
Lever House reflects the product of the Company and so the great areas of glass are here justified. Even so, 
all in all, it is a clear and pleasing silhouette in our city of towers.” 
 






building surfaced when the decorative signs disappeared, and the building represented the 
company it housed in an abstract manner. The executives at Lever Brother’s wanted to 
associate their products with the building. This was not limited to simple association 
through advertisement. Architecturally, as Mumford realized, Lever House was “the first 
office building in which modern materials, modern construction and modern functions 
have been combined with a modern plan.”46
However, this does not mean there were no discrepancies. There was an abrupt 
transition between the exterior and interior of the building. Yet here too we find 
connections. Bunshaft joined SOM (then, Skidmore and Owings) in 1937 after working 
for Raymond Loewy, an industrial designer, for several months. When Luckman and 
SOM reached an agreement on designing a new headquarters, the president put in a 
condition that Raymond Loewy Associates would do the interior design of the building.
 By weaving these various aspects into a 
seamless entity, the building easily became comprehensible to the public as well as to 
architects and critics. This consistency of being modern in construction, function and 
interior organization gave the company a distinctive air of being new and advanced.  
47
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Loewy had long been associated with the company and had been responsible for its 
 







commercially successful product packaging.48 He also had architectural experience. 
Loewy expanded his business beyond industrial and graphic design projects in 1937 
when he added a Department of Architecture and Interior Design to his firm. He designed 
a cafeteria and its interior for Lever Brothers when the company was located in Boston.49
Nonetheless, the differences help anticipate SOM’s design ambitions for 
creating a building holistically. Donald Albrecht contended that Loewy’s design 
expressed “the hierarchical nature of mid-20th-century corporate culture.” Loewy 
organized the interior to proceed with gradual changes from “public to private, open to 
closed, common to elite.”
 
Luckman, Raymond Loewy and SOM shared business sensibilities and worked 
successfully together.  
50
                                            
48 Aline B. Louchheim, “Newest Building in the New Style,” New York Times, April 27, 1952, X9.  
 Hierarchy, never limited to the spatial organization, was in 
part concealed by the organic’ quality of the interior design (fig. 3.15) (fig. 3.16). 
Architectural Forum in 1952 reported that designers of the Loewy firm designed interiors 
“on a very firm basis of efficiency, sales atmosphere, and comfort.” While it was an effort 
to design efficient yet accessible space, it sometimes reinforced the contraction between 
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the stark prismatic form on the exterior and comfortable, streamlined interior. One 
extreme case was the executive floor. Three executives asked for wood-burning fireplaces 
in their top-floor air-conditioned office and actually received them (fig. 3.17).51 The 
interior was extremely well organized; “In all working spaces the interior design is so 
efficient a fulfillment of the use requirements of the building that esthetic problems seem 
almost incidental.”52 Aline B. Louchheim already mentioned this point as early as 1952 
stating “their esthetically vulgar ‘conspicuous consumption’ seems raucously at variance 
with the spirit and style of the architecture.”53
In contrast, the interior design of the third-floor cafeteria, a space accessible to 
all Lever employees, expressed a cheerful message of the egalitarian corporate family 
(fig. 3.18). Loewy provided simple, tailored furnishings largely detached from the glass 
walls that mirror SOM’s sharp, rectangular architecture. In addition, some furniture 
contained the streamlined aesthetic of the 1930s. The interior of the building was 
designed to symbolize Manhattan street traffic lines with horizontally striped draperies, 
metal screened partitions, and a tile floor.
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51 “Lever House Complete,” 109.  
 After explaining air-conditioning, acoustical 
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control, lighting and elevators, Architectural Forum concisely stated, “Interior comfort is 
produced mechanically.”55
When the model of Lever House was first shown to the public at the Museum 
of Modern Art in 1950 for the show, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Architects, USA, 
some felt the fear of working in a glass box during the era of the atomic bomb. A visitor 
named L. J. Salter wrote a letter to the museum pointing out the absurdity of building a 
flimsy glass building in the era of atomic war.    
 Although both the interior and exterior designs were based on 
the same four-foot, eight-inch module, the differences between inside and outside reveal a 
wide gap. Lever House gave SOM a chance to realize the importance of the holistic 
design to a large-scale building project.      
  
This is the reality which most advanced architects are blindly 
ignoring. In the face of contemporary political and military 
possibilities, they continue piling humans into glass cells in the 
cities, exposing them to as serious hazards as the thousands huddled 
in Hiroshema's [sic] slums! One has but to vision the state of things, 
had Hiroshema had a few of the glass structures visioned in your 
Bulletin.  
So long as economic and political differences between nations 
remain un-reconciled, the threat of total destruction spells the end of 
'city culture' as you know it today. Wealth, therein concentrated in 
the form of 'property', becomes worthless. A thing is 'worthless' 
when there are no 'buyers' -- and who will venture (invest) against 
                                            






the threat of A-bombs?56
 
 
The author of the letter combined the images of a fragile glass wall and the devastation of 
Hiroshima after the bomb. A tall glass skyscraper appeared entirely unreasonable to some 
people. They thought it was nonsense to think of the new building’s cultural or 
commercial value in a time of imminent atomic war.   
When Lever House was completed, the world was divided into eastern and 
western blocks. The Cold War had intensified with the Soviet Union’s announcement of 
its first successful detonation of an atomic device in 1949. Furthermore, the United States 
was deeply engaged in the Korean War (1950-53). This post-war international unrest 
infiltrated into the country’s social and architectural culture. However, architectural 
experimentations were not stopped. Although there was fear of voyeurism and 
vulnerability, SOM designed a building with a flat glass wall. Lever House was to some 
extent a continuation of various architectural experimentations with a glass wall. Lewis 
Mumford found a positive aspect in Lever House.   
 
Lever House, by reason of the internal consistency in its design, is 
at the very least a highly useful experiment. Fragile, exquisite, 
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undaunted by the threat of being melted into a puddle by an atomic 
bomb, this building is a laughing refutation of “imperialist 




Mumford saw Lever House as a positive gesture because it did not surrender to the fear 
of a possibly imminent catastrophe. It was an expression of confidence in a peaceful 
future. Corporations needed both peace and confidence to prosper and expand.   
 
Manufacturers’ Trust Company Bank  
Only five-stories high, the Manufacturers’ Trust Company Bank, completed in October 
1954, is an example of architecture’s contribution to the embodiment of a new banking 
system (fig. 3.19). This building gave a new type expression to post-war banks. Located 
at 43rd Street and 5th Avenue in New York City, Manufacturers’ Trust Company Bank 
was designed by William S. Brown (coordination) and Gordon Bunshaft (design). Other 
collaborators included the interior designer Eleanor LeMaire, landscape architects Clarke 
& Rapuano, artist Harry Bertoia, and industrial designer Henry Dreyfuss. Despite its 
relatively small size, this bank is one of the most successful embodiments of teamwork 
from different disciplines. In addition to its formal innovations, the building presented 
                                            






itself as a critical example of post-war architecture, attempting to reorganize urban space 
in the American city.  
The building has a clear structural composition and meticulously designed 
details. A transparent glass box packed with elaborate mullion profiles, make up the 
building. The slabs behind the skin seem suspended in the air, eliminating any weight 
from the surface. The continuous horizontal lines of the interior and the grid-pattern on 
the façade create a sense of endless expansion and control (fig. 3.20). Due to its unique 
cantilever structure, there are only eight exposed columns, all of which look like 
freestanding objects. The offices and banking facilities are grouped according to function 
and located on the four main floors with the penthouse on the fifth floor. Mechanical and 
employee facilities are on the lower level (fig. 3.21).  
The main entrance, just off Fifth Avenue, is marked by two large double doors 
of plate glass divided by a panel of polished Canadian black granite, into which the night 
deposit facility is recessed (fig. 3.22). The first floor is devoted primarily to quick, 
convenient handling of the large volume of everyday banking transactions. The repetition 
of the grid on the ceiling and floor creates a sense of order and purpose. In addition, the 
bands on the ceiling serve to unite the air conditioning diffusers. The Otis escalators, 






banking area located on the second floor.  
A metal screen by Bertoia stands below the grids (fig. 3.23) (fig. 3. 24). 
Stretching seventy feet long, sixteen feet high and weighing six-tons, this sculptured 
screen functions as a partition wall while the escalators function as artistic instruments. 
The luminous ceilings, a product of the Marlux Corporation, greatly reduce the 
reflectivity of the glass wall in the daytime.  
The formal characteristics of the bank were not independent from the changes 
in the United States banking system. Horace C. Flanigan, the president of the bank at the 
time, indicated that “banking today is selling a service, and is to a great extent 
comparable with department stores and specialty shops where the aim is to provide 
inviting quarters and an attractive atmosphere as well as to sell quality merchandise.”58 
Accordingly, the building embodied this change with huge glass curtain walls set in 
polished aluminum frames (fig. 3.25). Ada L. Huxtable, the eminent American 
architecture critic, contended that “with deposits federally insured, banks are selling 
services, not security.”59
                                            
58 Horace C. Flanigan, quote from “1954 Building News: A Glass Bank and Two New Office Buildings,” 
The Architectural Record (October 1953): 10. 
 Gordon Bunshaft of SOM also proudly recalled, “The main 
contribution of Manufacturers Trust was that it broke the masonry-fortress psychology of 
 







branch banks up to then.”60
From Fifth Avenue, there is no sign of the function of the building except the 
shining vault door. The door was placed on the dark screen only ten feet away from the 
exterior glass wall (fig. 3.26). The vault, made of stainless steel and polished bronze, 
resulted from the collaboration between noted industrial designer Henry Dreyfuss, the 
architects of SOM, and the engineers of the Mosler Safe Company. It is argued that, 
mechanically, the thirty ton closure was so delicately balanced that it could be swung by a 
finger. Symbolically, it ensures that customers’ money is safe behind the sleek, metallic 
vault. Trust is established with the symbolic gesture that the employees’ actions can be 
seen through the transparent glass. Thus, “More than any single element, the vault door 
characterizes a bank building as a bank.”
 Until then, popular taste identified banks as massive, marble 
faced buildings. With the transparency of the Manufactures’ Trust Company Bank, SOM 
conceived of a new bank style of glass and steel with which the financial institution was 
entirely satisfied.  
61
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 The vault functions perfectly as a bank icon 
and is a part of Dreyfuss’s later exploration of ‘universal symbols’ illustrated in Symbol 
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Dreyfuss described his experience with the Mosler Safe in his autobiography, 
Designing for People; he wrote, “Our directive from the Mosler Safe Company was to 
incorporate their engineering staff’s improvements into a new concept that would reflect 
modern banking and contemporary architecture, yet still give the customer the feeling of 
security that is essential to the renters of safe-deposit boxes.”
  
63
Lewis Mumford characterized the appearance of the building as “a paradoxical 
combination of transparence and solidity.”
 A grilled gate with seven 
up-titled pikes was replaced with one simple mechanism without pikes and only one 
handle and two dials (fig. 3.28). While the original vault door revealed the inner 
mechanism of the vault, Dreyfuss’s design concealed it and invented a rather elegant new 
surface.   
64
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 The vault provided the building with a 
feeling of solid stillness entirely opposed to the open, flowing, transparent space, 
represented by emptiness and dynamic movements inside. The vault door was kept open 
during the day and was continuously emphasized by a spotlight at night. Mumford 
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correctly pointed out that it was “the most impressive possible symbol of security” and “a 
natural advertisement.” He continued to say that “this is what one might call inherent 
symbolism.”65 Combining a sense of security with advertisement, ‘inherent symbolism’ 
over-achieved its purpose. The door has become a universal symbol, which overcomes its 
heavy materiality. It became the most effective “window display.”66
Huxtable proposed an advanced reading of the building, stating that, “The 
whole, viewed from the outside, is no longer architectural in the traditional sense: it is a 
design, not a substance, but of color, light and motion.”
 The display is not a 
display of objects, but a new relationship in the flexible system of accumulation of capital 
in the post-war period. The shining vault door, black marble wall, and almost clear glass 
wall, as well as the city, the spectator, and the dim reflection of him self-represented the 
world of liberated phantasmagoric images (fig. 3.29).  
67
                                            
65 Ibid, 200. 
 When seen from the Fifth 
Avenue, the building seems to have virtually no physical presence except for the thick 
metal frames. The glass walls simply disappear, leaving only omnipresent grids. The bank 
becomes a design of color, light and motion. Any objects between the grids appear to be 
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released from their traditional roles and associations. When surrounded by the grids, 
human figures look like they are flowing, rather than occupying fixed space and time.  
From inside, another impact of the largest glass pane of the time became quite 
apparent. Jack Alexander of the Saturday Evening Post reported in 1957 that female 
employees were conscious of “being constantly on display-before sidewalk crowds, 
workers in nearby buildings and parties passing through on conducted tour.” A “more 
noticeable effect on personal habits and grooming” was observable among the two 
hundred female employees (fig. 3.30). A female worker explained, “You can’t help being 
alert and pleasant when you know that you are performing in a showcase.”68
However, the interaction was purely visual. The bank, although seemingly 
open, was physically sealed. Alexander writes, “To those on the inside, the traffic noises 
of midtown seem muted and remote and the bank itself a quiet, luxurious enclave in a 
rackety, hurried world whose atmosphere is polluted with soot and exhaust gases.”
 The acts of 
seeing and being seen were violently intensified inside the glass box (fig. 3.31).  
69
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 The 
glass box creates an entirely sterile, enclosed environment within the bustling city. 
Therefore, the gestures and interactions created by the bank are non-communicative. 
 






There are pure gestures and empty interactions. The distance between inside and outside 
becomes infinite and at the same time non-existent.  
The bank also creates an interior park, or a hole, on Fifth Avenue where urban 
architecture sacrifices its materiality and solidity to visualize the post-war urban space as 
dynamic, yet inaccessible and incommunicable (fig. 3.32). The vertical and horizontal 
lines created by the endless repetition of the module seem lightweight, yet they expand in 
all directions. This creates a mysterious sense of depth along with an open, continuous 
space. Free, dynamic, yet almost depthless interactions among objects and people 
exemplify a new experience of urban space initiated by the postwar economic and 
political transformation in the post-war American city. There is no attempt to rebuild the 
urban fabric in the heart of the city, simply an intensification of the human experience 
that has been liberated from the urban fabric. The post-war urban space of New York City 
was gradually being fragmented and transformed into a spectacle.  
 
The U.S. Air Force Academy 
SOM’s rise in the 1950s would not have been conceivable without its involvement with 
the military-industrial complex. Large corporations of the country collaborated with the 






important role, is a good example of this. Although the term, “military-industrial 
complex,” became popular after President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s farewell address in 
January, 1961, its growing power was apparent during the Second World War. Beginning 
with the Cold War, the military-industrial complex grew stronger, and SOM greatly 
benefitted from being a part of it. Designing and constructing large military bases or 
airports in foreign countries, SOM embodied a new image of the American military 
institution with modern visual language. The United States Air Force Academy 
exemplifies this.  
On May 15, 1955, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) announced plans for its 
Academy project in Colorado Springs. Created as a direct result of the National Security 
Act of 1947, the USAF would formulate a new direction for the American military.70 The 
lawmakers hoped to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the 
country through three military departments – the Army, the Navy (including Naval 
Aviation and the Marine Corps), and the Air Force – providing coordination and unified 
direction under civilian control without merging them.71
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The Air Force initially had difficulty securing an adequate source of trained 
officers. In 1949, the Army and the Navy agreed to allow twenty-five percent of the 
graduating classes at the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at 
Annapolis to accept commissions in the Air Force.72 There was an urgent need to 
establish an independent system for recruiting officers and to formulate a strong identity 
among them. Although President Truman signed the legislation that created a separate Air 
Force, it was President Eisenhower who appointed Harold E. Talbott as Secretary of the 
USAF in 1953. Talbott materialized the Air Force Academy project. When the U.S. 
Congress authorized the creation of the Academy in April 1954, Talbott began to search 
for a permanent site. Two months later, he chose a site on the east slope of the Rampart 
Range of the Rocky Mountains near Colorado Springs (fig. 3.33) (fig. 3.34) (fig. 3.35).73
The leaders of the academy knew they had to find a new way to train highly 




                                                                                                                                  
 
 Like civilian organizations with similar problems, the Air 
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Force chose to follow the “business school approach to organized decision-making."75
Today it seems obvious that SOM was selected for the project considering the 
firm had successfully completed many projects with corporate clients with similar 
aspirations. Yet, the process shows SOM’s ongoing evolution. From the large number of 
applicants, the Selection Board chose a small number of the firms to interview 
representatives. Among them were SOM, Kittyhawk Associates, Eero Saarinen, Harrison 
and Abramovitz, Pietro Belluschi, and Pereira and Luckman. After seeing the site, 
Owings decided against submitting a sketch design for the final interview, wanting to be 
free of a priori choices. Instead, he presented a work progress chart, from master 
planning and design through the construction phase, showing the firm's intentions with 
regard to research, programming, scheduling and design. Owings wrote that, "Our own 
presentation consisted of fifteen panels, each devoted to one aspect of the total problem: 
research, programming, scheduling and design of the academy."
 In 
other words, facing a totally new organizational challenge, the Air Force and its academy 
tried to imitate business.  
76 SOM emphasized the 
process of design and its ability to manage the complexities of the project.77
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approach in fact resulted from SOM’s experiences with the military both during and after 
the Second World War.   
Owings’s gamble proved worthwhile since SOM was awarded the contract on 
July 23, 1954.78 The design evolved between 1954 and 1957 and construction took place 
from 1956 to 1962. The project was initially directed by Bunshaft from New York with 
Walter A. Netsch, Jr. from Chicago. The firm’s goal was to create a modern academy that 
would not repeat the aged images of West Point and Annapolis. Owings recalled that "It 
would be great to have a hand in creating from scratch a contemporary academy as a 
counterpoint to Classic Annapolis and Gothic West Point."79 In June 1955, Architectural 
Forum commented that, "SOM's models indicated their Air Force architecture will be 
traceable directly to the dynamic tradition of the great airplane hangars and the airplanes 
themselves. It will be straight, simple U.S.-industrial-age idiom, but with the added 
refinement of what Owings called 'global style'."80
                                                                                                                                  
77 For more information, see Kristen Schaffer, "Creating a National Monument: Planning and Designing 
the Academy," in Modernism at Mid-Century, 29-30.   
 SOM followed and updated the glass 
 
78 According to Gordon Bunshaft's recollection, there were two people that Talbott was strongly influenced 
by: Mrs. Talbott and Farzar Wilde. The former was then the chairman of the New York Infirmary which 
was designed by SOM, and the latter was an old friend of Talbott and head of Connecticut General Life 
Insurance. Wilde was enthusiastic about his experience with SOM which had designed the corporate 
headquarters for the company. See Gordon Bunshaft, "Recollections of Gordon Bunshaft," in Modernism at 
Mid-Century, 186-89. 
 
79 Owings, The Spaces In Between, 150. 
 






and steel precedents of anonymous industrial pioneers, not to mention several well-
known leaders in architectural engineering such as Albert Kahn, Mies van der Rohe, 
Buckminster Fuller and Konrad Wachsmann. At the same time, the architects of SOM 
devised an artistically sophisticated project.  
Despite some support from the Air Force, SOM’s early design raised some 
public controversy. In 1955, Frank Lloyd Wright went to Washington to testify before 
Congress, demanding that SOM's design be replaced by one more "in harmony with the 
rugged mountains and natural beauty of the West."81 He lambasted the design, calling it 
“half-baked” and “a birdmen’s factory.”82 Although the style of the design played a large 
role in his attack, Wright's opinion was further biased by his own unsuccessful pursuit of 
the design commission as a member of the Kittyhawk Associates team put together by 
Cleveland architect Richard Hawley Cutting.83
                                                                                                                                  
 
 Fearful that funding for the project would 
be withheld indefinitely, Air Force Secretary Harold E. Talbott presented a Senate 
committee with revised drawings showing the reduced use of glass. In addition, Talbott 
warned the committee that a whole year would be lost if funds were not provided. The 
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question of style remained a topic of heated public debate. Many architects supported 
SOM's design as an appropriate expression of function and technology.84
  
 The New York 
Times ridiculed the Congressional reservations.    
To the congressional mind, untutored in the recondite processes of 
modern art…[modern] suggests such radical images as Pablo 
Picasso, one-eyed women, and melting watches…. A plan for the jet 
age it may be, but the suspicion in Washington is that Congress 
would breathe easier if the architects would come back with a 
variation blending Chartres Cathedral and Independence Hall.85
 
  
To many members of Congress, SOM’s modern design appeared radical and 
inappropriate for the important military institution. They wanted an authoritative and 
traditional style built of natural materials such as stone. However, the leaders of the Air 
Force themselves wanted a modern building which would project its progressive image. 
Moreover, it was economically unwise to build the Academy in a traditional style with 
stone. Hanson W. Baldwin wrote for the New York Times on July 11, 1955: 
 
It is probable that when the architectural skirmishing has been 
finished, the final style that will evolve will be a modified 
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contemporary functional, utilizing much metal and glass.  
The use of much stone as at West Point and Annapolis is simply too 
expensive today, Air Force officers say. The total authorization of 
the Air Force Academy today is $126,000,000. If West Point or 
Annapolis were to be built today, the cost of either institution 
probably would be between $250,000,000 and $700,000,000. 
Despite congressional critics, it seems certain that the cold hard 
facts of economics will force the architectural style of the new 
academy into a modified modern mold.86
 
  
This assessment appears almost prescient. Building the Air Force Academy with a 
classical style such as at West Point or Annapolis would cost much more than the budget 
allowed. Modern was economical. In the end, when the debate was over, there was little 
change in the design.87 All the buildings were formed almost entirely of gleaming 
industrial materials such as aluminum, steel and gray tinted glass. Panels of ceramic tile 
in bright colors stressed the perfection of the machined materials.88
SOM designers used modules beginning in the early stages of design, which 
 SOM’s choice of a 
modern design and new materials gave the Academy the appearance of a new, 
progressive military institution.  
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facilitated not only construction but design thinking as well.89 However, instead of 
providing multiple examples, it is better to focus on Cadet Dining Hall which best 
represents the use of modules (fig. 3.36) (fig. 3.37) (fig. 3.38). To accommodate the entire 
cadet corps in one sitting, this hall provided a two hundred fifty-two feet square, 
completely column-free dining space. The twenty-four foot high roof structure consisted 
of forty-six prefabricated steel trusses intersecting at right angles and supported the three 
hundred and eight foot square roof. The framing rested on sixteen exterior steel columns, 
four to a side, with cantilevers of twenty-two feet on each of the four sides. The square, 
coffered, metal ceiling housed light fixtures and air-conditioning outlets and provided for 
good acoustics.90 All exterior walls were of plate glass with aluminum mullions. The 
senior structural designers at SOM utilized a computer system developed at the 
University of Illinois for calculation. Engineers at the firm suggested the use of the Uni-
Vac mainframe computer.91 This was one of the earliest applications of the computer in 
structural analysis.92
                                            
89 "United States Air Force Academy," Architectural Record (June 1955): 172. It says, "A 3 ft. 6 in. module 
has been used throughout." 
 SOM architects and engineers took advantage of new technological 
 
90 Ernst Danz, Architecture of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 1950-1962 (New York, Washington: Frederick 
A Praeger, 1963), 112. 
 
91 Gertrude Kerbis, Oral History of Gertrude Kerbis, Interviewed by Betty J. Blum (The Art Institute of 
Chicago, 1997), 76.  
 






developments to solve various structural obstacles.   
Gertrude Kebris, who participated in the design of the Air Force Academy, 
recalled that the design of the dining hall was inspired by Mies van der Rohe’s 
Convention Hall Project (1953-54) in Chicago. Although influenced by Mies, SOM 
engineers materialized the structure by building the roof on the ground and then elevating 
it into place. At the time, hydraulic lift technology was used for construction in Texas. 
The SOM engineers and U.S. Steel, who was part of the construction team for the 
Academy complex, decided to apply this same method. It was the first time a hydraulic 
lift was applied to steel construction. Mies would employ the same method in the 
construction of the Berlin National Gallery (1962-68).93
The ceiling of SOM’s dining hall seems to float in the air since the structural 
system is hidden, fabricating yet another layer of module (fig. 3.39). Konrad Wachsmann 
provided a close reading of the ceiling.   
  
 
The modular order defines space. Each ceiling panel becomes a 
mechanical function. Its technically determined form is 
concentrated in the outlets for lighting, air conditioning, ventilating 
and communication systems. The room is a combination of self-
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contained parts, not intended to carry loads or indicate the 
distribution of forces in the structure. The dominant effect is that 
linear correlation of the elements.94
 
  
While the pattern appears simple, the operation of the ventilation and the lighting is 
meticulous and well concealed (fig. 3.40). SOM designers hid the connections between 
the roof truss and columns, systematically eliminating tectonic expression. All pieces 
float as “self-contained parts” in a weightless space. Endless grids of a module hover 
over empty space (fig. 3.41). The linear correlation of all of the elements shows the 
repetition and expansion of a module. This weightless, expansive, yet orderly space 
seems a suitable symbol of the rising military institution. While the chapel was more 
literally and formally related to the idea of the Air Force, the dining hall represents a 
similar idea spatially.    
The Academy’s interior design and the furnishing of all the items and 
equipment was done by Walter Dorwin Teague Associates (WDTA). Pencil Points called 
Walter Dorwin Teague the "Master of Design" in September 1937. Diane Cochrane 
characterized him as the "Great American Design Machine" in Industrial Design. WDTA 
had become one of the largest industrial firms in the United States by the 1950s along 
                                            






with Raymond Loewy Associates, Eliot Noyes and George Nelson. Considering WDTA’s 
experience with large corporations such as Eastman Kodak, Proctor and Gamble and 
Boeing, it is no wonder why the Air Force chose WDTA.   
Industrial Design reported that WDTA won the U.S. Air Force contract: “The 
U.S. Air Force Academy in Denver has paid a tribute, by deciding that the interior 
arrangements, equipment and furnishings of all Academy buildings should be the 
responsibility of industrial design."95 The task was daunting. It was estimated that 60,000 
kinds of equipment and fittings had to be selected and specified, of which some 1,500 
would have to be designed.96 Their interior work included the furnishing of 3.5 million 
square feet of space – dining halls, dormitory rooms, classrooms, and other areas (fig. 
3.42) (fig. 3.43) (fig. 3.44).97
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 The firm built full size mock-ups of two of the typical 
dormitory rooms which made possible the testing of acoustics, lighting, and such 
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furnishing details such as doorknobs and wastebaskets.98 In order to efficiently operate, 
WDTA structured the project team into two groups, one located in Denver and the other 
in New York. A team of twelve designers in Denver worked closely with SOM and the 
military to get approval on preliminary designs. On the other side, around twenty 
designers in New York carried out finished or definitive plans based on the Denver 
group's preliminary designs. The New York team researched the accessibility of 
commercial items and took part in follow-through on equipment including the 
preparation of procurement documents.99
In the early stage of the design, the Air Force specified four basic requirements 
to WDTA: economy, standardization, compatibility with SOM's architecture, and 
furnishings with durability and a life span of fifty years.
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or designed furnishings and selected colors, fabrics, and floor-coverings–much as if the 
job were one of decorating on a grand scale. The necessity for specifying items in the tens 
of thousands determined their other role as equipment engineers. 
The essential part of this task was the 13-digit IBM code with which designers 
were able to codify every item they were dealing with (fig. 3.45). In the code, the last 
seven digits provide complete identification of every piece of equipment and all its 
infinite variations, including frame material, special designation, upholstery and color. 
The code was a symbol of what equipment engineering meant; digitized design of every 
object.101
WDTA (with SOM) also used a color code to establish the character of an area 
and create uniformity. Thus, variety was created in those everyday items reproduced 
multiple times. The essence of WDTA's approach could be summarized as versatility 
through standardization. Standardized variations of a basic chair, for instance, fitted it for 
use in areas of widely differing function and character.
 In the project, computation of the design was vividly seen as an active 
response to the architectural challenge. The IBM code was critical to satisfying the 
requirements of the Air Force and SOM.  
102
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 Netsch commented on the use 
 







of color. Concerning the cadet rooms, he emphasized providing flexibility in the uniform 
space. The use of color for the blankets would vary with each class: red for seniors, 
electric blue for juniors, golden yellow for sophomores and dark blue for freshmen. He 
insisted that cadets might have "some variety within a regimented military space where 
all the quarters were masculine; and you could pick up accents through the special 
arrangements of the standardized furniture or through accent colors."103
There was extra effort made to maintain the attention of the cadets in the 
classrooms. "Windowless classrooms, arranged in clusters for flexibility, were 
deliberately designed to focus attention, blackboard-lined for daily cadet routine."
 Is it possible to 
argue that those colors were really symbols of variety? Each color functioned exactly as 
if it were an electrical signal, allowing designers to easily arrange their items and helping 
the cadets to adjust to the circumstance they were facing. The variety, in fact, directly led 
to control and discipline with which the organization is maintained. 
104
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 All 
the classrooms were similar to each other, if not identical. Netsch recalled that "We set up 
interior classrooms to offer a closed and concentrated experience while the cadet was in it, 
because for the kind of instruction at the academy little is learned by gazing on the 
 







mountains and you had better concentrate on the blackboard."105
 
 There were no windows, 
just walls of blackboard (fig. 3.46) (fig. 3.47). Again, the ceiling and the floor shared the 
same grid pattern which was the setting for the hidden codes of chairs, tables and other 
equipment. WDTA successfully completed its task at the Air Force Academy. Reviewing 
WDTA’s activities, Industrial Design summarized the significance of the project.  
Aside from the general excitement created by the Academy, the 
Teague [WDTA] assignment has a special significance for designers. 
In an age of corporate 'bigness,' designers may increasingly be 
faced with similar problems of large-scale, or 'organizational' design. 
Solutions may be as numerous as the design offices which enter this 
field, but Teague's approach – decentralization, delegating authority, 
detailed tabulation (based on a central system of standardization) – 
may be a guide.106
 
 
Systematization of design and furnishing helped the industrial design firm organize their 
processes more effectively. However, the same evaluation can be applied to SOM. 
Dealing with one of the largest commissions in modern history, the two firms developed 
an efficient system of practice, which later became common in architecture and industrial 
design. The guide has been accepted and developed by many corporate design firms. 
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These skills are no longer a hidden secret, but are now entirely revealed and have become 
basics in the design business. On the slope of the Rampart Range of the Rocky Mountains, 
the business-minded military leaders decided to build the Air Force Academy in which 
they also hoped to exemplify a new way of organizing the military. SOM and WDTA 
took charge of almost all designs including selecting the required items at the Academy. 
Their collaboration and the final result symbolize architecture and design in the age of the 
military-industrial complex. 
 
Behind the Glass Wall: Foreign Operations 
While working on the $133 million Air Force Academy project, SOM also worked on 
various architecturally prominent projects for corporate clients. They were the Inland 
Steel Company building (1958), which Mies called “the best building in Chicago,” and 
the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company headquarters (1957). The San 
Francisco office also erected the Crown Zellerbach building (1959).107
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 All of these 
buildings greatly contributed to the enhancement of SOM’s position as the leading firm in 
modern architecture. To American society, SOM was represented by advanced glass and 






scale projects avoided public attention, in particular, some of the firm’s foreign projects.    
Furthermore, SOM’s foreign activities were much larger in scale and more 
complex in program. SOM’s capacity to complete such projects skillfully came from its 
experiences at Oak Ridge, where the partners of the firm were “willing and able to handle 
jobs no one then expected an architect to manage, including site surveying and master 
planning as well as design.”108
In 1946, SOM worked for the Creole Petroleum Corporation, a branch of the 
Standard Oil Company, constructing refineries in Venezuela. With the rising pressure for 
sufficient oil supply, oil companies expanded their production. The construction of a new 
town complex for the refineries was part of the efforts to relieve the pressure of the world 
oil and gasoline shortage. The Creole project was considered the largest single building 
program for Standard Oil up to that time, estimated to cost around $120 million in 1946. 
The program was to build an industrial town for 10,000 people. Like Oak Ridge during 
the war, SOM designed the whole town including housing, a community center, schools, 
 As in Oak Ridge, SOM worked as an architecture-
engineering firm covering site survey, master planning, various building designs and 
construction supervision. SOM’s wartime experience helped the firm successfully win 
and manage projects in foreign countries.  
                                            






hospitals, clubs and other facilities necessary for normal town living.109 SOM had a 
similar project in the same time period for a company named Standard Vacuum Oil 
jointly owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey and Mobil. For this company, SOM 
designed housing, schools, hospitals, offices and other facilities for refineries in Sumatra, 
Indonesia.110
SOM’s military commissions were even larger than the project in Venezuela. 
The firm SOM worked with the Corps of Engineers on the Far East Command’s 
Construction program as the architect-engineer. The firm set up a Tokyo Office in 1950, a 
sub-office of the San Francisco Office, and moved to Okinawa in 1953. SOM worked as 
part of the Okinawa Engineer District for the construction of a permanent military base 
on the island.
  
111 Walter Simmons reported for the Chicago Daily Tribune in 1952 that 
Okinawa was “being groomed as America’s forward atomic base in the Pacific” and 
about $300 million had been budgeted for the project.112
                                            
109 Permanent Housing Project: Creole Petroleum Corporation, Amuay Bay, Venezuela, S.A. New York, 
1946. The architect-engineer for this project was Skidmore, Owings & Merrill–Philip Ives.  
 SOM did site analysis of vast 
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areas on the island, developed master plans, and planned various facilities, dormitories 
and houses for a town. The project was to build all the necessary buildings, power plants, 
highways and airfields for the large scale military operations in the Pacific. The base was 
to serve as an “overall Far East Headquarters” for the United States.113 The temporary 
SOM Okinawa office headed by John O. Merrill hired 250 Americans, 150 Filipinos, 250 
Japanese, and 150 Okinawans in 1953.114 At one moment, the Okinawa office was one 
of the largest jobsite staff organized by SOM.115
The firm also worked on the construction of “five huge air bases” for the U.S. 
Air Force in the French Protectorate of Morocco. The air bases were part of the Air 
Force’s strategic plan to increase their presence in the area. To execute the mission of 
designing and constructing five air fields and related facilities, SOM organized a joint 
venture with Owings’s former Civil Engineering professor at Cornell University, who 
Owings called ‘Professor Urquhart.’ Working with the Army Corps of Engineers, the 
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After the Second World War, SOM worked with the military and many 
corporations in designing towns, bases and buildings in foreign countries. In many of 
those foreign operations, the firm played more complex and extensive roles abroad than it 
did at home. SOM’s success came from its capacity to undertake some of the most urgent 
and complex projects in an efficient and timely manner, allowing SOM to be deeply 
trusted by the military and corporations. The firm was, simply put, an essential part of 
Pax Americana. Ironically, SOM presented itself as a firm of modern architecture largely 
emphasizing the formal aspects of its work. Architectural communities and the general 
public scarcely knew the firm’s extensive operations on foreign soils. While constructing 
some of the finest examples of sleek, glass and metal office buildings in urban and 
suburban areas in the United States in the 1950s, SOM was building towns with master 
planning, site analysis, building projects, roads, water and sewage systems and power 
plants in foreign countries. SOM’s operations went far beyond any traditional definition 
of architecture.  
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Constructing Corporate Architecture: Hitchcock, Wright, Giedion and SOM  
  
 
But the real problems in the interpretation of modern architecture 
that concern us most are really the problems related to the definition 
of what constitutes the best present-day practice. These problems 
tangle themselves in aesthetics and sociology and the fact that we 
are well into a period in which the greater part of architectural 
production is destined to be bureaucratic and anonymous make 
many students reject a priori the lessons that remain to be learned 
from the great individual architects who have already made their 
mark in the twentieth century and who are, some of them, teachers in 
our schools. There seems to be a dilemma about articulate architects, 
notoriously in the cases of Le Corbusier and Wright. A very different 
doctrine emerges from the study of their executed buildings and 
projects than from a careful reading of their prolific written 
exhortations. Architectural students, themselves, perhaps 
automatically divide between those who are most influenced and 
educated by what they see and those who, either in their courses or 
in their general reading, are more influenced by what they hear and 
read. Both types tend to become connoisseurs of architecture, either 
in graphic documents or in written opinions, and both need, for such 
things as the sense of scale and a feeling for materials as 
distinguished from an intellectual grasp of their use, frequent contact 
with real buildings. That contact should not be restricted to the 
hypothetical masterpieces of the present, however justifiable it may 
be to concentrate in the further past upon a few masterpieces, but it 
certainly should not ignore the work of those who have been 
considered the twentieth century masters. 






of Modern Architecture,” 1942   
 
The American discourse on modern architecture changed dramatically after 1950 with the 
rise of corporate firms like SOM. The label “corporate modernism” emerged soon 
thereafter, partially in response to these changes, although it is unclear who used it first. 
The term suggests that the architectural icons of an ‘aberrant’ modernism are subservient 
to American corporate clients and, therefore, superficial in initial design concepts and 
their formal resolution.1
The term is clearly a critique of mid-twentieth-century American capitalism 
which seemed to dominate the cultural world at that time. The judgment was clear from 
the start: corporate modernism was a corruption of Europe’s true and real modernism that 
had consciously resisted these forces. Large architectural firms, such as SOM, were 
demonized as exemplars of this perfidious change. However, for us to comprehend the 
complex changes that did indeed recast modern American architecture in the mid-
 Combining the two words, architectural critics and historians 
sharply differentiated one from the other, good from bad, pure from impure, utopian from 
dystopian.  
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twentieth century, it is crucial to examine how American architects and critics of that era 
tried to understand this phenomenon. Not surprisingly, SOM was often used as the prime 
example of a transformation that held new possibilities as well as many risks.    
Henry-Russell Hitchcock, often considered one of the most influential 
historians of modern architecture, described and justified the early development of large 
firms like SOM under the rubric of “The Architecture of Bureaucracy.”2
There is no doubt that modern architecture became dominant after the war, 
especially in the United States. This moment coincided with the construction of internal 
enemies as well as opposing approaches to modern architecture. A common commitment 
was now divided into opposing camps: genius versus bureaucracy, also known as creative 
 There are 
fundamental differences between this term, the architecture of bureaucracy, and what is 
commonly meant by the later term, “corporate modernism.” Nevertheless, Hitchcock’s 
terminology is the most conspicuous qualifier of the former. Beginning with Hitchcock’s 
theory and his interactions with SOM, this chapter illustrates how the idea of corporate 
architecture emerged and changed during the postwar evolution of modern architecture in 
the United States and in the world.  
                                            
2 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, “Modern Architecture – A Memoir,” Journal of the Society of Architectural 
Historians (December 1968): 227-33 and Helen Searing, “Henry-Russell Hitchcock: The Architectural 
Historian as Critic and Connoisseur,” in Elisabeth Blair MacDougall (ed.), The Architectural Historian in 






versus corporate architecture. While the battle between modern and classical architecture 
was still fundamental and encompassed the issue of style, this internal battle was limited 
to methods of production often difficult to discern and a sometimes ambiguous rhetoric of 
quality against quantity. The intentional separation of the two approaches to modernism 
ultimately helped the discipline of architecture concentrate on a safe haven of forms 
instead of engaging in the overwhelming social, cultural, economic and, political changes 
of the last several decades. However, the identification of “genius,” or creative 
individuals resisting yet operating within an otherwise rational world, created a 
dangerous state of schizophrenia in architecture. To some extent, we could say that the 
discipline sought to negate itself in order to keep its identity at an impossibly pure state.   
 
“The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius”   
Exactly fifteen years after the canonical International Style in 1932, Hitchcock published 
an article in January 1947 in Architectural Review entitled, “The Architecture of 
Bureaucracy & the Architecture of the Genius.” While the former focused on formal 
aspects of modern architecture, the latter dealt with organizational aspects of architecture 
firms. The author claimed that the emergence of teamwork in building design and 






generate a “new architecture of bureaucracy.”3 Embracing modernism was no longer the 
major problem of architecture in the middle of the twentieth century, wrote Hitchcock; it 
was that of maintaining quality in the rush of modern design. Architecture’s most 
important consideration should be the “basic conditions of the times.” In this regard, the 
vast task of reconstruction after the Second World War was the main cause of the division 
between the architecture of bureaucracy and the architecture of genius and their 
respective missions.4
In a previously unpublished article, “Industrial Architecture,” Hitchcock 
insisted that advanced industrial architecture would require the organizational 
advancement of architectural offices. While discussing Gropius and his work, the Fagus 
Factory (1911-13), Hitchcock argued that despite the influence of the project, the 
architect remained an individual architect rather than developing an architectural 
organization “to cope with all the problems which the continuous designing of large-scale 
   
                                            
3 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, “The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius,” 
Architectural Review (January 1947): 4. Hitchcock reasoned this dichotomy until his later years and 
applied a different set of criticisms to them.  
 
4 During the Second World War, Hitchcock expected vast reconstruction of the destroyed cities. He wrote 
that “the appalling destruction of European cities has the silver lining that it clears the way for drastic 
urban solutions.” The historian believed what “men in the early twentieth century have dreamed of as 
possible through architecture, will finally in the next quarter century, come to large scale actualization.” 
Henry-Russell Hitchcock, “War Influences on Architecture,” Broadcast Over W.G.Y. Schenectady on 
June 30, 1942. “Lectures” File, Box 24, The Henry-Russell Hitchcock Papers, The Archives of American 







industrial projects demand.” To Hitchcock, Europe did not have the right condition for 
industrial architecture. But, America was different.  
 
But the fullest of industrial architecture required the 
industrialization of the architectural office itself and that was fully 
developed perhaps only in America.  
In America, conversely, where the necessary organization of the 
architectural office was early developed, the contribution of the 
architect as individual genius was less than abroad… It is inevitable, 
perhaps, that the group coordination of the large organizations 
which build American factories should function best in dealing with 
whole plants where the full range of the many talents grouped under 
a single head can work out the entire problem with something of the 




Industrialization or rationalization of architectural practice was a necessary condition for 
advanced industrial architecture. Hitchcock believed the United States was the right place 
for successful industrial architecture due to its large factories and ability to manage them 
effectively. Moreover, the influence of individual genius appeared to be much less in the 
United States than in Europe. He believed that the achievement of the best industrial 
architecture as in Detroit would be positive. It would be double-sided. On the one side, 
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there would be advanced architectural production and organization. This practical side 
would help architectural firms to tackle growing size and complexity of projects. On the 
on the other, this new situation would cultivate “the impersonal architectural expression” 
in architecture.6
Hitchcock proposed a similar notion of impersonality in the bureaucracy article 
of 1947. By defining bureaucratic architecture as “all building that is the product of large-
scale architectural organizations, from which personal expression is absent,”
  
7 Hitchcock 
simply meant architecture produced by large-scale architectural organizations displaying 
little personal expression. The term explained how a building was produced. The model 
of bureaucratic architecture was not government ministries, which Hitchcock saw as 
rather loosely organized, but the work of an architectural firm such as Albert Kahn, Inc. 
Such a firm did not depend on an individual genius but on the “organizational genius 
which can establish a fool-proof system of rapid and complete plan production.”8
                                            
6 Ibid.  
 While 
Kahn was seen as an average architect and individual, the Kahn firm appeared as an 
organizational masterpiece. Hitchcock describes its production process: 
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The different sets of plans for construction, for wiring, for heating, 
etc., and even for design, ought to come down the line and meet on 
the site with as perfect mutual co-ordination as machine parts come 
from the various sections of a factory to be joined first into sub-




This highly organized process was necessary for the vast reconstruction of post-Second 
World War America; one person, whether a genius or not, could not master all the 
problems involved in such a large project.10
By combining various considerations in a complicated building project as in a 
well-coordinated machine, “bureaucratic architecture can achieve in experienced hands a 
high level of amenity.” The absence of personal expression in bureaucratic architecture 
 Thus, the post-war industrial demand in 
America legitimized the emergence of bureaucratic architecture. As more complex 
programs and larger projects emerged, Hitchcock contended that the architecture of 
bureaucracy was a completely natural evolution of modern architecture.  
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10 Hitchcock prepared several photographs for the article. One of them was a photo of Eero Saarinen’s 
General Motors Research Institute, which was presumably an example of bureaucratic architecture. “I 
have now photographs of the Wright model of the Guggenheim Museum of Non-Objective Art, the 
General Motors Research Institute by Eero Saarinen and a wind tunnel connected with the plant where I 
was working. I am also after photographs of a characteristic wartime plant, Dodge-Chicago, which were 
promised me by the Kahn office when I was in Detroit, and am attempting to obtain photographs of Oak 
Ridge, the A-bomb city.” The Architectural Review ultimately did not include the General Motors 
Research building and the wind tunnel. Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Letter to Nikolaus Pevsner on October 






was regarded as the natural result of its organizational development. Now, the issue of 
quality in bureaucratic architecture was “to raise housing, schools, and other community 
facilities to the level of the best new factories,” like those designed by the Albert Kahn 
office.11
Hitchcock employed the terms “bureaucrat” and “bureaucratic” without the 
“pejorative connotation which they have for many people.” The term was used only to 
designate the organizational structure of an architectural office. Likewise, “genius” was 
intended to define an architect who worked as “a creative individual rather than an 
anonymous member of a team.”
 
12 Genius merely implied an individual’s “psychological 
approach and way of working at architecture which may or may not produce 
masterpieces.” Bureaucratic architecture was assessed from the sum of its particular 
amenities compared to similar buildings while the quality of architecture of genius 
depends on overall impact, thus becoming an “organism not a mechanical assembly of 
parts.”13
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 For this reason, Hitchcock did not appraise Frank Lloyd Wright’s Solomon R. 
Guggenheim Museum as a collection of fragmented parts but as a whole, like a work of 
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art.    
The architecture of genius was an “artistic gamble” that may or may not be 
pulled off. On the contrary, the architecture of bureaucracy was expected to meet certain 
expectations and solve enormous practical needs by way of technically and 
programmatically capable hands. Hitchcock insisted that giving the commission of large-
scale practical projects such as factories, schools or housing projects a single architect-
genius is undesirable and risky because those projects involve too many technical and 
practical considerations for a single designer to take care of. In the end, according to 
Hitchcock, the designer sets up a pseudo-bureaucratic organization, yet it is not possible 
because the individual is not likely to have either “the taste or the special administrative 
and executive talent.”14
This is not to say that the architecture of genius is no longer necessary. Some 
buildings by architects of genius are needed in order to balance and relieve “the necessary 
monotony and the low level of plastic interest of the bureaucratic architecture.”
  
15
                                            
14 Ibid, 6.  
 Focal 
structures such as the theatres, churches, libraries, and municipal buildings, which serve 
the community as a whole, should be given to the architect of genius and the rest, 
 







including housing projects, schools, or hospitals, to the bureaucratic architectural 
organization. Thus, the role of a genius was defined in comparison with the architecture 
of bureaucracy. Like different types of projects, their architectural criteria should be 
separate. Hitchcock insisted that conceptually “the two types of work are distinctive and 
should not be subjected to the same type of analysis and criticism any more than the same 
type of analysis and criticism should be applied to a Hawksmoor church or Soane art 
gallery on the one hand to a London square or terrace of their periods on the other.” The 
two types of practice should be evaluated separately. Hitchcock elaborated further.   
 
Both sorts of work require technical mastery of the structural means 
of the day, both require skilful analysis of purpose and mastery of 
functional planning, both need thorough and consistent designing; 
but only complex individual structures of generalized symbolic 
meaning actually fail architecturally when there has been no 
individual imaginative formulation. While in the eighteenth century 
terrace of houses or the twentieth century factory too intense an 




In this manner, Hitchcock clearly separated the two types of architectural production, 
assigning each group different roles to play in the reconstruction of post-Second World 
                                            







War cities. The architecture of bureaucracy played an essential role in solving urgent 
practical problems, combining modern aesthetics with new technology and introducing 
new modern organizational methods to architecture. There was less consideration for the 
style and more for “quality in the terms appropriate to the method of architectural 
production.”17 The emphasis on a few men’s contributions gave excessive weight to 
unique structures such as churches, museums and private houses “in a world actually 
more largely concerned with extensive projects of rebuilding bombed towns, large and 
small, with re-housing rapidly a high proportion of national populations and, now in 
America, with innumerable programs of renewal of the cores of existing cities.”18
This does not mean that Hitchcock drastically altered his position from the 
formalism exhibited in the International Style book to a more inclusive stance. Even in 
1948, the historian argued that “architecture has always been essentially an abstract 
 The 
architect of genius lacks the capability of undertaking the speedy construction of complex 
practical and technical buildings. The question of style in the 1932 International Style 
exhibition was now replaced by the economic, political, and technological necessity of 
the rising corporate world.  
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art.”19 Now, he wanted to contextualize formalism in a world where modern forms were 
inevitable and omnipresent. It should be noted that Hitchcock had intentionally avoided 
any socio-political issues crucial to European modernism in the 1932 catalogue, the most 
calamitous year of the Great Depression. He continued to avoid social issues, attempting 
instead to identify and separate the architecture of bureaucracy from the architecture of 
genius without focusing on whether certain forms were modern or not. Simply put, he 
focused on how architecture was produced, not how it looked. Firmly taking the position 
of the architectural historian as a ‘connoisseur’ of images,20
For the first time, the historian divided modern architecture into two groups 
based on their method of production regardless of the quality of their work. Hitchcock’s 
distinction between bureaucracy and genius in architecture had no precedent in 
 Hitchcock noted two kinds 
of architecture: one produced by a single designer and the other by a group of participants. 
He tried to preserve the pristine world of genius in which architectural forms still had 
some hermetic meaning while accepting the accelerating bureaucratization and its 
mechanical production of architecture by corporate firms. In this sense, the historian’s 
work appeared to be part of the ideology of the Pax-Americana.      
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architectural history. However, he most likely drew upon the work of Max Weber. In 
1946, a year before the publication of Hitchcock’s article, Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright 
Mills translated and edited a collection of Weber’s theories and published them: From 
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. This book was divided into four sections, “Science and 
Politics,” “Power,” “Religion” and “Social Structures.” The section on Power included 
segments about two types of authority: bureaucratic and charismatic.21
Weber had originally argued that there are three pure types of legitimate 
authority in history: traditional, charismatic, and legal rational authority. Traditional 
authority relies on belief in the sanctity of immemorial tradition and custom. This type is 
embodied by tribal chiefs, patriarchs, and feudal aristocrats. Charismatic authority rests 
on devotion to the sanctity, heroism or individual attractiveness of a heroic figure. 
Revolutionary political leaders, religious prophets or legendary warriors fall under this 
heading. The third type is legal rational authority based on properly enacted rules. 
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The term charisma originally meant ‘the gift of grace,’ wrote Gerth and Mills 
in the introduction. According to Weber, charismatic leaders are seen by their followers as 
having some extraordinary power or quality that allows them to be dominant. The leader 
is blessed with God’s grace or, in other terms, is seen as a genius. Weber’s conception of 
the charismatic leader is “in continuity with the concept of ‘genius’ as it was applied 
since the Renaissance to artistic and intellectual leaders.”23 Because charisma overrules 
“all rational economic conduct,” charismatic authority is foreign to economic gains.24 
This authority, according to Weber, exists “specifically outside the realm of everyday 
routine and the profane sphere.”25
The most common means of domination in modern societies is the third type of 
authority, legal rational authority. In this instance, an individual who holds authority 
dominates using impersonal norms, not the residue of tradition but rationally constructed 
criteria. When legal rational authority is highly developed, it becomes a bureaucracy. The 
 The administrative staff of charismatic leaders is not 
chosen because of rational qualifications, social status, or family loyalty. They are 
recruited as followers. Loyalty precludes any set hierarchy or promotion. Regular salaries 
do not exist because pure charisma is alien to economic calculability.  
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staff of an organization operates continuously according to formulas that govern the 
conduct of their official business. This legal authority is based on rules and coercion 
within the organization. Those subject to legal rational authority owe no personal loyalty 
to a superior. They follow his or her commands solely within the restricted sphere of 
boundaries specified by rules within an organization. 
Bureaucracy has little to do with inefficiency. In fact, the opposite is true.  
 
The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization 
has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form 
of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism 
compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with 
non-mechanical modes of production.  
Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, 
discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of 
material and personal costs-there are raised to the optimum point in 
the strictly bureaucratic administration…26
 
 
The efficiency of a bureaucratic organization in performing a routine everyday task is the 
main reason for its spread in modern society. This efficiency is a natural result of 
rationalization. In addition, these qualities are exactly what capitalism needs to keep its 
system operating successfully. Weber understood rationalization as an unavoidable 
                                            






process of modernization which forces the entire society to become more bureaucratically 
organized. Bureaucratization “offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying 




Bureaucracy has a ‘rational’ character: rules, means, ends, and 
matter-of-factness dominate its bearing. Everywhere its origin and 
its diffusion have therefore had ‘revolutionary’ results, in a special 
sense, which has still to be discussed. This is the same influence 
which the advance of rationalism in general has had. The march of 
bureaucracy has destroyed structures of domination which had no 
rational character, in the special sense of the term.28
  
 
While bureaucratic authority is a permanent system of administration associated with the 
routine tasks of everyday life, charismatic authority is temporary and extraordinary. A 
charismatic individual, one whom followers believe to possess strikingly exceptional 
capacities, is thought to be of a supernatural kind. Extraordinary qualities should be 
constantly attributed to the person by others. Pure charisma does not require any 
legitimacy other than the exceptional qualities of the person in question.   
According to Weber, there have been two major revolutionary forces 
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throughout history. One is the general tendency of bureaucracy which destroys 
“structures of domination which had no rational character.” The other one is the 
emergence of charismatic movements which disrupt the established institutions, traditions 
and forms of rational management. Bureaucracy revolutionizes modern society externally 
because it creates the condition in which people are forced to live. Charisma, however, 
results in a revolution internally because it alters people’s perceptions of certain issues. 
History for Weber is an endless struggle between charisma and bureaucratic 
rationalization although there can be no clear explanation of why a charismatic figure 
emerges at a certain time.29
 
 In addition, charisma is not permanent and is inherently 
unstable. Weber writes:  
Every charisma is on the road from a turbulently emotional life that 
knows no economic rationality to a slow death by suffocation under 
the weight of material interests: every hour of its existence brings it 
nearer to this end.30
 
 
Charisma is therefore always under the threat of demise in modern society as a result of 
the surrounding material civilization. While the process of bureaucratization is constant 
                                            
29 Talcott Parsons, “Introduction,” in Max Weber, Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic 
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and permanent until it reaches the level of the “iron cage,” charisma appears abruptly and 
loses its force quickly.31 Facing its looming death, charisma tries to stop its fate by 
perpetuating its life through bureaucracy. Weber called this the “routinization of 
charisma.” The routinization of charisma occurs when people try to transform a gift of 
grace into a permanent possession of everyday life, in which process the charisma of an 
individual does not disappear. Rather it becomes objectified as a quality of the order 
developing from a charismatic origin, as the charisma of office or of a ruling house.32
It is undeniable that there many similarities between Hitchcock’s 1947 article, 
“The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the Architecture of Genius” and the theories of 
Max Weber, particularly the segment included in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 
in 1946. The similarities and differences between the two publications illustrate the 
impact of sociology on the conceptualization of corporate modernism and its problems. 
The first similarity is the separation between bureaucracy and genius. Although Weber 
proposed three types of authority, only two types were introduced in From Max Weber. 
Likewise, Hitchcock employed two types in order to explain two major types of 
architectural productions in the modern world. The second similarity is the use of the 
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terms genius and charisma. Weber employed the concept of charisma in a “completely 
value-neutral sense.”33
  
 He took the position of a social scientist. As described above, 
Hitchcock followed precisely the same direction. It is uncommon for an architectural 
historian to employ the terms bureaucracy and genius without a sense of value.  
Genius and the Mob   
Two years later Frank Lloyd Wright published Genius and the Mobocracy, a biography of 
Louis Sullivan combined with an autobiography of the author’s earlier years with 
Sullivan.34
Wright and Hitchcock had an intense and somewhat contentious professional 
and personal relationship. The historian and the architect began to acknowledge each 
 The book can be interpreted as a direct response to Hitchcock’s 1947 article. 
While Hitchcock saw the rise of large bureaucratic architecture firms as a necessary 
development of architectural production, Wright illuminated the importance of the genius 
and lamented over the pitiful situation that creative leaders had to encounter. He was 
condemning the modern bureaucratic firm, holding this kind of architecture to blame for 
a degraded twin in American modern society.  
                                            
33 Max Weber, From Max Weber, 245. 
 
34 Frank Lloyd Wright, Genius and Mobocracy (New York: Horizon Press, 1971), 166. Originally 






other from the late 1920s until the early 1930s.35 In 1942, Hitchcock published a book, 
In the Nature of Materials: The Buildings of Frank Lloyd Wright, 1887-1941. This 
biography of the architect began with the catalogue from the exhibition of Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s architecture at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1940, which 
Hitchcock called “the most important architectural exhibition” since the international 
exhibition of Modern Architecture of 1932.36 Hitchcock closely collaborated with Wright 
for both the exhibition and the book.37 He dedicated the book to Wesleyan University, 
which became known as the “first American institution to recognize the genius of Frank 
Lloyd Wright with academic honors.”38
                                            
35 Wright was well aware of Hitchcock’s work at least from the 1930s on. For the early relationship 
between Hitchcock and Wright, refer to Donald Leslie Johnson, Frank Lloyd Wright versus America: The 
1930s (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1990), 28-38. 
 However, relations between Hitchcock and 
Wright were not always congenial. In fact, the historian and the architect had a long 
history of hostility towards one another. This was in part due to the fact that Hitchcock 
held a radically different view on Wright’s role in modern architecture from that of the 
architect himself.  
 
36 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, “Frank Lloyd Wright at the Museum of Modern Art,” The Art Bulletin 23, 
No.1 (March 1941): 73.  
  
37 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, In the Nature of Materials: The Buildings of Frank Lloyd Wright, 1887-1941 
(New York: Da Capo, 1942), xxviii. Hitchcock wrote, “I have had throughout very complete cooperation 
from Wright and the members of the Taliesin Fellowship.”  
 






Hitchcock’s stance on Wright was made clear as early as 1932. Hitchcock 
introduced two fronts of modern architecture in the catalogue for the International Style 
exhibition: artistic and technical. In writing about Le Corbusier’s Villa Savoye at Poissy, 
Hitchcock hinted at how he would eventually evaluate modern architecture.  
 
It is inevitable in the discussion of such a house to emphasize the 
aesthetic side of modern architecture. But the adjustment of the plan 
and the adaption of the structure are no less masterly. It is moreover 
imbued with a personal spirit as Wright’s best work always has been. 
Much of modern building, particularly in the field of housing, must 
be impersonal to the extent of anonymity. But modern architecture 
has also a place for individuality and a genius which is primarily 
artistic.39
 
   
In this comment, Hitchcock illuminated his belief that modern architecture was technical 
as well as artistic at the same time. While Le Corbusier was believed to possess both 
attributes, Wright was understood mainly through artistic exploration.  
One could argue that Hitchcock had already been exposed to Weber’s theory. 
                                            
39 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, “Le Corbusier,” Alfred H. Barr and et al. Modern Architects (New York: 
Museum of Modern Art, 1932), 77. There has been confusion about names of the catalogue and the 
exhibition. The exhibition and catalogue had the same name, Modern Architecture – International 
Exhibition. This catalogue (Museum of Modern Art) written by Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Philip Johnson 
and Lewis Mumford was published with another title, Modern Architects (Museum of Modern Art and W.W. 
Norton). Hitchcock and Johnson published another book, The International Style: Architecture Since 1922 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1932). This book has been taken to be the catalogue of the Modern architecture 
exhibition. Terence Riley, The International Exhibition 15 and the Museum of Modern Art (New York: 






Regardless, there is no doubt that the historian characterized Wright as not entirely 
modern. He was pictured as a historical figure, losing his legitimacy in the modern world. 
Hitchcock made it clear that Wright’s role would be limited due to the emergence of a 
new modernity.   
 
But, now conditions are changed. No young architect anywhere 
grows up in quite the isolation of Wright’s youth. American 
architecture need not develop entirely in the footsteps of her great 
individual genius. A larger and a newer world calls. The day of the 
lone pioneer is past, the advance may be on a more general front at 
last. Throughout the world there are others beside Wright to lead the 
way toward the future.40
 
  
As a result of the new historical condition, “the day of the lone pioneer” was obsolete. A 
more general pattern of innovation and change would be advanced, not by a single 
individual, but by diverse groups. Hitchcock’s argument on who should lead modern 
architecture was known to the master. Wright expressed deep contempt for Hitchcock and 
his lack of understanding of architecture. The quote below shows the early relationship 
between the two before it was mollified by Hitchcock’s publication of In the Nature of 
Materials: The Buildings of Frank Lloyd Wright, 1887-1941. In a letter in 1937, Wright 
                                            






berated Hitchcock for his ignorance and arbitrariness: “Your knowledge is so superficial, 
related only to some predilection you have for certain effects which please you, which 
makes them right, and certain effects which displease you, which makes them wrong.” To 
Wright, Hitchcock appeared to be a young man who pursued fame with little knowledge 
of architecture. Wright asked about the real identity and intention of the historian.   
 
Did he happen or did he grow – what does he know? Is he the usual 
guesser writing to be noticed – right or wrong – or is he a sincere 
student of his subject prematurely sharing his personal and 
inquisitive impressions (in a man of your type they would be 
“convictions”) with all and sundry.  
I have been amazed at the continual effrontery of your dicta when I 
see so plainly the serene negation, and recognize the depths of 
ignorance beneath it – of all I have myself learned of architecture 
except certain effects proceeding from my own work which you 




Wright sarcastically suggested Hitchcock should become his apprentice at Taliesin for a 
year to develop a true understanding of architecture. Apparently, Hitchcock appeared to 
be an obstacle to creativity and organic architecture: “Our movement in the direction of 
                                            
41 Frank Lloyd Wright, Letter to Henry-Russell Hitchcock, “Correspondence, 1937,” Box 1, The Henry-
Russell Hitchcock Papers. The letter dated September 15th, 1937. In the same letter, Wright added that, “We 
have met, you and I, and I have recognized a certain dogmatic Presbyterian force of character and 
personality in you which might serve a good purpose if it went right and do harm if it went wrong.” In the 







an organic architecture has suffered a terrible set back [sic] from the exploitations of the 
left wing of which you are a camp follower.”42 Considering Wright believed his organic 
architecture was essential to building democracy and democratic freedom, Hitchcock was 
unmistakably understood as an opponent of American virtues.43
Wright differed from Hitchcock on many issues. Nevertheless, the architect did 
not question the legitimacy of the separation between genius and bureaucracy. On the 
contrary, he fully accepted the separation and positioned himself with Sullivan as a 
genius who suffered from the dictatorship of the mob.  
    
 
In what we call production and success there is no longer the spirit 
of youth because there is no firm platform nor any springboard at 
all for truly creative imagination. In this civilization, premature by 
way of science and sudden riches – probably proceeding from 




The genius was losing his or her leadership in a rationalized society. According to Weber, 
                                            
42 Ibid. 
    
43 Wright made many comments similar to the one regarding left wing European architects. One of them 
reads: “These Bauhaus architects ran from political totalitarianism in Germany to what is now made by 
specious promotion to seem their own totalitarianism in art here in America.” Frank Lloyd Wright, “Frank 
Lloyd Wright Speaks Up,” Architecture in America: A Battle of Styles, eds. William A. Coles and Henry 
Hope Reed, Jr. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1961), 351. The original article was published in 
House Beautiful, XCV (July, 1953).  
    






this occurrence was a natural process of rationalization, but Wright thought it was a 
deplorable degradation of the world. He contended that a genius is a “man who has an 
eye to see nature. A genius is a man with a heart to feel nature. And a genius is a man 
with a boldness to follow nature.” The genius is higher than an ordinary person as were 
Sullivan and Wright himself. It is no wonder that, with the material and technological 
development of American society, Wright protested what seemed to be the lack of 
leadership. He maintained that “we’re living in a field in a time when great advantages – 
magnificent advantages – all becoming disadvantages for the lack of the prophetic genius 
who can see in the nature of the thing, analyze it, and make it beneficial.”45
And yet, even arguing the importance of genius in the world where the mob 
controls everything, Wright too separated bureaucracy and genius in architecture. 
Hitchcock attempted to justify the emergence of a new method of architectural 
production; however, Wright did not see any good reason for the existence of the 
architecture of bureaucracy. To him, it was just the control of the mob without any cause 
or justice. It was a mindless revolt against leadership. Not surprisingly, especially with 
such an extreme contrast, Wright opposed the control of the mob and naturally proposed 
  
                                            
45 Frank Lloyd Wright, “Frank Lloyd Wright with the Student Architect of the University of California-
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As my work went on, gradually, I saw more clearly the spiritual 
implications of plasticity where space was a quality to be realized in 
building construction. I learned the stimulating values of its 
implication wherever the life of the free individual might be served 
by the building. Of course, such objective outward expression of 
subjective inner life can only survive in the freedom of genuine 
democracy; the highest form of aristocracy ever seen – that of the 




As if paraphrasing Weber, this aristocracy relies on an extraordinary individual or a 
charismatic leader with a higher spiritual mind.47
                                            
46 Wright, Genius and Mobocracy, 81. 
 The aristocrat does not know or need 
any legitimacy simply because his mission does not come from rational considerations. 
 
47 Thomas Jefferson had previously proposed the idea of natural aristocracy. He compared natural 
aristocracy to artificial aristocracy. There are clear similarities between Jefferson’s two aristocracies and 
Wright’s genius and mobocracy. Jefferson’s focus was not the lamentable situation of the leaders but the 
importance of not being dominated by the privileged without talent. “For I agree with you that there is a 
natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents. Formerly bodily powers gave 
place among the aristoi. But since the invention of gunpowder has armed the weak as well as the strong 
with missile death, bodily strength, like beauty, good humor, politeness and other accomplishments, has 
become but an auxiliary ground of distinction. There is also an artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and 
birth, without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the first class. The natural 
aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, and government of 
society. And indeed it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for the social state, and 
not to have provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage the concerns of the society. May we not even 
say that that form of government is the best which provides the most effectually for a pure selection of 
these natural aristoi into the offices of government? The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in 
government, and provision should be made to prevent it's ascendancy.” Thomas Jefferson, The Adams-
Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams, 







He is a genius with a “gift of grace,” who exists beyond the current status of the 
professional organization. It seems natural that Wright argued “professionalism is 
parasitic – a body of men unable to do more than band together to protect themselves.”48
Wright went beyond criticizing those professionals. He saw the very economic 
system the cause.  
 
To him, professional societies such as the American Institute of Architects were 
organizations of incapable people whose mission was to pursue their own secular goals. 
They refused to accept the leadership of the genius, pursuing only their monetary and 
political interests.  
 
Of course, this sinister economic “system” (ours) in which without 
foundation we have at last so completely invested our future – and 
that of the world at Bretton Woods – is better served that way. 
Mobocracy does thrive thus and the economic unit, the buyer, is 
already so far conditioned in the direction of quantity instead of 
quality that the merchant’s real profit lies in this oblique direction, 




With the money economy controlling all possible boundaries of life, there appeared little 
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room for genius. The victory of quantity over quality is another way of describing the 
situation of the genius against the mob.  
A half century of intellectuals had tried to make sense of this fundamental 
societal shift. In fact, this sentiment had been common amongst many intellectuals at the 
turn of the century. Georg Simmel, for example, wrote in “The Metropolis and Mental 
Life (1903)” that “they [things] all float with the same specific gravity in the constantly 
moving stream of money. They all rest on the same level and are distinguished only by 
their amounts.”50 However, Wright believed there was a chance of redemption. When 
arguing that “at least so long as we are not yet committed to the mobocrat’s idea of ‘the 
common man’ there is hope.”51
 
 Wright believed the last chance of redemption was in the 
hands of the genius. While Wright did not see anything beyond the mob in SOM, some 
historians found multiple meanings and contributions from the bureaucratic firm.     
 “The Experiment of S.O.M.” 
And so the incipient issue of the architecture of bureaucracy resurfaced about ten years 
after the publication of Hitchcock’s “The Architecture of Bureaucracy and the 
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Architecture of Genius.” At this moment, SOM would become the epitome of the new, 
more bureaucratic approach to architecture. In a special issue on the firm of Skidmore, 
Owings & Merrill, the architecture journal Bauen und Wohnen included Sigfried 
Giedion’s article entitled “The Experiment of S.O.M” (fig. 4.1). The firm that Hitchcock 
described in 1947 as a nascent example of the architecture of bureaucracy now appeared 
as one of the most important experiments of modern architecture.    
Early on in his article, Giedion wrote that great Chicago architects such as 
William Le Baron Jenney, Holabird and Roche, Burnham and Root, Adler and Sullivan 
“were not just impersonal titles of firms, but highly individual architects and 
engineers.”52
                                            
52 Sigfried Giedion, “The Experiment of S.O.M.” Bauen und Wohnen 12 (April 1957): 113. 
 Here, Giedion echoed Hitchcock’s dichotomy of organizations versus 
creative individuals. Whereas Hitchcock found the legitimacy of the architecture of 
bureaucracy in the historical demands of the post-Second World War reconstruction and 
in the complexity of architectural programs, Giedion turned to the end of the nineteenth 
century with its sudden increase of relatively large-scale architectural projects in New 
York and Chicago. Giedion maintained that “with the increasing complexities of the 
profession, large architecture factories began to crop up in New York, with hundreds of 







darkness of Wall Street.” The primary cause of corporatization of architectural firms in 
the end of the nineteenth century, argued Giedion, was “commercialism without 
conscience.”53
It is clear that Giedion understood Hitchcock’s distinction between the large 
architectural firm and the individual architect. When discussing large architectural firms 
after the Second World War, both Hitchcock and Giedion saw that the issue of style was 
obsolete. The main focus became whether a building was designed and constructed by a 
group or a creative individual; the key element to this focus was organization.  
 Architecture factories abused the architectural forms that had been 
collected and classified during the nineteenth-century. Creative individuals were crushed 
by large firms which were solely motivated by the commercialism of the period.  
However, Giedion did not portray SOM as one of the “architecture factories.” 
On the contrary, he praised the firm as the key to a new era of architecture. He called it an 
“experiment on a grand scale.” The challenge facing the firm, according to Giedion, was 
how to fulfill the potential of contemporary architecture without being swayed by the 
business interests of the client. Giedion admitted that it would be a tough task for the firm 
of nine hundred employees.54
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architecture by subdividing its personnel into small groups. In doing so, individual design 
and large-scale planning could coexist within the organization. The historian saw that 
“the potentialities of different individuals and regional characteristics are respected and 
immediately invisible in the result.”55 The organizational structure of SOM allowed an 
individual designer to better exert his or her potential in design (fig. 4.2). Working in this 
organizational structure, Walter Netsch, who was only about thirty-five years old, won 
the competition for the Air Force Academy project and completed the design of the 
general plan and individual buildings.56
It is also interesting that Giedion, who blamed “commercialism without 
conscience” for the emergence of the architecture factories, did not mention the corporate 
clients of post-war American capitalism as if the corporate client of the mid-twentieth 
century was more enlightened than those of the late nineteenth-century. Giedion 
accordingly sensed in the corporate firm a “healthy and alive atmosphere, which was “the 
result of the careful selection of the designers, some of which have been selected even as 
students from among the most talented in the architectural schools.” After observing a 
room in which young architects were discussing the design of the Inland Steel Company 
  
                                            









building, Giedion admitted that the atmosphere in the room recalled a description by 
Frank Lloyd Wright in Genius and the Mobocracy.57 Whereas Hitchcock distinguished 
two types of architectural practice, Giedion saw a more important role for an organization 
like SOM to play in contemporary architecture. “Can it forge ahead into the unexplored 
as did those of the previous generation – Le Corbusier, Gropius, Aalto, Mies?” he asked. 
After the great masters lost their leadership, the corporate architecture firm became a 
potential candidate for the leading role in architecture. The success of SOM’s experiment 
in balancing the requirements of the client and the fulfillment of contemporary 
architecture “depends on whether teamwork can supplant the force of individual genius. 
We are still far from the kind of teamwork that built Chartres Cathedral.”58 Giedion was 
aware of the intrinsic risk of the experiment. That risk is, put simply, how well such a 
large firm could hold business interests in the background so they did not interfere with 
architectural solutions. He added that this issue was not merely a question that concerned 
the experiment of SOM, but it was a “question that affects the fate of our whole 
period.”59
                                            
57 Ibid. 
 SOM could be successful if it restrained its monetary gains and pursued 










Was it possible for a bureaucratic organization like SOM to not give priority to 
its business interests? Giedion knew that the complex organizational structure of the firm 
was essential to its success in the post-war period. In the organization chart of SOM 
Chicago, for example, architectural design appears much less important than in a 
conventional architecture firm. How, then, could one possibly give priority to 
architectural solutions over business interests when they are in conflict with one another? 
In Giedion’s assessment, “the fate of our whole period” was doomed to fail.   
 
SOM, or Architecture of Organization   
Giedion recognized SOM as a new type of architectural organization that combined the 
creative forces of individual architects with the strength of a large-scale firm. This 
observation was foreseen by the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) when it invited the 
firm to exhibit its recent projects in 1950 (fig. 4.3). The bulletin for the exhibition 
reported that it was the first architecture show that did not focus on individual designers 
or collaborating partners. It was a firm “composed of a group of single designers working 
exclusively in the modern idiom, [that] produces imaginative, serviceable and 
sophisticated architecture.”60
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architecture that was creative, practical and technically advanced. The bulletin continues:  
 
The single designers who function within this organization have no 
fear of a loss of individuality. They are able to work within their 
corporate framework because they understand and employ the 
vocabulary and grammar which developed from the esthetic 
conceptions of the twenties. They work together animated by two 
disciplines which they all share – the discipline of modern 




The architects of the organization understood their new situation. Due to the size of 
projects and personnel involved, they could no longer work as individuals. Indeed, they 
were willing to work together collectively. They could communicate comfortably with 
one another by employing the same visual language. The museum recognized SOM as an 
excellent combination of modern architecture and American organizational methods.   
Giedion’s characterization of the young architects at the SOM Chicago office 
came from this exhibition at MoMA. This aspect of SOM indeed enabled the designers to 
contend with seasoned, well-established individual architects in the competitive yet 
dynamic market after the Second World War. Young designers seem to prefer to be part of 
an organization that had already achieved a complicated network among various experts 
                                            






and specialists related to the design and construction of large-scale projects.62
 
 They 
knew that by working together they could achieve much more. William Hartman, a 
partner at the SOM Chicago office, portrayed the process of corporatization of the firm.    
The more complex a project, the more varied skills have to be 
brought to bear. There was not the luxury of being in your own cell 
and doing a design alone. This led to what I believed should be the 
framework for a SOM… there is room for a firm like ours that 
would be an assembly of the finest talents in every discipline 
naturally, architectural design and all those skills which lead to 
architecture and design. But, coming right along in parallel, 
structural design and mechanical, electrical, and plumbing design 
coming right behind that and a part of it. And interiors. And because 
buildings fit in some kind of an environment setting, planning and 
landscape architecture, for sure. And we did resolve to establish that 
type of organization. With emphasis on quality of talents.63
 
  
SOM grew out of the increasing size and complexity of architectural and engineering 
projects. Hartmann suggested that it was necessary to create an organizational structure to 
manage such large-scale projects. Bringing in professionals with various backgrounds 
and incorporating them into parts of a large corporate structure was what made SOM 
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63 William Hartmann, Oral History of William Hartmann, Interviewed by Betty Blum (The Art Institute of 







successful. Moreover, SOM attempted to find energetic and capable young talents.  
Choosing modern design as the sole communicable language, SOM designers 
developed only modern style buildings. There was total agreement that their main 
concern was how to execute it effectively and affordably. They also had to cope with the 
change in the business of architecture from the simple design of buildings to more 
inclusive architecture-engineering projects. Organizing several hundred or sometimes a 
thousand employees in a efficient way was a new and different task. The lessons of 
American organizational methods were what led to SOM’s success in the discipline of 
modern architecture.   
The American Institute of Architects (AIA) New York Chapter recognized this 
ingenious combination of modern architecture and business techniques, awarding 
Skidmore the Medal of Honor in March 1949. By then, SOM had built the Great Lake 
Naval Training Center, the Sloan-Kettering Institute, the Bellevue-New York University 
Hospital Research Group, the Town of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Terrace Plaza 
Hotel in Cincinnati. Skidmore had also established one of the most successful 
architecture-engineering firms in the nation (fig. 4.4) (fig. 4.5) (fig. 4.6). But, the award 
was not given to Skidmore because of the quality of his work. As one of the founding 






and program. Skidmore proved how “to understand the practical problems of the client, 
to solve these problems in an economic and socially useful manner, and to produce from 
this distinguished architecture.”64
The combination of a modern architectural idiom and bureaucratic 
organizational techniques was deeply embedded in the birth and early development of 
SOM. When the brothers-in-law, Skidmore and Owings, set up their firm in 1936 in 
Chicago, the formation was very simple; there were two collaborating partners and 
several employees. However, it suddenly changed when the architect and engineer John 
O. Merrill was invited to be a partner in 1939. Although the name of the firm changed 
from Skidmore and Owings to Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Merrill remained a limited 
partner for the following ten years. In 1949, the firm gave up the dual partnership, 
accepting Merrill, William S. Brown, Gordon Bunshaft, Robert W. Cutler, and J. Walter 
Severinghaus as full partners. After that, the firm occasionally accepted full partners with 
unanimity. The modern partnership structure in the firm had finally come to fruition (fig. 
4.7) (fig. 4.8).  
  
This expansion of leadership was influenced by the founders’ desire to keep the 
firm intact and flexible when they retired. They considered the organization’s well-being 
                                            






much more important than themselves. Fortune magazine noted that the formula used to 
broaden the base of the original two-man partnership was a “variation of one widely used 
by law firms, but rare if not unique in architecture."65 Indeed, the leadership structure 
was initially drafted and continuously rewritten by Marshall Grosscup Sampsell, a lawyer 
who started working with the firm beginning in 1936. He was a partner of the Chicago 
law firm of Isham, Lincoln & Beale. Many early partners remembered him as one of the 
most important figures in the development of SOM (fig. 4.9).66 To Bunshaft, Sampsell 
was “the man who’s responsible for the creation of what the firm became.”67 Sampsell 
developed the basic structure of partners, associate partners, and participants in order to 
make the firm a continuously growing organization. Within this structure, young 
designers could progress up the ladder.68
Hartmann argued that there were three essential people who established the 
firm: Skidmore, Owings and Sampsell. He emphasized the importance of the lawyer 
 Sampsell based this concept on the structure of 
law firms he knew well.  
                                            
65 “The Architects from ‘Skid’s Row,’” Fortune, January 1958: 212.  
 
66 Box 21, The Nathaniel Alexander Owings Papers, Library of Congress. Sampsell wrote SOM’s early 
partnership agreements beginning 1939.  
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assuring that, “He was of great importance in how SOM was established. I’m sure it 
would have fallen apart if he hadn’t existed.”69
 
 As Bunshaft and Hartmann remember, 
Sampsell was much more than a lawyer for the firm. He introduced the system of 
partnership to the firm in 1936 and became the person in charge of maintenance of the 
rational bureaucratic structure for several decades. To some extent, he was much more 
important than any single partner, becoming the guiding light in all crucial decision-
making processes. Owings recorded this significance:        
Marshall Grosscup Sampsell folds his money flat with a silver clip, 
and all of the crisp bills held therein are new…  
Grosscup is orderly where I am not, calm where I am not, cautious 
where I am not. Something like a satellite moon to Saturn, he is 
essentially a part of SOM, yet detached. Shy, retiring, he has been 
our legal mind since 1936, serving as confidant and confessor.  
The overall partnership documents under which SOM operates were 
originally put together by Gross and are ever-changing, like the 
amorphous body of English law, which includes much that is not 
written down at all.70
 
 
Sampsell was both an outsider and an insider. He was a partner at a law firm and decided 
many critical decisions with partners. In fact, he guided the direction of the firm, 
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providing everyday legal and operational advice. Sampsell was the legal mind and at the 
same time a caring friend to most of SOM partners. He was the hidden anchor of the firm 
at least three decades starting in 1936. It was no wonder Hartmann brought up Sampsell 
first when arguing why the Chicago office was a kind of central office to SOM.71
As a large firm, SOM developed a system for employees designed to maintain 
long-term stability. A medical insurance program and a profit-sharing retirement fund 
were among the benefits that it offered employees. SOM was one of the first firms that 
introduced an inclusive medical insurance program. In 1953, SOM Newsletter reported 
the introduction of Group Insurance as an important part of the firm’s personnel policies. 
The medical insurance program was made possible through the Connecticut General 
Insurance Company and the New York Life Insurance Company. Over two hundred 
employees were eligible.
   
72
                                            
71 Hartmann, Oral History of William Hartmann, 164. 
 With the guidance of Sampsell, the partners decided to begin 
a ‘Profit-Sharing Retirement Fund’ in 1956. SOM is believed to be one of the first 
professional organizations to establish this type of fund. There were two hundred twenty-
two persons eligible that year. “By broadening the base of profit participation, the Fund is 
one more step in our goal of recognizing the part each person plays in contributing to the 
 







success of this firm.”73
When the AIA awarded its gold medal to Skidmore in 1957, the highest honor 
had previously been given to only fourteen American architects, among whom were 
Charles F. McKim, Paul P. Cret, Louis Sullivan, Eliel Saarinen, Frank Lloyd Wright and 
Bernard Maybeck. Skidmore was being recognized among the most prominent architects 
in the United States. However, his qualifications were vastly different from those of the 
previous recipients.   
  
 
Pioneering new paths in a profession depending hitherto largely 
upon individual service, you have built an organization with the 
name of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill in which you have united in 
singleness of purpose the manifold skills, imagination and judgment 
fitted to serve, with marked distinction, a wider more diverse 
clientele than had been thought possible. In giving architectural 
service to the needs of an era of vast building activity, you and your 




Skidmore’s main contribution was the success of the organization, not his artistic 
achievements. He received this honor a year after his official retirement. As a fatherly 
figure to the firm, Skidmore’s reception of the award was met with great celebration. If 
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there were any charismatic figures in the firm, he must have been the one. However, upon 
his retirement, the firm began relying entirely on the bureaucratic system. The last trace 
of a charismatic figure was finally gone and with it the traditional architect-artist.   
 
Three Keys to Success 
Skidmore once described the critical factor in the firm’s design process. He did not 
discuss any design language or skill, but instead mentioned the importance of 
understanding the requirements of a project.  
 
Our philosophy of design is simple. Before pencil is put to paper, 
the owner’s requirements are closely examined and thought out into 
a written program of requirements. Thus when the physical design 
is begun there is a clear basis of procedure. Incidentally, this is good 
for the designers’ morale and for the job costs. This approach not 
only clarifies procedures in the office but gives the client 
confidence that his program is clearly visualized in principle75
 
.  
SOM developed an efficient system of design production with a four step process: 
analyzing the client’s needs, translating programming into preliminary drawings, 
producing working drawings, and supervising construction. By establishing this sequence 
                                            








of activities, SOM created a more efficient and systematic process.  
In order to maintain cohesiveness of taste and technique, a coordinating partner 
was selected annually. This person’s role was to coordinate administration and production 
as well as design. He also held monthly meetings among the four offices and assigned 
partners and staff members to specific phases of each project.76 In addition, there was a 
partner in charge of design; the role went to Bunshaft in the New York office. Taking on 
different roles in an office, the firm helped partners better understand the general process 
of design. The purpose of this development was to achieve greater efficiency and 
flexibility. Buildings not designed by an individual architect were clearly recognized as 
different from those created by a group following a process referred to as “design by 
conference.” In addition, SOM gave its clients an active role in design process. By 
incorporating the client as a part of the design process, the firm could prevent a lack of 
practical considerations and arbitrariness from the design process. Bunshaft contended 
that, “some good architecture is occurring because it isn’t the whim of one genius – it’s 
an intelligent effort of a client and a designer.”77
In 1962, when a German publisher, Verlag Gerd Hatje, released a book on 
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SOM’s work, Architecture of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 1950-1962, for which 
Hitchcock wrote the introduction. It was a brief yet revealing analysis of how SOM 
became representative of corporate architectural firms. For the book project and in 
particular for the introduction, Hitchcock initially approached Walther A. Netsch, one of 
the partners in the Chicago office. Realizing that he could not work with Hitchcock, 
Netsch asked Hitchcock to request the help of Robert W. Cutler, a partner in the New 
York office.78 Hitchcock toured SOM’s buildings with the help of the firm and worked 
closely with the partners on the preparation of the book.79
 
 In addition, Hitchcock shared 
the introduction developed with Mr. Cutler with all other partners and was willing to 
incorporate their opinions. For example, Hitchcock wrote in a letter to Mr. Cutler on 
November 5, 1961:  
I have also made a revision of the original introduction, omitting or 
modifying most of the recurrent references to Mies which I agree 
were excessive. I very much hope that you, your partners, and Hatje 
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Hitchcock Papers.    
 
79 SOM arranged and paid for Hitchcock’s travels to the firm’s buildings. “Correspondence-SOM,” Box 9, 
10 and 11. Visual materials were prepared by the firm and presented to Hitchcock and to the publisher of 
the book, Gerd Hatje. Robert W. Cutler was deeply involved in deciding the general organization and 
content of the book. In a letter sent to Hitchcock, Cutler reported the progress of the business related to the 
publication of the book. “We have been working night and day going through it carefully to make sure that 
all errors are corrected… I sincerely hope that this [editing] meets with your approval.” Cutler’s letter to 







will wish to include the longer historical introduction as well as the 
shorter new forward. I rather gathered that Bill Hartman and Walter 
Netsche [sic] thought the introduction worth including.80
 
 
Hitchcock sought reviews of his introduction from SOM partners. His description of the 
firm’s history came from the firm itself. After the publication of the book, Cutler wrote to 
Hitchcock that, “I reread your Introduction with a great sense of satisfaction and respect 
for your able documentation of a difficult subject. My sincere congratulations for a job 
particularly well done.”81
                                            
80 Hitchcock, Letter to Cutler on November 5, “Correspondence” Box 10, The Henry-Russell Hitchcock 
Papers.    
 Hitchcock’s introduction and the rest of the book was the result 
of close collaboration between Hitchcock, Hatje, and the firm. SOM coordinated much of 
the publication process with Hatje. Hitchcock probed into the early development and 
future potential of the firm and delivered an eloquent, aesthetic review of the buildings. 
Considering Hitchcock’s close collaboration with SOM, his characterizations of the firm 
in the introduction must have been reflective of the partners’ idea of the firm. Based on 
Hitchcock’s introduction and other writings such as “The Architects from ‘Skid’s Row,’” 
SOM’s three unique approaches to architectural practice can be identified: its focus on 
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decentralization, the package deal, and a lasting relationship with its clientele.82
Though common today, decentralization was an innovation that SOM 
originally introduced. A year after its establishment in 1936, SOM split their offices, 
situating them in the Midwest and on the East Coast. While Owings remained in Chicago 
running the original office, Skidmore set up the firm’s second office in New York. Before 
long, in addition to the original Chicago (1936) and New York (1936) offices, Oak Ridge 
(1942-46), San Francisco (1946) and Portland (1951) offices were established.
  
83 By the 
mid-1950s, SOM had four offices (Chicago, New York, San Francisco, and Portland) 
located across the country working on projects across the United States and in many other 
parts of the world. The four offices divided the world map into four areas. The New York 
office undertook projects on the East Coast, in Europe, in the Middle East, and in South 
America; the San Francisco office served the West Coast and the South and Far East. The 
Portland office, which was developed in association with Pietro Belluschi, operated in the 
Pacific Northwest and Alaska. The Chicago office, the administrative center of the firm, 
covered projects in all other sections of the country.84
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Decentralization was a challenge because of the great distance between offices 
and the unique identity of each. The benefit, however, far outweighed the challenges. In 
January 1958, Fortune magazine reported that “its four regional offices operate 
autonomously in their own areas but join forces as needed for national and international 
accounts, so there is considerable switching of specialists, facilities, and jobs among 
offices.” The synergy of the diverse resources of the firm was compared to a “collective 
blaze.”85 Furthermore, the partners realized that the difficulty of decentralization would 
be lightened externally by emerging communication and transportation technology and 
internally by the standardization of design. Alan Colquhoun recently noted that 
standardization could be epitomized as “maximum flexibility of spatial planning; 
maximum standardization of part and modular coordination of all systems; air 
conditioning; fully glazed and sealed curtain walls; all-day artificial lighting; and deep 
office space.”86
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 SOM understood that unifying the firm’s production and standardizing 
its organization in a manner that paralleled the standardization of the building industry 
were crucial steps for a successful architecture business. For this reason, every project 
was organized in the same manner in all of SOM’s regional offices. According to 
 







Hitchcock, this new decentralized organization was a feature of an “enlightened” 
architectural bureaucracy.87
Another characteristic of SOM’s business practice was the ‘package deal’ 
which included master-planning, engineering, and construction supervision as well as 
architectural design. This comprehensive design package became possible when 
Skidmore and Owings invited architect-engineer John O. Merrill to join them in 1939 as 
a limited partner. Merrill made a big contribution to the young architecture firm, enabling 
it to provide their clients with more services. Those who would be accepted as general 
partners were chosen for the same purpose: Severinghaus became a housing expert; 
Cutler became a hospital expert; Brown became a prefabricated housing specialist; and 




Up until the War most U.S. architects were trained to work only on 
small plots, they left the problem of coping with large scale projects 
– industrial plants, and airfields – to the engineers. We felt that if the 
architect wasn’t to limit himself to domestic housing he would have 
to win back his role as the creator and coordinator of big projects.88
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The central issue in this statement is how to attract large-scale projects which were then 
being awarded primarily to engineers. The market and the corporate clients were the 
driving force of the organizational changes. After the introduction of the package deal, 
SOM could attract much larger, more diverse projects from both industry and government. 
In terms of organizational structure, each of the four SOM offices was quite 
similar. Under a managing partner, there were five functioning groups. They were 
composed of A. Project Management, B. Design (Programming, Design of Project, 
Interiors, and Material and Methods Research), C. Construction (Contracts, Construction 
Supervision, and Field Offices), and D. Administration (Office Procedures, Records, 
Accounting, and Non-technical Personnel). These different groups reflect the nature of 
SOM’s transformation of traditional architectural practice. New architectural practice 
required construction-related personnel and a large group of administrative staff. Design 
required the collaboration of various specialists.   
 
The design team has assigned to it engineering specialties, either 
from within S.O.M. or from consultants, to assist in solution of 
technical phases of projects. An intimate relationship is encouraged 
among the designer, the electrical engineer, structural engineer, and 
other specialists in such fields as acoustics, landscaping, process 
engineering, plumbing or air conditioning.  






technical elements, coordinated and integrated in the overall concept 
by the architect. S.O.M. recognizes the increasingly vital role that 
the mechanical systems will play in modern buildings in the United 
States and undertakes research into new developments in this area as 
well as structures, materials, and construction techniques.89
  
  
Hartmann’s description of architectural practice at SOM reveals its complexity and 
collective nature, emphasizing the significance of rational communication among people 
involved in the project. The growing importance of the mechanical systems of a building 
required an entirely different approach to architecture. Hitchcock fully understood the 
loss of individuality within such organization but remained unconcerned. On the contrary, 
worried about the “hysterical vitality” of the architect-designer, he emphasized SOM’s 
unsurpassed achievements made possible by the “relative looseness of the SOM 
organization, the importance of designers in its hierarchy, and the inclusion of engineers” 
in the firm.90
SOM’s third business strategy was to foster a lasting connection with its clients 
which significantly helped expand the firm during and after the Second World War. As 
Business Week pointed out, SOM’s relationship with its clients was far different from, for 
  
                                            
89 William E. Hartmann, “S.O.M. Organization,” 116. 
 







instance, Frank Lloyd Wright’s patron-architect relationship. “SOM gives its clients an 
active part in the planning, rather than regarding a contract as a commission to go all-out 
on its own ideas of design.”91 Clients took so active a role in the design process that 
Bunshaft portrayed their every jot as a “marriage of owner and architect.”92 Recalling the 
Chicago Fair, Owings testified that Skidmore exerted extreme power over design related 
issues at the fair and had connections with the leaders of the business world of the day.93
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Skidmore and Owings began to develop long-lasting connections with the leaders of large 
businesses and governments at the Chicago fair of 1933. These connections accelerated 
during the New York World’s Fair of 1939. Throughout the 1930s, the world’s fairs were 
the primary venues for industrial designers, architects, government and corporate leaders 
to escape momentarily from the gloomy shadow of the Depression and promise 
Americans a brighter future. The importance of these fairs to the formative years of SOM 
should not be underestimated. Skidmore and Owings met their strongest supporters and 
friends there. Among these people were Howard Heinz, president of the Heinz Company, 
John Kimberly of Kimberly-Clark and Robert Moses; these relationships continued for a 
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long period of time.   
The significant government connection began with the Oak Ridge project. 
Through the project, SOM gained experience in housing; commercial, religious, and 
municipal buildings; and roads and utility systems.94 Working confidentially with regard 
to the project’s purpose, SOM assembled an on-site practice involving 450 architects, 
engineers, and surveyors. Hitchcock stated that the experience in Oak Ridge “laid the 
organizational foundation for undertaking the extensive and varied private commissions 
that came their way in increasing numbers when the building curve turned upward two or 
three years after the War was over.”95
Despite Hitchcock’s support of the “Architecture of Bureaucracy” in 1947, 
harsh criticisms of corporate architecture have appeared over the last several decades. 
Rather than helping us understand, the dichotomy that the historian described has been 
 The strong relationships with business and 
governmental clients helped the firm become active not only in Chicago, New York City, 
San Francisco, and Portland but also in such far-flung places as Venezuela, the 
Philippines, Morocco, and Okinawa.  
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used to demonize bureaucratic architecture. The critics and architects who criticized 
corporate architecture employ it as a negative contrast to the so-called creative 
architecture which can supposedly only be achieved at the hands of a creative individual 
or a genius. It seems that Wright’s argument, genius versus the mob, became the new 
guideline for understanding corporate architecture. The possibility of teamwork produced 
by creative individuals working together, as in Giedion’s earlier description of SOM, no 
longer seems to be legitimate.  
What, then, was Hitchcock as an architectural historian really trying to achieve 
throughout this whole process? He played a dual role in the game of writing the history 
and theory of modern architecture: identifying and permanently isolating the architecture 
of bureaucracy and maintaining formalism. Two types of modern architecture, corporate 
and creative, were identified. While the former is now understood as something 
contaminated by corporate culture, the latter is accepted as something architects should 
pursue. In some sense, Hitchcock’s architecture of bureaucracy was a shrewd way of 
manipulating history. As a result, our contemporaries find, in Hitchcock’s concept, a 
justification for returning to the mystical world of forms.  
SOM’s bureaucratization of architecture was the result of a broader and 






essence of modernization. Yet, in architectural history, bureaucracy was positioned as the 
artificial interloper, the enemy of “true” or “creative” architecture. It should not be 
forgotten that two constructed modernisms, corporate and true, came to define each other 
within a confined sphere of operation. Figures like Hitchcock, Wright, and Giedion 
helped contribute to this framework. However, to grasp the multi-layered social, 
technological and cultural meanings of a building, it is urgent to overcome the concept of 
architecture as an art.  
Upon Skidmore’s retirement in 1956, SOM’s lawyer, Marshall G. Sampsell, 
sent a letter to the State of California to inquire if SOM could keep Skidmore’s name in 
its title. The state answered that if Skidmore was paid as a consultant, SOM’s use of the 
name Skidmore, Owings & Merrill in California was “not in violation of Business & 
Professional Code §5580.”96
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Chicago Law office Isham, Lincoln & Beale on October 6, 1962, “Skidmore, Owings & Merrill: Firm 
Name in California,” Box 8, The Nathaniel Alexander Owings Papers, Library of Congress.  
 Similar to Skidmore, when Merrill retired in 1958 and 
became a consultant, there was little concern about keeping the name intact. However, 
Skidmore’s death in 1962 created confusion and concern among the firm’s partners. 
Firmly believing that the name Skidmore, Owings & Merrill could not be altered, the 








Upon facing the same problem in Oregon, Sampsell pursued a permanent 
solution. In order to prevent any future issues, he proposed “to attempt to have the statute 
amended” at the state legislature session “so as to permit indefinite use of the name of 
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill in Oregon.”
  
98 He also advised the partners to consider an 
alternative solution in case his attempt did not work out: the appointment of Louis 
Skidmore, Jr. as a member of the Oregon partnership.99 All of the partners and Sampsell 
believed that keeping the name of “Skidmore, Owings & Merrill” was essential for the 
firm. They understood that the firm had moved beyond individual partners and that the 
partners belong to the firm, not the other way around.100
                                            
97 Ibid.   
 However, these legal troubles 
showed the partners that their architectural practice was at risk of doing illegal business 
 
98 Marshall Grosscup Sampsell of Isham, Lincoln & Beale, “Memorandum: Reuse of the Name Skidmore, 
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under a “fictitious name.”101 This predicament originated from the growing rift between 
SOM’s organization and the old, legal definition of architectural practice. Architectural 
practices were traditionally based on an individual or a group of individuals. But, SOM 
pursued a collective identity, or “Modern ‘Gothic Builders Guild.’”102
 
 It was not an 
architectural firm based on the creativity of a single individual. The firm outgrew the 
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102 When describing the beginning of SOM with the idea of a “Modern Gothic Builders Guild’ as an ideal, 
Owings emphasized having a social impact and believed creating a large organization would accomplish 
this goal. “We were after leverage to influence social and environmental conditions. To work, we must have 
volume. An efficient set of master builders can eat up a lot of work. Volume meant power.” Owings, The 


















By the 1950s, SOM was known as one of the greatest modern architecture-engineering 
practices in the world. The transformation from a small design office in the 1930s to one 
of the largest firms in the world by the 1950s was achieved not just during, but in 
response to two cataclysmic events – the Great Depression and World War II – that had 
resounding effects on the United States and the entire world. SOM greatly advanced by 
taking up pressing social issues related to architecture, including the commercialization 
and industrialization of buildings, that grew out of these historical events. In doing so, the 
firm reformulated the concept of architecture and its practice.  
The organizational and architectural vision of the two founding partners, Louis 
Skidmore and Nathaniel A. Owings, served as a guide for the firm during three pivotal 
decades. The two led the firm, from its inception to its expansion, through its younger 
partners and a growing staff of professionals. Central to their vision was the question of 
how to better serve humanity. They believed they could accomplish this by modernizing 
architecture and utilizing new sociological and scientific research about people and their 





1957, Skidmore spoke about what architecture and its practice should mean in modern 
society. He argued that,   
 
the scope of the profession of architecture was far greater than had 
been realized, and we have never found its boundaries closing in. 
Because architecture, even it its narrowest limits, is the housing of 
all human activities, it immediately involves all the approaches to, 
and the extensions of those activities. The boundaries recede at once, 
and the architect discovers the need of knowing all that he can learn 
of human living, of its needs, its conduct, and its ends.  
The architect must, therefore, constantly, grow in stature, and his 
younger partners with him; and the collaboration must have a life 
beyond and greater than his own, that its services may be 
continuous to the continuity that it serves.1
 
  
Skidmore suggested that architecture should be practiced with the goal of 
accommodating all human activities. Therefore, the practice of architecture required an 
understanding of the psychological, physiological and economic needs of human beings. 
The architect must be able to understand architecture as more than just a formal issue 
since it is a combination of technical innovation and professional expertise on people and 
their environments. While some architects and critics focused on the stylistic aspects of 
modernism, Skidmore in particular proclaimed a more comprehensive approach to 
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architecture. A large, well-managed firm, equipped with various professionals and 
specialties, was the necessary evolution of an architectural practice in order to meet the 
demands of complex modern projects.  
For Skidmore and Owings, modern architecture was closely related to society’s 
modernization and to aspects of everyday life. The potential of modern industrial 
technology, including new materials and advances in building technology, was critical. 
Skidmore and Owings understood modern architecture in a much broader sense than its 
formal aspects. They saw it as an expression of a new condition of life: technological, 
artistic and rational. A rational understanding of human beings, scientific organization of 
interior space and an innovative construction technology were important components. 
Modern architecture was an effort to elevate the built environment with the help of 
science and technology.  
Skidmore and Owings were not unique in these aspirations. The catalogue, 
What Is Modern Architecture?, published by the Museum of the Modern Art as the first 
publication of the Introductory Series to the Modern Arts in 1942, defined the modern 
architect as a scientist, a psychologist, and an artist.2
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 As a scientist, the modern architect 





psychologist, the modern architect must have “the human insight necessary to construct 
an architectural environment which will be psychologically pleasing to his clients.” And 
finally, as an artist, the architect must give a building beauty.3 While the catalogue 
identified formal characteristics such as the open plan, continuous, flowing space and a 
lack of ornament as characteristics of a modern aesthetic, it also paid special attention to 
practical issues such as new construction methods and new materials. Modern architects 
were concerned with such utilitarian subjects as program, equipment, and site. 
Furthermore, large-scale planning was necessary to be modern.4
The experiences which occurred during the Great Depression and the Second 
World War helped SOM construct its organizational structure and identity. During these 
transformative times, Skidmore and Owings expanded and realized the opportunity for a 
new type of architectural practice. In tackling two of the greatest and most urgent crises 
 While to some people 
modern architecture was almost entirely an issue of certain formal expressions, the 
catalogue suggested modern architecture should be a combination of new scientific, 
psychological, practical and artistic considerations. This comprehensive and rational 
definition of the modern architect represents Skidmore and Owings’s vision for their firm.      
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of modern society, the firm grew to become a model of team-based architectural practice. 
Skidmore and Owings advanced architectural practice by recognizing the transformations 
that were taking place in the profession and society as a whole. After the Second World 
War, the firm expanded its efforts to provide the entire globe with comprehensive 
services, dividing the world map into several areas based on the locations of their local 
offices. In doing so, SOM was able to further develop their sophisticated yet abstract 
designs, technical expertise in building technology, and an advanced bureaucratic 
organization. The scope of SOM’s expertise allowed the firm to undertake architectural 
and engineering projects that other architectural firms could not have handled.  
Skidmore and Owings learned critical lessons during the first ten years of the 
firm’s existence even though their commissions were relatively small. They foresaw how 
the profession of architecture could take on a more important role in a society that had 
suffered from the economic cataclysm of the Depression and the turmoil of the war. In 
the 1930s, Skidmore and Owings realized the importance of interacting with the public. 
During such a serious financial crisis, architects attempted to attract the public’s attention, 
transforming buildings into easily recognizable products. While working at the two World 
Fairs of the 1930s held in Chicago and New York, Skidmore and Owings were exposed to 





Recognizing that the success of industrial design products was based on the designers’ 
ability to visualize and embody the taste of the public, they attempted to internalize a 
more legible approach to architectural design.   
During the same period, Skidmore and Owings developed an acute awareness 
of the relationship between design and people’s reactions that could be called a 
psychological approach to design. Spatial or formal design was understood as an 
instrument to create certain psychological effects. When SOM applied their findings to 
commercial and exhibition spaces, these effects replaced the authority of forms. At the 
Chicago Exhibition of 1933, Skidmore developed the idea of an architecture of 
performance that was impermanent and functioned only for a brief period of time. 
Skidmore’s idea was architecture with a short life-span, but of heightened psychological 
impact. During this period, the firm’s main projects were relatively small stores, 
exhibitions and houses for various companies; yet this idea of architectural performance 
would be essential to the firm’s design of its much larger post-WWII office buildings.  
Even as they were working on their first architectural commissions for the 
Chicago fair, Skidmore and Owings realized the importance of housing in a depressed 
market with a high rate of homelessness. This initial interest was furthered by the firm’s 





Pierce Foundation to develop low-cost prefabricated prototypes and gain expertise on 
human behaviors in domestic environments. All elements, including human beings and 
their usual activities in the domestic environment, were measured and calculated to 
facilitate standardization and mass-production of a building prototype and its component 
parts. The research completed with the Pierce Foundation helped SOM advance its 
technical expertise on building technology, including curtain wall construction.     
The turning point in SOM’s formation as a large, architecture-engineering firm 
was the Manhattan Project during World War II. Between 1943 and 1945, the firm 
dramatically increased its personnel and developed a truly rational and modern 
organizational structure, which was required by the commission’s complexity, autonomy 
and extreme time pressures. Through the Oak Ridge commission, SOM grew from a 
small design firm to a large-scale, multi-service firm, mass-producing a vast number and 
various types of prefabricated buildings for the military. While working on the design of 
the city and numerous buildings necessary to normal life, SOM developed the capacity to 
deal with large-scale projects and integrated competent personnel from various fields. 
The two partners understood that a complex organization was essential to tackling these 






With the end of WWII, public knowledge of Oak Ridge gave SOM an enviable 
international reputation as a leader in modern architecture. SOM’s war-time experience 
helped the firm develop the expertise to construct some of the finest post-Second War 
office buildings. SOM designed headquarters for some of the largest corporations and 
financial institutions in the country. In addition, SOM built some of the largest and most 
complex military projects. The firm developed a distinctive design system based on 
teamwork. Rather than relying on a single genius, SOM’s design process was based on 
the expertise of a group of professionals. The vast size as well as the technical and spatial 
complexity of large modern architectural and engineering projects required the firm to 
develop a new approach. A building was understood as a combination of different parts as 
each professional was a member of a larger group.  
An interesting comparison exists between a prefabricated building and a large 
corporate organization in terms of the relationship between a unit and the whole. Whether 
it is a prefabricated building or an organization, it is critical to maintain flexibility in 
order to enhance the various combinations of the parts. In the building, parts should be 
easy to assemble and dissemble. SOM similarly developed an idea of flexibility in its 
design process. Each unit was standardized to be repeated as much as was necessary. 





In doing so, it was possible for SOM to produce exemplary glass and steel office 
buildings which were technically advanced and spatially flexible. However, it would be 
unfortunate if SOM in the 1950s was remembered only as a producer of office buildings. 
While designing and constructing some of the best modern buildings in the United States 
based on newly developed ideas of flexibility and abstraction, SOM continued building 
large-scale developments in foreign countries. As in Oak Ridge, the firm designed and 
built towns, airports and military complexes around the world. In the 1950s, the volume 
of SOM’s design and construction activities was not reduced but rather dramatically 
increased.    
Learning critical lessons at each stage of their projects, the firm developed new, 
more efficient office and construction systems. These systems continuously focused on 
process rather than final form. Even during the war, SOM was no longer an architecture 
firm in a traditional sense. Fortune magazine called SOM’s design and planning process 
“an exercise in group intelligence.”5
                                            
5 “The Architects from ‘Skid’s Row,’” Fortune (January 1958): 212. 
 More and more, the firm’s design and construction 
were highly systematized. Its team-oriented design processes allowed many different 
professionals to collaborate. Mechanical, structural, spatial, formal, and economic 





incorporated into the general design process. For this firm, design was the coordination of 
all of these considerations.  
This study of the formative decades of SOM reveals several pervasive shifts in 
modern American architecture in the 1930s and 1940s. SOM’s history discloses shifts in 
design considerations from the internal logic of forms to people and their reactions, that 
is, a psychological approach to design, from small-scale architecture-design to large-scale 
multi-service operation and from atelier to corporation. SOM built its success perfecting 
these transitions. The changes were in part the result of pervasive historical shifts that 
resulted from the transformation of American society in the 1930s and 1940s. Skidmore 
and Owings were able to combine many existing ideas about modern architecture, 
including certain formal characteristics, economy of construction and teamwork, with the 
new demands of an evolving society. In so doing, they created a new kind of firm. 
Modern spatial organization based on scientific research on human activities, innovative 
construction technology, rational architectural practice, and modern forms were all an 
important part of modern architecture for SOM.  
At a time when many architects, both modern and historicist, were still 
preoccupied with style and form, the new firm of SOM self-consciously attempted to 





based on the scientific analysis of human activities and the categorical classification of 
different types of programs and sizes of spaces, together with systematic design processes 
and industrialized construction. SOM’s contribution to the development of modern 
American architecture in the middle of the twentieth century is found not only in the 
technical perfection and the innovative spatial, structural, and formal characteristics of its 
individual buildings, but also in the first broad, pragmatic rethinking of the very nature of 
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